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TRADE POLICY AND THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS
Don Greenfield, Director, International Trade Relations Division,
Department of Trade and Industry
Agricultural economists will be well versed in the problems which
the current round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations is aiming to
overcome. Protection for domestic producers, subsidisation of
agricultural production and export subsidies are issues which New
Zealand has been confronting domestically and internationally for
many years. Measures like these taken by Governments on the
domestic front to support their agricultural sectors almost
invariably impact on international trade. The domestic problems
are thus exported to the rest of the world and are left to trade
negotiators to try and resolve.
Occasions such as this provide a valuable opportunity for an
exchange of ideas between trade negotiators and economists. We
depend very heavily on your analysis of the problems and on the
figures you produce to show how serious they are: my intention
today is to provide some insight for you into the negotiating
process in the GATT - which must often appear to be a very arcane
world. In particular I would like to give you some idea of the
dynamics of the current negotiations.
First however, I should sketch the background to the agricultural
negotiations in the Uruguay Round, and bring you up to date on
what has occurred so far.
You will have heard many times the claim that this is the first
time agriculture has been included in a GATT Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. While this is not strictly correct - a
negotiating group on commodities was formed in the last round, and
agricultural products have been subject to tariff reductions in
previous rounds - it is certainly true that this is the first time
that GATT member countries have grasped the nettle of
comprehensive liberalisation of agricultural trade.
Until now agriculture has been shielded from proper scrutiny and
the rigours of GATT rules on subsidies and access by virtue of its
so called "special characteristics". This was largely due to the
emotional hangover of wartime food shortages and other disasters.
It is not only generals who have a weakness .for always fighting
the last war. Thus, while trade in goods has shown a healthy
trend towards lower tariffs and fewer access barriers, trade in
agricultural products has become more and more distorted by
measures designed to protect food security and agricultural
producers in general.
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However, thanks to a convergence of interests in the period
leading up to the launch of the Uruguay Round, a new dynamic
emerged in favour of agricultural trade reform. Politicians were
shaken by the paradox of enormous food surpluses piling up in the
developed countries while millions in the Third World were
starving. At the same time the tremendous burden of propping up
uneconomic production was beginning to place intolerable strain on
EC and US budgets.
A strong mandate on agriculture was therefore given by Ministers
of GATT member countries when they met to launch the round at
Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986. They identified an
urgent need to bring more discipline and predictability to world
agricultural trade by correcting and preventing restrictions and
distortions. The aim of the negotiations was to achieve greater
liberalisation of trade in agriculture and to bring all measures
affecting import access and export competition under strengthened
GATT rules.
In concrete terms, this comes down to ultimately creating a
climate in which the EC, US and Japan will not be able to maintain
restrictions on our dairy exports, in which Thailand will be able
to export rice freely to the US, and in which the US will not cut
Australia out of its traditional grain export markets by competing
with subsidised exports.
However, the task of negotiators in the GATT is to devise a
framework of principles and rules which can be applied on a global
basis to meet these ends. We can all take satisfaction from
bilateral deals such as the recent agreement on beef imports
between Japan and the US (and Australia). The importance of the
multilateral negotiations in the GATT is that all member
countries' policies will be covered by the resulting agreements.
Since the round was launched, all the major parties in the
agriculture negotiations have submitted proposals advocating
methods for achieving agricultural trade reform. The US has
targeted the elimination of all trade distorting subsidies and
protectionist measures by the year 2000 - the "zero option". At
the other end of the spectrum, the EC's proposal is for short term
emergency measures to be taken on "problem" commodities (cereals,
sugar, dairy and meat) and for a multilateral agreement on future
supply and price management. The Japanese proposal shows little
movement on access barriers and subsidies, and amounts to a
prescription for continued control/management of world
agricultural trade.
Between these widely diver~ent approaches sits the Cairns Group of
Free Traders in Agriculture. Our proposal envisages three phases:
- for the long term, the development of a framework of rules
and disciplines to govern international trade in
agriculture;
- in the medium term, commitment by all countries to the
progressive elimination of trade distorting domestic
agricultural policies and trade practices;
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- in the next two years a programme of early relief measures,
including reductions in support for agriculture, access
improvements, and agreement on the management of surpluses.
The details of this proposal still remain to be ag~eed on by
Cairns Group members. The next step is to put our elaborated
proposal back into the ring and attempt to engage the US and the
EC in constructive negotiation - an objective which is made more
difficult by the political tension and numerous trade disputes
between the two.
Having given you an idea of the framework within which we are
negotiating I would like to turn to the dynamics of the
negotiating process.
As you will have gathered from the different approaches in the US
and EC proposals, a choice exists between grasping short term
measurable gains and aiming for longer term benefits, more soundly
based and more extensive but less tangible. It is necessary
therefore to adapt ones tactics to the result desired from the
negotiations. The position New Zealand has adopted is that we
have far more to gain from a long term comprehensive reform of the
world agricultural trading system than from short term concessions
which would go only part of the way to meeting our immediate
needs, let alone our longer term needs.
However this position poses some difficulty in terms of sustaining
political commitment. Obviously the anticipated goodies I
mentioned earlier will take many years to arrive. The temptation
is very strong to settle for half a loaf on ~he grounds that the
offer may not be there much longer.
I believe that we must avoid this trap at all costs. The struggle
for agricultural trade reform has been going on for so many years
already that it would be a terrible waste of investment to abandon
the long terms objectives now. Genuinely radical change is
needed. Politicians recognised this in their focus on agriculture
at Punta del Este, and it is essential that the momentum be
sustained.
In addition to political imperatives¥ another factor bringing its
own dYnamic to bear on trade negotiations is the climate.
Agricultural production and hence trade move in cycles determined
largely by climatic conditions. Frost in Brazil causes a rise in
international coffee prices, while a drought in the US brings a
temporary glut of beef onto the market and then leads to a
shortage, causing prices to rise.
When commodity markets are perceived to be on the rise,
governments feel much less pressure to confront the underlying
problems. This is one of the immediate dangers facing the
negotiations. The current rise in world grain prices, for example,
will appear to bring to producers many of the benefits which
governments have been predicting would accrue from trade
liberalisation. Obviously though, the root cause of the problems
which have racked the grain market over the last few years,
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principally surplus production and subsidised exports, has not yet
been eliminated.
These tensions are very much in evidence during the negotiations.
For example, at the meeting of Cairns Group ministers in
Bariloche, Argentina, in February, the Australians expressed some
fear that if we didn't go for some'short term gain now, we might
gain nothing at all. There was also a widespread feeling that the
period until the American elections in November presents a window
of opportunity which should be exploited while it is still there.
These factors reinforce the importance of developing a longer term
strategy which is based, not on short term gains, but on tackling
the fundamental problems affecting agricultural trade. The current
Cairns Group proposal is structured along the lines New Zealand
wants from this point of view. We will be pushing hard to maintain
this line against the considerable pressure in favour of settling
for immediate but lesser gains.
An important part of the Cairns Group's proposal is the use of an
aggregate measure to gauge the level of protection and budgetary
support in different countries' agricultural sectors. The device
advocated is the PSE (producer subsidy equivalent), which
represents the paYment that would have to be made to compensate
farmers for the loss of income resulting from the removal of a
given set of agricultural policy measures. It thus goes to the
heart of the domestic policies which are responsible for the
agricultural crisis. '
The PSE concept has recently been picked up by the OECD which has
calculated PSEs for a number of products in a number of countries
over the last 15 years. However the origin of the PSE goes back to
the "Standard Method" developed by a GATT committee in 1960,
following a call for a study on methods for measuring levels of
protection. The aim way back then was to effect a gradual
moderation of the level of agricultural protection.
The intrusion of a useful technical device such as the PSE into
the world of trade negotiations does however pose some
difficulties. Negotiations become much more complicated when
countries have to decide exactly what percentage reduction in PSE
there should be in anyone year, and for what products. There is
certainly some truth in the KISS (Keep IT Simple Stupid)
principle. When the agreement of 96 countries is required, there
are definite advantages in keeping the proposal simple.
These difficulties have led some countries such as Canada to
suggest that the PSE should be used to measure current support
levels, and then t~own away. Indeed, Japan has not accepted the
use of the PSE at all, claiming that it does not export
agricultural products (but ignoring the fact that its domestic
market is a significant component of the global market). New
Zealand's position is that once PSEs have been used to calculate
the aggregate measure of support, countries should commit
themselves to cutting the aggregate measure support levels by
certain percentages, by means of adjustments to domestic policies.
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It is the poligy changes that countries would be bound to
implement, not the exact PSE reduction.
The principal dynamic at play in the negotiations over the next
six months will be the imminence of the Mid-term Review of the
Uruguay Round to be held in Montreal in December. The issue is how
to maximise the advantages of this occasion, when the participants
will clearly want to show some results for the last two years of
negotiations, without succumbing to the temptation to announce
premature short term gains. The location of the MTR is
particularly significant for the agriculture negotiations, as
Canada has been perhaps the Cairns Group member to experience the
most political difficulty in accepting mandatory cuts in
agricultural support.
However, it is important to remember that the Group Negotiating on
Agriculture is not the only sphere of activity for New Zealand in
the Uruguay Round. There are in fact 15 different negotiating
groups, and New Zealand is putting considerable effort into the
negotiations on subsidies and tariffs. It is possible that these
groups may achieve as much for agricultural trade as will the
specific agriculture negotiations.
Trade negotiations, as you will have seen, take place on
constantly shifting sands, swept along by currents of different
kinds. It is essential to have the compass fixed on the direction
you want to head in, but at the same time to stay attuned to wind
shifts which mayor may not play to your advantage. So far New
Zealand has kept on a steady course towards comprehensive long
term agricultural trade reform. It is too early to predict the
final outcome, but I hope you will have a better appreciation now
of the environment in which the negotiations are taking place.
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ON THE MEANING AND MEASUREMENT OF
AGRICULTURAL TRADE DISTORTIONS
Donald MacLar-en*
School o~ Agr-icultur-e and For-estr-y,
Univer-sity o~ Melbour-ne, Victor-ia 3052, Austr-alia
SUMMARY
The pr-oposals for- agr-icultur-al policy r-e~or-m which wer-e
submitted to the GATT as par-t o~ the Ur-uguay Round ar-e
yeviewed as is Pr-oducer- Subsidy Equivalent which was
suggested as a measur-ing and monitor-ing device. The
paper- ar-gues that this measur-e is wr-ongly ~ocussed since
it is dir-ected towar-ds the income tr-ansfer-s o~
agr-icultur-al policies r-ather- than their- tr-ade e~~ects.
The meaning of the term tr-ade distor-tion is explor-ed in
a var-iety o~ models and it is concluded that mor-e
attention should be paid in the negotiations to the
tr-ade impact o~ specific policies.
Key Wor-ds: tr-ade, agr-icultur-al, GATT, distor-tions
INTRODUCTION
The gener-al objectives for- the agr-icultur-al
negotiations which ar-e par-t o~ the Ur-uguay Round in the
Gener-al Agr-eement on Tar-iffs and Tr-ade (GATT) wer-e set
out in the Minister-ial Statement o~ September- 1986. In
essence the Contr-acting Par-ties agr-eed, for- the ~ir-st
time in a multilater-al tr-ade negotiation, that mor-e
discipline and pr-edictability wer-e r-equir-ed in
agr-icultur-al tr-ade in or-der- to r-educe uncer-tainties,
imbalances and instabilities in wor-Id mar-kets. These
aims wer-e to be achieved by br-inging under- mor-e
e~fective GATT r-ules, measur-es which a~fect impor-t
mar-ket access and expor-t competitiveness , speci~ically,
" ... impr-oving the competitive envir-onment by incr-easing
discipline on the use o~ all dir-ect and indir-ect
subsidies and other- measur-es a~fecting dir-ectly or-
indir-ectly agr-icultur-al tr-ade ... II (Miller-, 1986, p 113).
As par-t o~ the initial phase o~ the negotiations
pr-oposals wer-e submitted to GATT ~r-om six countr-ies or-
countr-y gr-oupings, namely, the Cair-ns Gr-oup, the United
States, the Eur-opean Community (EC), Japan, the Nor-dic
countr-ies and Canada (ABARE, 1988).
The aims o~ this paper- ar-e: ~ir-st, to r-eview the
main themes o~ these pr-oposals ~or- r-e~or-m (Section 1);
second, to descr-ibe the quantitative measur-es which have
been pr-oposed to analyse and to monitor- gover-nment
* With the usual caveat I am gr-ateful to Alan Lloyd and
Bill Malcolm ~or- helpful comments.
6
support to agriculture (Section 2); and third, to
determine what the trade negotiations +or agriculture
should be about in addition to those aims outlined
above, eg the interpretation 0+ term "trade distortions"
and importance 0+ identi+ying the trade impact 0+
speci+ic policy instruments (Section 3). The +inal
Section contains some conclusions.
1. REVIEW OF PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Four common themes run through the six sets 0+
proposals submitted to GATT. First, there should be a
reduction in the use 0+ traditional price policy
instruments; this reduction being directed both at
improving import market access and at eliminating the
use 0+ export subsidies, although on this latter aspect,
the EC may object. Second, there is acceptance 0+ the
need to "de-couple" +arm income support +rom production
levels: a proposal which acknowledges the political
desire +or governments to continue to in+luence the
levels and distribution 0+ +arm incomes. In Hathaway's
view "wel+are issues and public expenditure issues at-e a
proper subject +or domestic politics, but bringing them
into trade discussions would overload the system" (p
125). Third, a time horizon 0+ around ten years is
required to make the necessary longer term adjustment.
And +ourth, there is general recognition 0+ the need to
en+orce existing GATT rules. However, there the +ragile
commonality 0+ interest seems to end.
There are at least +our important matters on which
there is no unanimity. First, whether or not there is a
need to implement any policy changes in stages: the US
is anxious to reach agreement on commitments to begin
the long-run process immediately, whereas the other sets
0+ proposals contain the idea 0+ an immediate +reeze or
standstill and then a reduction in support. Second,
there is disagreement on whether or not there should be
some quantitative indicator used to re+lect the existing
values 0+ income support +or +armers, and which could
therea+ter be used to monitor progress in reductions of
that support: The US strongly +avours this approach,
whereas Japan believes that such a measure is not
necessary. This proposal is similar in some respects to
the montant de soutien concept put +orward by the EC
during the Kennedy Round negotiations 0+ 1964-67 and
which was to have been used as a measure 0+ internal
market support and +or monitoring adherence to any
agreed levels 0+ support. Third, whilst the Cairns
Group and the United States have a stated liberal
agricultural trade regime as the long-run goal, the EC
probably does not. For the latter, international market
sharing arrangements and the retention of export
subsidies as an integral part 0+ the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) are deemed to be important. And +ourth,
the Nordic countries and Japan regard the onus 0+
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short-run adjustments in policy to lie with those
countries currently using export sUbsidies, e.g. the US
and the EC, rather than with the countries using import
impediments to trade.
The implicit economic model underpinning these sets
0+ proposals seems to di++er, ranging +rom an acceptance
0+ +ree trade as the proper goal to one 0+ managed
agricultural tt-ade. "The simplest and most
intellectually satis+ying approach would be to get an
agreement whereby all countries would agree to phase out
all +orms 0+ import controls and all subsidies -
domestic and export - which a++ect international tt-ade"
(Hathaway, p 140). This is, 0+ course, essentially the
position taken by the US proposal. However, it will be
suggested below (Section 3) that this view is not
without its theoretical shortcomings as a basis +or
addressing current concerns about protectionism.
2. PROPOSED QUANTITATIVE MEASURES
The United States has proposed that Producer
Subsidy Equivalents (PSEs) should be the quantitative
indicator used to monitor progress towards the phasing
out 0+ all assistance to agriculture with +ew
exceptions, e.g. de-coupled income support. PSEs were
used by the OECD (1987) to measure support levels during
the period 1979-81, work which was updated by the USDA
(1987) using data +or 1982-84. According to Tangermann
et al "The concept 0+ producer subsidy equivalent is
straight+orward. It is the subsidy that would be
necessary to replace the array 0+ actual +arm policies
emp loyed ina part i cu 1ar country in or der to 1eave +at-m
income unchanged ... The main purpose 0+ the measurement
is to aggregate, in a manageable way, a wide range of
price and non-price policies whose e++ects are not
otherwise comparable" (p 266). With the emphasis on
+arm income, the implication is that both revenue and
cost e++ects should be considered. The authors
acknowledge that in the context of trade negotiations
some policy instruments would be ignored, ie those
instruments with only negligible e++ects on trade.
With such flexibility possible in the definition 0+
PSEs, it is necessary to know what de+initions were used
in published values in order to interpret them properly.
It appears that the OECD used the +ollowing de+inition
(OECD, pp 104-105).
Total PSE = Q(P o - Pw ) + 0 - L + B,
where Q:
Po:
Pw :
0:
L:
8:
level 0+ production,
domestic producer price,
re+erence price,
direct payments,
producer levies and +ees, and
other budget payments, direct or implicit.
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From such a de~inition o~ PSE it is clear that the
measure is static, that it re~ers only to the revenue
side o~ the ~arm income calculation and there~ore
ignores the conceptual and empirical issue o~ costs o~
production, that it does not distinguish between direct
trade instruments and others, nor does it distinguish
instruments that induce supply response ~rom others.
Moreover, inherent in this definition are the
following conceptual and empirical issues which generate
problems for measurement and for interpretation of the
numbers: exchange rate variations over time, extent of
the policies included, stage in the marketing chain at
which prices are identified, quantitative restrictions,
stock holding policies, concessional trade, fluctuations
in world prices, supply control policies, and the large
country case. All of these are discussed in some detail
in DECO (1987, Annex II, pp 99-124) while the last is
analysed below (Section 3).
It has been argued by Rausser and Wright (1987)
that the DECO and USDA calculations should have
separated those policies which induce supply ef~ects
from others that do not (p 38). To remedy this
perceived de~iciency they proposed a modified measure
that they called Producer Incentive Equivalent (PIE), a
measure which would include only output-inducing
policies. To some extent this new measure is not
required, given the flexibility in definition suggested
by Tangermann et ala However, it does serve the useful
purposes o~ focussing on the subset o~ policies which
provide output-increasing incentives to farmers, and
alerting the user to check on which policies belong to
this subset.
However, a more important criticism must be
levelled at the focus on PSE or PIE as a quantitative
indicator for the trade negotiations. They are intended
as a measure of income support or income trans~er and
they do not measure comprehensively the trade distorting
effects of the inc I uded po Ii cy instruments. "The
negotiations are not addressing how much income is
transferred to the farm sector in individual countries
[they] will attempt to devise rules that will remove
or reduce adverse effects on trade of government
measures designed to trans~er income to ~armers"
(Hathaway 1987, p 138). The trade distorting effects,
which should be the subject of the negotiations, depend
upon the supply, demand and trade ef~ects. It is to
these aspects that the paper now turns.
3. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The aim of this section is to consider various
theoretical interpretations of the term "trade
distortion". First, the deterministic, partial
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equilibrium model ~or a single, small country is used.
Second, within this same ~ramework price uncertainty is
introduced in order to explore the implications +or
trade distortions 0+ a de-coupled income support
measure. And third, the outcome ~or the
gains-~rom-trade theorem are summarised in order to
indicate how di~~icult it is to place any precise
meaning on the term "trade distortion" once one o~ the
principal assumptions o~ the model is relaxed.
Clearly, to describe the present state o~
agricultural trade as distorted, suggests a norm or base
set o~ trade ~lows which would di~~er ~rom those
currently observed and which would be in accord with
some theoretical ideal, eg ~ree trade. Corden (1984>
has de~ined "~ree trade" in such a way that it can be
separated ~rom domestic "laissez-~aire". "Free trade
is de~ined here as the absence o~ all trade taxes,
subsidies and regulations, but still allowing non-trade
interventions - e.g. taxes and subsidies on particular
~orms o~ domestic production or consumption which may
still incidentally a~+ect trade. Thus the case +or ~ree
trade and the case ~or laissez-~aire are divorced"
(p 87, original italics). Thus governments can support
~arm incomes but only through direct domestic
instruments i~ they are to ~ollow a ~ree trade policy.
Hence there appears to be theoretical support ~or the
position adopted by the US and the Cairns Group.
However, this distinction between ~ree trade and
laissez-~aire begs two questions as ~ar as agricultural
trade policy is concerned: ~irst, will de-coupled income
supports still a~~ect trade through domestic supply
response; and second, is ~ree trade the optimal global
economic policy against which to measure trade
distortions?
3.1 Trade Distortions
8e~ore addressing these questions it is necessary
to establish meanings ~or the term "trade distot-tion"
and to assess the extent to which the PSE measure is an
appropriate conceptual indicator. In a deterministic,
partial equilibrium model, which is the one in which PSE
was developed, the meaning o~ the term "trade
distortion" can be shown easily. Such an analysis also
makes clear the importance o~ the particular policy
instrument used ~or ~arm income support. It is not the
intention to present a typology o~ such instruments but
only to illustrate, perhaps, the rather obvious point
that PSEs do not address the essential issue o~ the
trade negotiations, namely, the trade impact o~ ~arm
support measures.
Single Product
Assume that the ~ree trade equilibrium price is p~
with production at q~, consumption at c~ and imports at
m~ , where 0 is the domestic demand ~unction, S the
domestic supply ~unction and ED the import demand
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~unction (Figu~e 1). The impo~t impediment is assumed
to be one which a~~ects both p~oduce~ and consume~
p~ices, e.g. a ta~i~~, th~eshold p~ice o~ impo~t quota
but not a gua~anteed p~ice/de~iciency payment. Then the
~ate o~ p~otection is (Pt - Pw)/Pw, the p~otective
e~~ect is (q~ - qw)/qw (Co~den (1971), p 21), the income
t~ans~e~ is the a~ea s, and the t~ade disto~tion is the
~eduction o~ impo~ts, namely,
Figu~e 1
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Hence, the size o~ the t~ade disto~tion clea~ly depends
upon both the domestic supply and demand ~esponses, the
given policy inst~ument, and the given di~~e~ence
between domestic and wo~ld p~ices measu~ed in domestic
cu~~ency. In othe~ wo~ds the ~ate o~ p~otection does not
t~anslate uniquely into a pa~ticula~ size o~ t~ade
disto~tion. Mo~eove~, the PSE measu~es only the income
t~ans~e~ and the~e is no way to ~elate that a~ea to the
t~ade disto~tion without speci~ying the type o~ policies
included in the measu~e and the pa~amete~s o~ the
domestic demand and supply ~unctions.
The la~ge count~y case is even mo~e indete~minate
in the sense o~ t~ying to ~elate PSEs to the t~ade
disto~tion (Figu~e 2). Assume that the ~~ee t~ade p~ice
is Pw with domestic p~oduction at qw, impo~ts at mw and
domestic consumption at c w, whe~e 0 is the domestic
demand function, S is the domestic supply ~unction, ES
is the impo~t supply ~unction and ED is the impo~t
demand ~unction. If a ta~i~~ is levied, how a~e the
va~ious p~otection e~~ects to be de~ined? The ~ate o~
p~otection can now be de~ined in two di~~e~ent ways
(Co~den (1971) p 22): as the dive~gence between the
~o~eign and domestic supply p~ices, i.e. (p~-
p~)/p~; o~ as the p~opo~tional inc~ease in the ~inal
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domestic pl""ice, Le. (Pi:. - P ... )/P .... The tl""ade e-f-fect is
the same undel"" eithel"" de-finition since impol""ts -fall -fl""om
m"", to mi:,. Howevel"", there are two values o-f the income
trans-fer e-f-fects corresponding to the two di-f-fel""ent
de-finitions o-f I""ate o-f protection, namely, (s + s')
-for the -fil""st de-finition and s -for the second. The GECD
(1987) study usep the actual prices obsel""ved -fOI"" the
base period and, thel""e-fol""e, employed the -fil""st
de-finition -fOI"" the good reason that data did not exist
-for the second. Hence, the income tl""ans-fel"" e-f-fected by
the policy can be measul""ed as a PSE calculation with, in
principle, two di-f-fel""ent values but neithel"" tl""anslates
uniquely into a tl""ade distol""tion because the tl""ade
e-f-fect depends now not only on the domestic elasticities
but also on the elasticity o-f the impol""t supply
-function.
Figure 2
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Multi-product
In the single-product, pal""tial equilibrium model
the direction o-f change in the import impediment and the
direction o-f change in import volume al""e unambiguously
opposite. However, in a multi-product environment this
need not be true. Paarlberg and Thompson (1980) showed
that in a two-country, two-product, partial equilibrium
model the size o-f the cl""oss-pl""ice e-f-fects were cl""ucial
in determining the dil""ection o-f change in the import
volume o-f both goods. "When these are relatively large,
the single-product model's estimates o-f the magnitudes
o-f imports -from tari-f-f will be inaccurate at best and
may err in predicting the direction o-f the e-f-fects"
(p 31). Consequently, it is not possible to predict, a
priori, the direction o-f the trade distortion which
arises -from the imposition o-f a single tari-f-f in one o-f
the countries. How much more di-f-ficult it would be in a
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multi-country, multi-product environment is obvious.
The same authors showed that in a 2x2x2 general
equilibrium model a priori indeterminancy also occurs.
However, it occurs, now because o~ real income e~~ects
rather than substitution e~~ects.
3.2 De-coupled Income Supports and Trade Distortions
In the theory o~ the deterministic, single product
~irm ~ixed costs are irrelevant to output decisions in
the short run. There~ore, an income supplement made
available to producers through a policy o~ de-coupled
income support would not generate any response in supply
compared with the situation o~ no such policy.
Starting, then, ~rom a given policy intervention and
trade position, removal o~ the price policy and the
substitution o~ de-coupled income support would lead to
only one source o~ supply response, namely, a reduction
in output to the ~ree trade position, the direct income
support having no production e~~ect. Hence, in this
model de-coupled income support would give rise to no
trade distortions, at least on the production side,
because there is no supply response and any changes in
the level o~ that support would not alter the level o~
imports, ceterus paribus. There~ore, Carden's separation
o~ trade policy ~rom domestic policy appears use~ul in
this model.
However, the ~easibility o~ non-trade distorting,
de-coupled income support is open to doubt once product
price uncertainty and risk aversion are introduced. It
can be shown that the supply response to a ~ixed income
payment may be negative, zero or positive, depending
upon the particular model used (Table 1). Only in the
second case can it be concluded that trade e+~ects will
be zero, ~or only in this case does the individual
+irm's short-run supply ~unction remain unchanged.
Table 1 Direction o~ Change in
Increases Certainty Roy
in
Short-run Optimal
Model
Telser Kataoki
a b
Output
Sandmo
Income payment o o + o +
Notes: The models re~erred to which allow ~or
uncertainty are the sa~ety-~irst models due to
Roy, Telser and Kataoki, and the maximum expected
utility model o~ Sandmo. Re~erences to these
models are given in the source paper.
a: probability constraint not binding
b: probability constraint binding
-Q a le~tward shi~t o~ the short-run supply
~unction
0: no shi~t
+. a rightward shi~t.
Source: MacLaren, 0 (1983).
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The~e~o~e, these ~esults demonst~ate that, in
gene~al, it may not be possible to int~oduce ~easible
domestic policies o~ the type being p~oposed (Section 2
above) which avoid having di~ect o~ indi~ect t~ade
e~~ects. Consequently, the meaning o~ "t~ade
disto~tion" again becomes unclea~.
3.3 Gene~al Eguilib~ium and T~ade Disto~tions
The essential message o~ the gains-~~om-t~ade
p~oposition is that "given ce~tain assumptions, not only
is ~~ee t~ade Pa~eto-supe~io~ to auta~ky but it is also
Pa~eto-e~~icient, being 'supe~io~ to va~ious deg~ees o~
t~ade ~est~iction" (Co~den, 1984, p 69). Co~den went on
to note the key assumptions which we~e made in de~iving
this ~esult, namely, " ... absence o~ inc~easing ~etu~ns
... , no disto~ting domestic taxes, no externalities, the
~easibility o~ lump-sum t~ans~e~s, and ~lexible ~acto~
p~ices that ensure ~ull employment o~ all ~actors"
(p 72).
However, recent work in the pu~e theory o~
inte~national trade has relaxed one othe~ assumption,
namely, that the model is dete~ministic. Unce~tainty
has been introduced th~ough either endowments, p~ices o~
technology, and the outcomes can be divided into results
which address the normative issues o~ t~ade, eg the
gains ~~om trade, and those which a~e conce~ned with
compa~ative advantage and othe~ positive issues.
Supe~imposed on this dichotomy is the p~esence o~
absence o~ a complete set o~ risk ma~kets. Since the
~eality o~ ag~icultural t~ade suggests that there is not
such a set o~ ma~kets, the ~ollowing ~esults assume
incomplete risk ma~kets. This lite~ature contains
several un~amilia~ conclusions. The ~ollowing are some
examples which have been de~ived +~om speci~ic
assumptions: a) ~ree trade is Pa~eto-dominated by
autarchy; b) starting ~~om a position o~ ~ree trade,
some rest~iction is Pareto-imp~oving; c) starting ~~om
a position o~ autarchy, some trade is Pareto-imp~oving;
and d) sel~ su~~iciency is an optimal policy. Pome~y
(1984), having ~eviewed much o~ this literature, wrote
"Where power~ul results would be most welcome, e.g. on
the desirability o~ ~ree trade, the~e appears no
justi~ication ~o~ an unambiguous conclusion" (p 461).
In one sense this conclusion is a set-back because
it may make i~relevant the policy prescriptions o~
dete~ministic general equilibrium analysis: in another
sense it is help~ul because political realities in
agricultural matters are such that governments want to
~etain the additional deg~ee o~ ~~eedom in policy choice
which a ban on trade policies would deny them. Pomery's
conclusion leads to the additional conclusion that i~
gene~al, a priori t~ade policy p~esc~iptions cannot be
obtained ~rom theo~y, then the concept o~ "t~ade
disto~tion" cannot be de~ined a priori and hence cannot
be measu~ed without precise speci~ication and estimation
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o~ the theoretical model. However, in the presence o~
uncertainty and in the absence o~ complete risk markets,
the Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) theorem ~ails to hold (Grinols,
1985, p 253) and, consequently, it is not obvious what
model should be estimated. There~ore, using the notion
o~ comparative advantage in the H-O sense, as a basis
~or de~ining "trade distortion", is also rather limited.
3.5 Other Aspects o~ Uncertainty and Trade
There is one ~urther aspect o~ international trade
and uncertainty .which should be discussed, albeit very
brie~ly. It is well known that protectionism causes
international markets to shrink and to become more
volatile in prices. But there is an additional
uncertainty present which is not easily modelled even
under subjective risk, namely, the periodic and
unpredictable use o~ export subsidies in selected
markets which disrupts the normal commercial exports o~
third countries. Australia, ~or example, is not alone
in having complained to GATT on a number o~ occasions
about EC exports made possible only by export
restitutions. The timing o~ the restitutions, the
volume o~ exports to which they are applied, the
destinations to which they apply, and the size o~ the
unit value o~ the subsidy, stem ~rom decisions made by
the various management committees that are part o~ the
CAP and these are based largely on political and
~inancial considerations. This makes them very hard to
predict. Hence, they are disruptive and, in a dynamic
sense, probably lead to more damage ~or third country
exporters than any single period loss of exports and
wel~are e~~ects would suggest.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The basic aims ~or the agricultural trade component
o~ the GATT negotiations are essentially to impart order
in an increasingly chaotic set o~ international
agricultural commodity markets. Six sets of country or
country-group proposals were presented to GATT by the
summer of 1987 and they display certain common areas of
agreement but other important areas o~ inconsistency and
potential con~lict. The main thrust is towards more
ef~ective discipline within GATT rules but there is
disagreement about the appropriate strategies to help
~orce moves towards ~reer, i~ not free, trade. The
monitoring o~ progress is regarded as important by most
o~ the proposals and ~or that purpose a measure called
Producer Subsidy Equivalents (PSEs) has been put
+orward. It is a partial equilibrium measure o~ the
income support provided to the agricultural sector
through various government policies.
This paper has suggested that the proper focus o~
the negotiations should be the trade distortions induced
by the wide range of policy interventions and not the
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amount o~ income t~ans~e~ per se. It has been st~essed
that the concept o~ t~ade disto~tion, while
st~aight~o~wa~d in a single, small count~y,
single-p~oduct, pa~tial equilib~ium model, becomes
increasingly elusive in mo~e complicated and ~ealistic
settings. It has been argued that PSE measu~es income
t~ans~ers ~~om which it is not possible to deduce
anything about t~ade distortions, even in the simplest
model, in the absence o~ in~o~mation about domestic
supply and demand own- and cross-price elasticities, the
particula~ policies used and the "size" o~ the count~y.
While computable gene~al equilib~ium models may playa
part in p~oviding estimates o~ t~ade disto~tions, it is
open to doubt whether, in a wo~ld in which unce~tainty
is prevalent, they a~e su~~iciently well-~ounded in
theo~y, since it is known that the H-O model o~
compa~ative advantage b~eaks down unde~ unce~tainty with
incomplete ~isk ma~kets.
Finally, the main th~ust o~ this pape~ has bee~ to
suggest that the measu~ement o~ the la~gely i~~elevant
should be replaced with an inc~eased emphasis on
~e~ocussing the t~ade negotiations towa~ds the way in
which both domestic and t~ade inst~uments a~~ect
inte~national trade. This would help di~ect discussions
away the amount o~ ag~icultu~al income supppo~t, which
is an inte~nal matte~, and towa~ds the dynamic economic
e~~ects o~ t~ade dis~uptions.
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GAlT MULTIlATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND FOREST PRODUCTS TRADE
1. J. Bourke and D. Wije-wardana
Ministry of Forestry
SUMMARY
The major increase in New Zealand's wood supply in the late 1990s and early 2000s means larger
volumes of processed and unprocessed products will need to be exported. There will need to be further
development of existing markets and the development of new markets. This paper addresses the extent
to which trade barriers influence trade in forest products. which are of greatest significance to New
Zealand and what changes are desirable.
It concludes that the benefits of GATT to New Zealand forest products trade depend largely on the
manner in which the negotiations are approached. their success in addressing non-tariff barriers. and
in particular the extent to which barriers in the developing countries can be reduced.
Key Words: Forest products trade. GAIT. trade negotiations.
THE GAIT NEGOTIATIONS
Background:
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) is the multilateral treaty that provides a global
system of rights and obligations governing international trade voluntarily accepted by its members. The
principal purpose of GAIT is to foster fair and free trade among its members on the basis of
reciprocity and non-discrimination. It provides a forum for review of trading arrangements and
practices to ensure they conform to the principles of the Agreement. It also provides for arbitration
and adjudication of trade disputes as well as for surveillance of international trade. •
There are 96 signatories to the Agreement with a number of others adhering to the GAIT rules. Most
of the others also benefit from the most-favoured rule of the Agreement. China is currently in the
process of becoming a member while the USSR is believed to be considering it.
The GAIT came into being in 1948. Since then there have been 7 rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations. The first six of ~hese. ending with the Kennedy Round in 1967. concentrated almost
exclusively on reducing tariffs. The seventh - the Tokyo Round. which lasted for six years from 1973
to 1979. was the first comprehensive attempt to deal with both tariff and non-tariff restrictions. It
developed a series of codes of conduct dealing with a variety of non tariff measures such as subsidies.
contervailing duties. technical barriers. import licensing. anti-dumping. government procurement and
customs valuation. Graph 1 shows the global tariff reductions achieved for industrial products during
recent negotiating rounds.
These achievements are significant: but a major disappointment for New Zealand was that so far
agricultural protection and access had not been addressed. Among other things natural resource based
products. including forest products as distinct from agricultural products. were also not dealt with
adequately.
By the early 1980s it was evident that further multilateral negotiations were necessary. Thus in 1986
the Uruguay Round commenced. The coverage of this Round is wide. Three categories of
negotiations cover: unfinished business (agriculture. natural resources etc). stand still and roll back. an
new issues (services etc).
Paper presented at the 1988 Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural Economics Society -
New Zealand Branch. Blenheim 8.9 July 1988.
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New Zealand is playing an active role in the negotiations. An advisory committee of sector groups
affected by these trade issues is providing a channel of consultation between the industry and officials.
In the past negotiations forestry products had not been considered separately but had been handled as
part of the general tariff negotiations. The first comprehensive attempt to deal with the restrictions
affecting forestry was made at the 1982 GATT ministerial meeting. However. a series of negotiations
that began in 1984 ended without much success largely because of the inability to agree on the
coverage. eg whether processed products such as newsprint should be included.
In the Uruguay Round forest products would be covered under three negotiating groups: tariffs. non-
tariff measures and natural resource based products.
TRADE BARRIERS FACING FOREST PRODUcrS
Tariffs
Like most exports forest products face protectionist pressures. Countries use a wide array of measures
to provide this protection. from well-known and easily recognised barriers such as tariffs. to less
obvious and more difficult to identify non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The latter include a variety of
measures ranging from quantitative restrictions such as quotas or licensing systems. to health and safety
regulations.
Average tariff rates facing forest products are relatively low in most developed countries. Unprocessed
or partly processed wood products such as logs. squares or rough-sawn timber are usually free of duty
or only have low rates. Semi-processed products such as veneer. fibreboard and dressed timber face
higher rates. while more highly processed products such as plywood. some reconstituted panels. wood
manufactures Uoinery. carpentry. mouldings etc.) and furniture are usually subject to very high tariffs.
This tendency. known as tariff escalation. is also apparent. but to a lesser degree. with paper and paper
products.
An analysis of pre- and post-Tokyo Round average trade weighted tariff rates for wood and wood
products carried out for selected major developed country markets showed that average rates for a
number of importing markets were zero for wood in the rough: declined from 2.4% (pre-Tokyo
Round) to 1.7% (post-Tokyo Round) for primary wood products; and from 7.8% to 5.7% respectively
for secondary wood products (UNIDO. 1983).
As a general observation. while rates of 5-10% may seem rather low. where the dutiable value is
relatively high and where highly competitive market conditions exist. the duty can have a major
influence on the competitiveness of a particular exporter. Further, low average rates can mask the
problem facing specific products.
Although tariff rates in developed countries are generally low for most forest products. those in
developing countries are often substantial. Most developed countries are signatories to GATT and
therefore bound by GATT rules. particularly in respect of providing Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
tariffs to other members; but developing countries have not been obligated to Cllt tariffs in any
programmed manner. They have however received MFN rates as a concession from the developed
countries. As a result. many of the reductions that have flowed from previous GATT negotiations have
not been reflected in the developing countries own barriers. (Tariff rates in a number of developed
countries are shown in Table I. and in developing countries in Table 2).
The result has been that many of the developing countries have benefited from declining tariffs on
forest products in the developed countries. but not had to make similar reductions themselves. The
developing countries have also benefited from additional special preferences such as the Generalised
System of Preferences (GSP) scheme under which individual developed countries offer special tariff
advantages to selected countries for selected products.
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TABLE 1 : Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Tariff Levels facing Forest Products
in selected developed countries:
(as at December 1986; Japan as at April 1987}1
Tariff.Rate (%)
General Product
Description Australia2 EEe Japan
Wood in the rough and
roughly squared 0 0 0
Wood simply sawn 5 4.1 0-4.8
Wood chips 5 0 0
Wood planed. 2-15 4.3 0-8
grooved etc.
Veneer 5 6.1 5
Plywood 28 10.4 S.W. 12.5
H.W. 13.5-17.5
Laminated lumber 15 11. I 15
Manufactured wood
products 15-22 2.6-10.5 2.5-4.8
Furniture 30 5.6-6.3 4.8
Wood pulp 2-15 0 0
Newsprint 0 5.4 3.9
Other paper and
paperboard 0-30 4.1-12.8 5.12
Notes: IThese are MFN rates. Special preferences may be available for
certain products and supplying countries. MFN rates apply
to member states who are contracting parties to the GATT
articles unless other lower - special rates apply. These are
the rates faced by New Zealand in the EEe. Japan and the USA.
2Zero tariffs for NZ products.
3Converted from US currency at April 1986 exchange rate.
S.W. - softwoods
H.W. - hardwoods
Sources: National tariff schedules; official documents.
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TABLE 2- Tariff levels for selected products in four developing countries*
(% ad valorem)
India Malaysia Korea China
Wood in rough 40 20 5 13
Wood sawn lengthwise 55 20 IS 19
Fibre building boards 140 (b) 25 20 7.5
Plywood 70 40 30 IS
Newsprint 0 5 40
Kraft paper 5 40
Furniture 90 55-60 50 150
* In most cases as at December 1986
(a) In addition product taxes are imposed which average about 10%.
(b) Basic tariff plus products tax.
Note: These rates should only be regarded as indicative.
Non-tariff measures
Non tariff measures used for protective purposes are wide ranging. They include direct quantitative
controls such as quotas. tariff quotas or voluntary export restraints; less direct controls such as import
authorisations (licenses. permits etc) which may be automatic or at the discretion of customs
authorities; price controls such as minimum prices. price investigations. variable levies and
countervailing duties; and health and technical standards which may be liberal or highly restrictive in
their interpretation. In addition. customs formalities. import deposits. government trading policies and
marking and packaging requirements can also act as NTBs. depending on their application. Even more
difficult to categorise are internal subsidies which have the same effect as NTBs.
Forest products are less affected by NTBs than most other products. Nevertheless NTBs do create
problems for some forest products. Developed countries such as Japan and the EEC use tariff quotas
for newsprint and plywood. Health and technical standards and import authorisations act as NTBs.
although it is sometimes difficult to determine whether they are being used for legitimate health and
safety reasons or as a means of trade control. Anti-dumping investigations are becoming more
common in developed countries such as the EEC. the USA and Australia. Similarly developing
countries use NTBs. Global volume controls are widely used. particularly monitoring measures.
quotas. discretionary licensing and foreign exchange controls.
The conclusion of a study on trade barriers affecting forest products (Bourke. 1988) was that in general
trade barriers are not a major impediment to trade. Tariff levels are generally low in developed
countries although they still remain a problem in some markets for plywood. some sizes and species of
sawn timber, reconstituted panels and for some more processed products such as furniture. The same
is not true for many of the developing countries where tariffs are a major barrier. The effects of NTBs
vary. with import procedures. anti-dumping and countervailing investigations and duties. and to a lesser
extent health and technical standards being of most concern. Again. the developing countries have
substantially higher barriers than most developed countres.
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Broadly. therefore. there is still a need for the reduction of tariff rates on some products in developed
countries. The main scope is in reductions by the developing countries. NTBs provide difficulties
which are in most situations greater than for tariffs. One feature of barriers is that as tariff rates
decline there is a tendency for NTBs to become more prevalent as countries seek alternative ways of
controlling trade. An additional problem is that although individually barriers may not be of major
consequence for forest products. collectively they can create considerable difficulty. since usually more
than one barrier applies.
NEW ZEALAND'S PRESENT MARKETS AND FUTURE SITUATION
Current Exports
Almost 40% (4.3 million m3 roundwood equivalent) of New Zealand's total wood production was
exported in the year to December 1987. Exports were valued at NZ$901 million with pulp and paper
and paperboard products accounting for 56% of the total. Two markets. Australia and Japan. dominate
New Zealand's export trade, accounting for nearly two-thirds of total exports (Table 3).
TABLE 3: Value of exported forest products by Country of Destination
(NZ$ million fob - year ended December 1987)
Country
Percentage
Australia
Japan
Taiwan
China
USA
India
All other countries
Value
330
233
47
34
31
27
199
901
Source: Ministry of Forestry
%
37
26
5
4
3
3
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100
Exports to Australia in order of importance (by value) are paper, sawn timber. wood pulp and panel
products; those to Japan are essentially unprocessed or less processed products - logs. wood pulp, wood
chips and sawn timber (mainly flitches). The main volume growth in exports in the past 20 years has
been in pulp (an increase of 282.000 t) and sawn timber. including flitches (an increase of 282.000
m3); but in more recent years the fastest growth has been in the reconstituted panel products area.
specifically medium density fibreboard.
Forest product exports to Australia benefit from the trade agreements between the two countries since
1965 with all products entering duty free. This provides New Zealand with an advantage over most
other developed countries. For example, while NZ gains duty-free entry. tariff rates on some wood
products are up to 30%. But this advantage is limited since most developing countries also receive
duty-free treatment through various concession schemes
Logs, flitches, large dimension sawn timber (> 160 mm). wood chips. and woodpulp are duty free in
Japan. but other products face tariffs ranging from 4.8% on sawn timber to 12.5% on softwood
plywood. In some cases developing countries (which includes Chile) receive duty free treatment. Of
some concern to New Zealand is the fact that timber from some important North American species
enter duty free while radiata pine faces a 4.8% tariff.
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Future Trends
New Zealand exports will expand dramatically towards the end of the century as the available wood
supply expands. With only limited growth in domestic consumption likely. the situation will change
from one where 40% of the wood supply is exported in various product forms. to that where 70%
could be directed to export. This could involve export volumes expanding from the 1987 level of 4.3
million m3 to an estimated 10 million 013 in 2000, and 17 million m3 by 2010 if all the available wood
is used.
Australia and Japan will continue to be important markets, out any substantial growth in the volume of
New Zealand exports to these markets will be difficult given their expanding domestic supplies and slow
growth in demand. In addition there will be increased competition from suppliers such as Chile, North
America, and the USSR. and increasing competition from other materials such as plastic, steel, and
concrete.
This will mean other markets must be developed, and New Zealand exporters can be expected to turn
increasingly towards the developing countries of the Asia/Pacific region: in particular, markets such as
the People's Republic of China, South Korea, India, and Taiwan are seen to have considerable
potential. This potential must. however, be developed, and initially at least, prospects appear greatest
for logs and pulp and paper products. Outside this region Western Europe and the USA may provide
markets for more processed items such as c1earwood products.
This trend will therefore mean exporting to markets where tariffs are higher. even in many cases on
unprocessed or semi processed products. As can be seen in Table 2. for selected developing countries
in the Asian region rates can be prohibitive with even logs facing high duties. North American tariffs
on most forest products are low, but Western Europe has rates which are more similar to those of
Japan.
Thus New Zealand will be placing increasing emphasis on markets where tariff rates are high - in
some cases prohibitive. And since New Zealand is attempting to move towards the exporting of
increasing volumes of more processed and higher value products there will be greater difficulties.
In addition, much greater problems with NTBs are also likely; in the developed countries the problem
areas will be meeting technical standards and possibly tariff quotas. In the developing countries import
procedures. licences, exchange controls, and government controlled procurement methods will be the
main problems.
Some of the concerns that will need to be addressed will therefore be high tariffs. tariff escalation, and
a variety of NTBs.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM GATT NEGOTIATIONS
Areas Requiring Action
The ideal objective for New Zealand is free trade in forest products. As noted earlier although trade
barriers are relatively low in most developed countries there are still difficulties facing some products in
specific markets and, as with most primary products. these barriers are greatest for more processed
goods. Further pressure to reduce these barriers would therefore be of value.
In the case of tariffs the most benefit to NZ for trade with the developed countries would result from
reductions on selected products such as panels, wood manufactures and furniture. In these countries
however. probably of greater importance than the absolute level of the tariff is the need for equality in
treatment with other competing exporters. For example in Japan to have the same tariff rate with North
American and Chilean softwoods. In the case of the developing countries. significant drop in tariffs
on most products is needed, since current rates are generally very high.
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In some developed countries, a reduction in NTBs is likely to be of greater importance than a
reduction in tariffs. Ensuring that NTBs such as health and safety standards are only used for
legitimate reasons rather than as de facto protection measures is essential. Another is, reducing the
risk of anti-dumping and countervailing duties. The same issues will also be of relevance in the case
of developing countries.
Negotiating Strategies
What does this mean for the current GATT negotiations? - or more correctly, what are the GATT
negotiations likely to mean for NZ's forest product exports? .
In past GATT rounds. negotiations have resulted in worthwhile reductions in developed country tariffs.
They have had little effect on those of the developing countries. Their effect on NTBs has also been
minimal, in no small part due to the difficulties of identifying and "proving" that these measures are in
fact being used as NTBs, and the difficulty of devising procedures which result in reductions. [I]
It also seems likely that although some improvement may be achieved in the current round. it would be
unwise to expect much of value for the NTBs that are of most interest to forestry - namely standards
and technical barriers, import procedures, and anti-dumping and countervailing investigations.
Pressure for improvement should be kept up on these areas. but any improvement will probably be
relatively minor.
Many of the strategies to be adopted in the negotiations. and the subjects to be addressed. are still in
the processs of being determined. Thus the full implications to forestry are unclear at this time. One
issue being addressed, and one which created some difficulty in previous rounds. is whether cuts
should be made across the board, on a sector-by-sector basis, or at the individual product level. The
implications to forestry will differ depending on which approach is selected.
Negotiations for tariff or non-tariff reductions could be dealt with broadly on a formula basis which
would bind all contracting parties. or be individually negotiated on a request/offer basis. Negotiations
within each of the GATT negotiating groups are still in progress but preliminary submissions by
member countries indicate the likelihood of formidable obstacles. Major exporting nations such as
Australia have proposed reductions of overall level of effective assistance to industry which covers both
tariff and non tariff protection including domestic subsidies which have a trade effect. For natural
resource-based products. Australia has suggested the phased elimination within 10 years of all tariff and
non-tariff restrictions, subsidies as well as all protective regulations. US supports a similar approach
with greater emphasis on request/offer basis for medium level tariffs and NTBs. New Zealand has
proposed fixing ceilings for all tariffs to be achieved over a specific period with a combination of
formula and request/offer arrangement for below ceiling rates. Japan on the other hand favours the
complete abolition of tariffs on industrial sector exports but excluding mining and forest products. EEC
appears to support a selective approach.
The effective rates of assistance approach is the ideal but it is doubtful whether the international
community is yet ready to apply such a comprehensive approach to tariff cutting. The formula basis is
the next best which can ensure worthwhile long term benefits. Request/offer approach is only useful at
the margin and does not offer much to smaller nations who do not have much bargaining power. Also,
countries can continue to retain restrictions on sensitive products under this system. The outcome of
the Uruguay round therefore. depends on how these basic approaches are sorted out.
New Zealand Requirements
With its expanding wood resource. and the need to increase exports substantially. New Zealand wi!!
have to place increasing emphasis on the export of forest products to markets othe than our current two
major trading partners Australia and Japan. In particular this means increasing emphasis on
developing countries. especially in the Asian region. These markets have substantial import restrictions
in most instances.
I] See World Bank, 1987 for discussion of recent trends in trade barriers. expecially NTBs.
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For example South Korea, Taiwan, China and India are all of considerable interest and all have high
tariffs and NTBs. As a consequence an important element in future export diversification and growth
will be the extent to which barriers are reduced in developing countries.
An important question for NZ forestry is therefore how barriers in the developing countries can be
reduced. Since developing countries tend to be treated somewhat differently from others the reductions
of interest to New Zealand are not likely to be properly addressed in the GATT negotiations unless they
are part of a trade-off package. Unless a trade-off can be achieved, wih the developing countries being
willing to reduce some of their own restrictions in return for gains from the developed countries. many
of the barriers of interest to forestry will have to be addr.essed outside the GATT negotiations on a
normal bilateral basis. This places countries such as NZ at a disadvantage with larger trading
countries. since we don't have the negotiating "muscle" of such countries. The willingness of the
major players in the negotiations - the EEC, the USA and Japan - to offer concessions on products
which are of major interest to the developing countries, such as textiles, clothing. electronic goods,
footwear and various agricultural products will therefore be critical. Given that the USA has been
pressing some of the Asian countries to reduce their restrictions on the entry of forest products it seems
likely that barriers in the developing countries may be reduced.
In the case of NTBs it will be more difficult to obtain cuts for the very reasons that make NTBs an
attractive way of providing protection - their lack of visibility and the difficulty of proving that they are
being used for trade protection purposes. It therefore seems likely that reductions in NTBs of any
consequence are less likely to be achieved through the GATT negotiations.
CONCLUSION
The value of the GATT negotiations to NZ forestry rests primarily on the extent to which they address
the barriers in the developing countries. To a lesser extent, both tariff and NTBs in the developed
countries are of interest, although most already have low tariff levels on forest products. In these
countries equality with other competing countries, including developing countries such as Chile. is of
greater importance than the absolute level of tariffs. The abortive 1984 negotiations on forest products
point to the difficulties associated with tariff and NTB reductions.
The value to New Zealand therefore relates closely to the extent to which workable systems to address
NTBs are possible. and in particular how the developing countries are involved in the negotiations and
committed to the process. The gains to forest products are likely to rest to a considerable extent on the
outcome from the bargaining surrounding other products which are of greater interest to the major
participants in the negotiations. As in previous rounds of negotiations, resolving problems surrounding
NTBs will be the most difficult problem. Bilateral negotiations are likely to remain important even
after the Uruguay round.
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TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
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SUMMARY
The need for multilateral liberalisation of agricultural
trade is discussed. Liberalisation of trade would
involve disciplines on domestic subsidies as well as on
trade barriers. To facilitate such a liberalisation
there is a need for an aggregate measure of support to
farmers in the producing countries. This paper
discusses the most widely canvassed of these measures:
the Producer Subsidy Equivalent [PSE). Variants of the
PSE, and their possible role in the GATT negotiations
are discussed. The possible consequences of an
assistance-based liberalisation for New Zealand trade
are modelled. This is done by the use of a non spatial
equilibrium simulation framework, incorporating all New
Zealand's major trading partners and the important
traded commodities.
Key words: agriculture, trade, assistance measure,
Liberalisation Scenarios
BACKGROUND - THE CRISIS IN AGRICULTURAL TRADE
The symptoms of the crisis in agricultural trade are
well known: surplus stocks of all the major commodities;
massive overproduction in the developed countries
co-existing with starvation in some developing
countries; depressed and unstable international
commodity prices; limited export markets in the face of
trade barriers. Insulation of agricultural markets from
the world market - the breaking of the link between
world price movements and domestic prices - has been
under way for several decades.
The GATT has tried to address the issue of agricultural
trade but since the GATT's establishment in 1948
agriculture has been sUbject to major loopholes. These
loopholes, in Articles 11 and 16 have allowed
quantitative restrictions on imports and for the payment
of subsidies on exports of primary products
respectively. The conditions placed by the GATT on the
use of these trade-distorting measures have proved
ineffective: the concepts of "equitable share" and
"serious prejudice" enshrined in Article 16 and the Code
* Authors wish to acknowledge the helpful suggestions
of George Rutherford and Ron Sandrey in the planning
of this paper. Special thanks to Ralph Lattimore at
Lincoln College for his comments and valuable
assistance in developing the MAFF model used in the
second part of the paper.
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on Subsidies have not proved workable and the use of
direct and indirect export subsidies on agricultural
products has burgeoned.
since the 1970s the GATT has made attempts to address
the issue of agriculture. A mandate to negotiate was
agreed in the Declaration which launched the Tokyo Round
of MTNs in 1973, but it was not sUfficiently detailed
and it stressed the 'special characteristics' of
agriculture. There was also disagreement about whether
the agriculture group was to be the sole body with
responsibility for all agricultural negotiations or
whether other groups (on tariffs, quantitative
restrictions) would also discuss agriculture. The result
was a dissipation of negotiating efforts and a move
to a commodity-specific approach which ensured that a
comprehensive solution for agriculture would not be
achievable.
In the current Uruguay Round of MTNs agriculture has
loomed large. The Round presents a new opportunity, and
probably the best for many years, to deal with the
crisis in agricultural trade. New Zealand's objective in
the Negotiating Group on Agriculture is to ensure that
international comparative advantage be allowed to
operate in agriculture.
THE NEED FOR AN AGGREGATE MEASURE OF SUPPORT
The cause of the problems of agricultural trade can be
identified quite simply as the major producing countries
supporting their farmers in ways that induce supply
increases.
Identification of the linkage between domestic subsidies
and trade is important. Domestic pOlicies are the root
cause of the crisis in the agricultural trading system.
Domestic support policies stimulate high-cost production
at the expense of low-cost producers and impede the
operation of international comparative advantage. All
supply-inducing policies, not just export subsides,
distort trade patterns. Research conducted by the OEeD
has shown that mUltilateral, mUlticommodity phaseout of
assistance would be the least painfUl way of
liberalising trade in farm products. An aggregate
measure of support would be necessary to establish
levels of current support and to plan and monitor such a
phaseout programme.
The Punta Del Este Declaration, which launched the
current GATT Round has these major Objectives for
agriculture:
(a) improve market access through the lowering and
removal of import barriers;
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(b) increase discipline on the use of all direct and
indirect subsidies and other measures affecting
agricultural trade, reduce their adverse trade
effects, and deal with their causes.
Reform must take place at the level of domestic
policies. It therefore falls within the domain of
national governments. So, for political reasons,any
attempt to reform agricultural trade is most likely to
be agreed mUltilaterally. Such agreement is more likely
to come about if there is to be multilateral
implementation of the measures required to bring about
reform. These measures must include reducing the supply-
inducing support given to farmers. Studies, by the OECD
in particular, have shown that a multilateral reduction
of assistance is the least painful adjustment process.
Multilateral liberalisation will be more politically
acceptable if countries simultaneously share the burden
of adjustment. This is the rationale for an aggregate
measure of support.
Types of aggregate measures
There are several measures that can be used to quantify
the degree of support given to agricultural sectors;
these are depicted in Annex 1. Generally, the more
comprehensive the measure the greater is its complexity
and its need for a large data requirement. Thus the
nominal rate of protection is the simplest measure: it
includes only the assistance to output delivered in the
form of border protection. The price adjustment gap
incorporates all assistance to output, but not
assistance to inputs or value adding factors. The most
comprehensive assistance measure is the effective rate
of assistance [ERA]; it captures all the net assistance
delivered to outputs, inputs and value adding factors.
The PSE differs from the ERA in that it does not take
accou~t of measures which increase the price of inputs
used by farmers.
The PSE is therefore less comprehensive than the ERA,
but it does represent a fair compromise between the
enormous data requirement of the ERA, and the relatively
incomplete price adjustment gap.
The'producer subsidy equivalent of a government policy
is defined as the money that would be necessary to
compensate producers for a removal of that policy. PSEs
measure pOlicies that result in budget outlays (for
example deficiency paYments and input SUbsidies) and
policies that do not (eg import quotas and variable
levies). They can be expressed in several ways:
Aggregate PSE: in monetary units, for one commodity or
for a range of commodities. This is the value of the
assistance given to all the producers of the commodity.
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Per- Unit PSE: the value of assistance per unit of
production, expressed for each commodity
percentage PSE: the OECD definition is the value of
assistance divided by the value production plus direct
government payments m~nus the producer levies paid to
the government:
value of assistance
value of production + direct payments - levies
It is also possible to express the PSE as:
value of assistance
value of production - levies
This form expresses total assistance to a product as a
percentage of the world price (or a reference price
proxy for world price). It is in effect a tariff
equivalent measure. This is the form that New Zealand
favours: it has the obvious advantage of being well and
widely understood, but the negative feature of varying
autonomously as a consequence of world price and
exchange rate changes.
It will probably be necessary, depending on how PSEs are
to be employed, to have other forms used simultaneously.
For example countries' aggregate PSEs could be targeted
as well as commodity-specific PSEs. But the percentage
PSE is the measure of the relative incentive to produce
as between products and countries and this should be our
principal target for reduction'.
Calculation of PSEs
PSEs measure support or protection provided by many
types of government intervention. Some of these pOlicies
result in budgetary expenditure - for example deficiency
payments and input subsidies. But they also measure
support provided in forms that do not result in budget
outlays: for example import quotas and variable levies.
The PSE is the sum of the two types of support:
1 BUdgetary expenditure: most policies other than
those that support market prices are delivered in
the form of budgetary outlays. These include:
Direct cash payments: as in deficiency payments,
headage payments, paid set aside, and direct
disaster payments
Related to the PSE concept is the CSE: the consumer
subsidy equivalent. This measures the subsidy to
consumers of government policies in agriculture.
For most producing countries CSEs are negative.
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Producer levies: these are treated as negative
payments and deducted from budgetary expenditure
Concessional credit: the programme interest rate
is deducted from the market interest rate and
mUltiplied by the loan volume
Input subsidies: the subsidy rate multiplied by
the volume of input used gives the outlay
Marketing programmes: for processing, inspection
marketing and transportation subsidies budgetary
data can generally be used
Long term programmes: these include research
extension, structural assistance and
conservation programmes. If these were to be
included into the agreed PSE measure bUdget data
could generally be used for these pOlicies.
Exchange rates: the treatment of fixed or pegged
exchange rates has not been decided. One method
would be to calculate parity exchange rates
based on the relative purchasing power
vis-a-vis, say, the US. The exchange rate
distortion per tonne of produce could then be
multiplied by total production to give the
subsidy element of this form of assistance.
2 Price differential: most market price support
pOlicies lead to differences between the domestic
and external prices for farm products. The
assistance element is derived by taking the price
difference and mUltiplying it by the volume of
production. Examples of price support polices that
would be captured by the price difference method
are:
Import quotas, two price systems and variable
levies, tariffs.
state trading operations, export SUbsidies, two
price systems, intervention purchases.
The effects of all these pOlicies would be difficult to
calculate in other ways, particularly their joint
effects.
This list of policies is not, of course, exhaustive.
Role of the PSE
Two broad roles for the PSE are envisaged: these
correspond to the first two 'Options for the use of an
aggregate measurement of support in the negotiations on
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trade in agriculture' identified by the technical group
of the GATT negotiating group on agriculture2 :
option 1:
Commitments to reduce support expressed directly as PSE
reductions. Under this option agreement would be reached
on final PSE levels: each participant would decide on
specific policy changes that would bring about PSE
reductions.
Option 2:
To negotiate reductions in assistance using the PSE as a
yardstick. Under this option PSEs would be used to
negotiate equivalent policy changes between countries:
assistance reduction policies would be negotiated in
order to reduce PSEs by, or to, a specified amount.
Either of these two options could lead to achievement of
New Zealand's goal in the agriculture negotiations. Our
preference has been for the first option, which provides
a high degree of sovereign control over the shape of
national reform packages.
option 2 would lead to practical problems involved in
describing, and agreeing on, required policy changes.
These problems would also occur under option 1, but,
under this option, solutions would not have to be
negotiated and agreed prior to the liberalisation
programme. Under option 1 their solution would be the
sole responsibility of the liberalising Contracting
Party. Nevertheless, New Zealand's objective in the
agriculture negotiations could be achieved under option
2 as well: agreement on this option should not be
resisted if it is clear that failure to agree on it
would lead to less favourable options from New Zealand's
point of view.
Policy coverage
The widest possible policy coverage is desirable. Almost
all forms of assistance will have some ef.fect on supply;
but these effects will not always be positive, and the
time profile of the different supply responses will
vary. We favour the inclusion in the coverage of PSEs of
all policies aimed at, or significantly affecting, the
agricultural sector. Exclusions from the PSE disciplines
could then be negotiated f with only those pOlicies
having no, or minimal, effects on supply escaping them.
These would be 'decoupled' pOlicies, under which support
is decoupled from output. In the presentation of the
case for aPSE-based liberalisation the distinction
between income-based support and output-based support
is of the utmost importance.
2 in document MTN.GNG/NG5/TG/W/4
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possible examples of decoupled support, as listed in the
Cairns Group proposal are:
Direct income' support which is decoupled from
production and marketing3
Adjustment or resource redeployment assistance
which has a negligible impact on production and
trade or which acts to reduce production levels
Non-commodity specific aid for infrastructure
development covering research, extension,
education, market information, inspection, grading,
pest and disease control
Specific, natural disaster relief measures.
Product coverage
Product coverage should be as wide as possible. The
ideal list of products would include all those which
accounted for ·more than 5% of any participating
country's gross agricultural production. Thus sheepmeat,
which may account for less than 5% of the EC's GAP would
be sUbject to PSE disciplines [in the EC and all other
participating countries] because it accounts for more
than 5% of New Zealand's [and other countries'] GAP.
Country coverage
Country coverage should be as wide as possible. All OECD
countries should be included as should all exporters of
any of the major commodities.
Processed Products
The boundary point for assistance measurement arises
when considering assistance to processing of
agricultural products. The New Zealand position is that
any assistance which increases processing capacity of
farm products should be counted as assistance and
included in the PSE disciplines. Note that the
definition of decoupled subsidies should not allow
assistance that increases processing capacity to escape
PSE disciplines. Any agreement on subsidies for
processing industries will have to be undertaken without
prejudice to agreement reached on industrial subsidies
reached in the Negotiating Group on Subsidies.
Inclusion of animal feed costs in PSEs
3 the political feasibility of direct income supports
is discussed and compared to that of supply control
pOlicies in Annex 2
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High prices for animal feedstuffs are a negative subsidy
- a tax - on livestock producers. Omission of the
effects of government policies which increase prices of
feed would overstate the net government sUbsidy given to
livestock producers. Net PSEs, as have been calculated
by the OECD, should therefore be used in the
negotiations.
EXCHANGE RATES AND WORLD PRICES
PSEs can vary independently of government assistance
policy because of autonomous changes in exchange rates
and world prices of farm products. Complications arise
because PSEs might increase not because of policy
changes in the country but because of falling world
prices or because of exchange rate changes. Governments
would be unlikely to agree to disciplines that required
binding of their PSEs over a period which was short
enough for these fluctuations significantly to affect
their PSEs. On the other hand, if a reduced PSE were to
relate only to the average over a very long period
domestic markets would not be SUfficiently responsive to
international markets. It is impossible to distinguish
between short-run fluctuations and long-term changes in
trends: so protection against price and exchange rate
fluctuations should not be allowed to create added
protection of domestic markets.
One remedy is to measure PSEs annually, but, when
establishing a country's compliance record, to compare
its average PSEs over the most recent [say] 3-year
period with its commitments. In effect countries could
align their domestic policies with a 3-year moving
average of world market prices: if PSEs were above their
bindings in the past two years the current year's
assistance would have to be reduced SUfficiently to
bring their average PSE for the 3-year period down to
the bound level. Exchange rates, or world prices, could
still change in the third year to such an extent that
the 3-year average PSE is too high. One solution is to
use the second year's prices for year 3.
The length of the reference periods used in assessing
PSEs and countries' fulfilment of their commitments to
reduce them has to be a compromise between the need to
smooth fluctuations in exchange rates and world prices,
and the need to ensure responsiveness of domestic
policies to price movements. An annual assessment of
PSEs, with averaging over 3 years to measure compliance,
would be an acceptable compromise.
Monitoring
The GATT must ultimately be responsible for monitoring
the fulfilment of contractual obligations as well as
servicing negotiations, maintaining and verifying aPSE
database. However the GATT would need to draw heavily on
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both national resources and on data compiled by the OECD
in particular.
Supply control
New Zealand's objective of restoring international
comparative advantage to the operation of agricultural
markets would not be fully reached if domestic
production quotas came to be regarded as the only way of
solving current agricultural trade problems. Quota
limits are unresponsive to market prices. 'They would
therefore entrench existing production patterns and
impede structural change.
Nevertheless there are pragmatic reasons for encouraging
the adoption of supply controls, in conjunction with PSE
disciplines, by the major producing countries. These are
summarised in Annex 2 where the political feasibility of
supply controls is compared to that of direct income
support. The arguments there point to the need to give
some credit for effective supply control policies.
This credit could take the form of the targeting of a
different variant of PSE: for those commodities under
supply control the commitment could be described as a
percentage reduction of the total commodity PSE. Thus,
where there are no supply controls, the percentage PSE
would be the desired form of commitment, but there would
be resort to the total commodity PSE when supply
controls are imposed.
Actual PSEs
PSEs have been updated to 1986. Figures show that OECD
assistance of agriculture has generally increased.
Average net percentage PSEs are as follows:
Australia Canada EC-10 US Japan New
Zealand
1979-81 9 24 37 16 57 18
1986 15 46 50 35 75 314
Source: OECD (1988)
VIEWS OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES
The Cairns Group and the US generally support the idea
of the PSE measure [as a basis for commitments and as a
monitoring tool]. Canada, as we saw, although a member
of the Cairns Group has proposed its own variant of the
PSE, the Trade Distorting Equivalent, which treats
supply control policies more favourably. Both the EC and
4 this figure, as the report says, is due entirely to
the once-off producer board write-offs. For 1985
the average PSE was 20%.
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the Nordic countries see a lesser role for the PSE but
Japan's proposal explicitly rejects the notion that an
aggregate measure of support can be useful in the
negotiations.
THE DE ZEEUW APPROACH
On his visit to New Zealand in August 1987 de Zeeuw,
chairman of the GATT negotiating group on agriculture
suggested that a compromise agreement might include two
sets of disciplines: .
One for competitive exporting countries where something
like the US proposal would apply with support being
decoupled from production and mostly confined to fixed
levies (tariffs).
A second where countries (or particular sectors?) which
were not exporting could maintain domestic support. If
they restricted imports they should also control supply.
The reasoning behind this approach is that it would be
unrealistic to say that non-competitive countries should
not have any agriculture sector at all. Under this
approach PSEs would still have a role: they could be
used as a monitoring device for phaseout of measures and
binding of support at certain levels. The approach
raises many questions: how far could food security,
emploYment and other social objectives be allowed to go?
What proportion of self-sufficiency would be permitted?
If a country could not compete internationally it should
not be exporting. But if Finland and Sweden ceased to
export but wanted to retain their domestic market would
that be enough? Would we then say they must have a
minimum access commitment? If countries restricted
imports they should control supply.
Questions that would have to be answered to determine
New Zealand's interest in the de Zeeuw approach would
be:
1 Whether the possibility of achieving any more
beneficial options were worth striving for in the
negotiations.
2 What degree of self-sufficiency would be the
maximum acceptable for each product?
3 How speedily would the exporting sectors be
expected to adjust to the new disciplines?
4 What would be the long-term implications of
acceptance of the approach? How would it affect
stability of the trading system?
What would be likely to happen if the de Zeeuw approach
were adopted? Clearly EC and US livestock products,
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which are currently in surplus, would have to be bound
by PSE-type disciplines. If supply controls on
substitute products were tight then producers of
livestock products would rely on decoupled support or
suffer a fall in their standard of living.
It is clear that if applied to livestock products, and
in the EC and the US in particular, the de Zeeuw
guidelines would, in general, benefit New Zealand. This
is provided that the permitted degree of self-
sUfficiency were lower than 100%.
So if there were no feasible negotiating alternative the
de Zeeuw approach could have some merit for New Zealand.
The answer to question 2 is important: we should aim for
the lowest negotiable self-sufficiency ratios for the
importing countries. Disciplines on access should be
strict and binding. The supply controls on the non-
exported products would also be critical: assistance
based liberalisation of the exported products should not
result in a shift of resources toward the production of
non-exported products.
For the exporting countries some form of aggregate
measure would be required to ensure that reductions in
support were uniformly applied across countries and
commodities. As with the A options definitions of
decoupled support would have to be agreed.
Arguments that could be deployed against the de Zeeuw
approach are:
1 That it would lead to ossification and entrenchment
of existing production patterns which are
inefficient in that the operation of international
comparative advantage is not allowed to operate
over the entire production range of a particular
commodity.
2 That it breathes new life into the 'special
characteristics' argument for agricultural
products.
3 That any self-sufficiency achieved could largely be
illusory because of imported fuels and fertilizers.
4 That expansion of domestic production to achieve
national self-sufficiency makes world markets
thinner and therefore less stable.
5 That the costs of any self-sufficiency achieved
could far outweigh the benefits.
Yet if a total liberalisation, along the lines proposed
by the US and Cairns Group, is not achievable, the de
Zeeuw approach may be New Zealand's preferred option.
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APPLICATIONS
Whether or not PSEs, or any aggregate measure of
assistance, will be used in the GATT agriculture
negotiations is still a matter for debate. The role of
an aggregate measure has also to be decided. If no such
means of capturing all forms of assistance is found, it
would be difficult to see how the GATT can advance. In
any event, it would be desirable to have an overall
assessment of the value to New Zealand of different
forms of assistance-based liberalisation. The next part
of the paper looks at a modelling framework which
simulates various liberalisation scenarios.
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A METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF ASSISTANCE
(PSE/CSE) BASED LIBERALISATION FOR NEW ZEALAND TRADE
The Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) and its variants
were defined and their usefulness as aggregate measures
of support to farmers was discussed in the first part of
the paper. Their potential role within a mUltilateral
trade liberalisation framework was also considered and
several technical issues involved were identified. The
objectives in the second part of this paper are: to
demonstrate the application of these assistance
(PSE/CSE) based liberalisation measures and to study
their effects on world reference prices, trade, welfare
etc using a static World Policy Simulation Model
(SWOPSIM) .
An overview of this modelling framework covering its
general scope and objectives, the model development and
its adaptation by the MAF/Lincoln research team and some
preliminary results, as well as their possible use in
trade negotiations, are discussed in the next section.
The results of two multilateral trade liberalisation
scenarios are detailed in the following section and
their implications evaluated.
Overview of the Trade Policy Simulation Framework
The SWOPSIM modelling framework follows the logic of a
non-spatial price equilibrium model, which assumes that
domestic and traded goods are perfect substitutes in
consumption. It is a computer simulation model based on
electronic spreadsheets available with micro computers.
It is also based on the OECD (MTM) trade model, which is
an economic model that runs on a mainframe computer
system, used mainly to evaluate general trade policy
impacts in all OECD member countries. But the OECD/MTM
model is less flexible in accommodating sub sets of
countries and commodities of importance in trade for, or
specific policies of interest to New Zealand.
The need to measure the effects of trade barriers and
domestic agricultural policies of important trading
partners on agricultural commodities of importance to
New Zealand necessitated the development of this
in-house capability at the Policy Services Division
MAFCorp. The specific objectives of this research are
threefold:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
the development of a quantitative framework for
Agricultural trade policy analysis,
the evaluation of a range of multilateral and
bilateral trade policy adjustment in
agriculture, and
the assessment of a series of specific issues
relating to trade talks in agriculture.
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SWOPSIM Model Development at the USDA
The trade policy modelling framework adopted was
originally developed at the USDA - Agricultural Trade
Analysis Division (Roningen, 1986). The models created
by the SWOPSIM framework have an economic structure and
a policy structure and reside in the country model and
country policy spreadsheets, respectively. The economic
structure includes constant elasticity supply and demand
equations and some summary policy measures. As in any
standard neo-classical net trade models, trade is the
difference between supply and demand.
Linkage across products occurs via cross price
relationships and technological parameters, while
linkage across countries and regions takes place through
domestic-international price equations and world trade
(Webb et aI, 1987). Policies are introduced into the
model by allowing world, producer and consumer prices to
diverge. This is accomplished by recognising the
marketing and transport margins, the exchange rate,
exchange rate transmission elasticity, a world price
transmission elasticity and a constant term. Two
additional equations link producer and consumer prices
in each domestic market to the world prices.
The policy diversity and richness of the
SWOPSIM-generated models is achieved by means of the
price linkage equations based on Josling's (1981)
subsidy equivalent method. This approach recognises the
close relationship between domestic and trade pOlicies
and quantifies the totality of the influence of
governments on the market. The separation of subsidies
to the producers (PSE) from those to the consumers (CSE)
allows the effects on these two groups in the economy to
be evaluated. PSEs attributable to trade measures such
as quotas and tariffs appear as constant terms in the
producer and consumer price equations, while policies
affecting domestic price margins enter the terms
associated with the marketing margins for producers and
consumers.
The data and parameters which define the economic
structure of each country's food and agricultural sector
are included in the model spreadsheets and are used to
generate the supply, demand and trade equations in
combination with the PSEs and CSEs transferred from the
policy spreadsheets. The PSEs and CSEs associated with
each policy for each commodity within each country are
computed by the policy spreadsheets based on original
bUdget data. This facilitates updating or revising the
policy information used in the model without disrupting
the economic structure of the model.
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policy Services version (MAFF) of the SWOPSIM Model
The particular version of the trade model developed to
evaluate the effects of assistance based liberalisation
scenarios on trade'between New Zealand and its major
trading partners is known as MAFF. This is constructed
within the overall SWOPSIM framework discussed in the
previous section, and makes use of the flexibility of
this modelling approach to determine the country and
commodity coverage. The model contains seven countries
or regions. These are Australia, Canada, EEC, Japan,
United States together with New Zealand and an aggregate
rest of the world (ROW) grouping.
The commodities covered in this version are beef,
sheepmeats, pork, poultry, (fluid) milk, dairy products
(butter, cheese, wholemilk powder (WMP), skim-milk
powder (SMP), and condensed milk), forage, wool, wheat,
soybeans, and coarse grains (including barley, maize
(corn), sorghum and millets). Some of these commodities
are included because of the cross-commodity linkages
(eg, coarse grains, soybeans, forage) as well as the
joint nature of production (eg, fluid milk, wool), even
though they may not be significant in New Zealand trade.
The supply and demand parameters (eg elasticities) used
in this model are those used by the OECD-MTM model, with
corrections where necessary, and the production
disposition (ie, quantity data) is based on OECD (1985)
sources for the 1979-81 period. Prices and pOlicies
(PSEs/CSEs) are 1985 values, except for New Zealand
which is based on updated 1986 figures (USDA, 1987),
also from OECD (1987b) sources. Producer prices are set
at the world price plus direct payment plus market
support only. Assistance to value adding factors and
input subsidies is excluded.
The model is solved using a set of Basic programs
incorporating the spread sheet program, SuperCalc. The
model spreadsheets for all the countries are used in a
procedure called WORLDMOD (or COMODMOD when only a
single commodity is under consideration), to generate
the solution using a full simultaneous mUlti-region
multi-product model from country/region spreadsheets.
The results are output as two spreadsheets. One
consists of supply, demand, trade flow and price changes
as a result of liberalisation scenarios introduced. The
other provides the welfare results in terms of changes
in net producer and consumer welfare and taxpayer
savings.
Model Results of Multilateral Trade Liberalisation
Scenarios
The political and economic rationale for multilateral
trade liberalisation and its implications for trade
negotiations within the GATT framework was addressed in
the first part of this paper. The model (SWOPSIM)
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framework outlined so far in the second part of the
paper is ideally suited for evaluating the trade, price,
and welfare effects of assistance (PSEjCSE) based
multilateral liberalisation scenarios. It uses the
subsidy equivalent' approach in reducing assistance
levels as opposed to a policy based liberalisation
strategy. The framework can be used to study the
effects on trade of a single commodity involving several
countries. But it is not presently capable of
effectively addressing issues of bilateral nature, such
as import or production quotas, or minimum prices,
directly.
Scenarios of Liberalisation Measures
within a Multi-lateral framework, two trade
liberalisation scenarios were considered to be of some
significance for evaluation using the MAFF model. These
examples are shown for the purpose of focusing on New
Zealand trade, price and welfare effects. They are
listed below, and their importance for New Zealand and
in this study are for somewhat different reasons.
(i) Tri-Iateral grains liberalisation - this
involves the reduction in assistance levels for
wheat and coarse grains producers in the EEC,
Japan and the US only.
(ii) Overall liberalisation - this is a mUlti-country
(6 countries explicitly treated in the case of
MAFF model) mUlti-commodity (13 traded and 2
non-traded commodities in the MAFF version)
assistance reduction measure.
The effects of Tri-Iateral grains liberalisation
scenario have not been widely studied nor discussed as
extensively as the overall liberalisation scenario.
Overall (partial) liberalisation has been reported at
the 10 percent (OECD, 1985 and 1987; USDA, 1987; and
Tyers and Anderson, 1986) and higher (ABARE, 1988;
Tangermann, 1988) levels of assistance reduction. For
this reason, it is important the grains liberalisation
scenario be studied to understand the effects on both
the grains trade as well as the trade in livestock
products, due to the feed grain - livestock linkages
particularly important in the northern hemisphere. The
implications for New Zealand trade, producer and
consumer prices, the welfare of both dairy and meat
producers and the economy could be very important. The
overall liberalisation scenario, on the other hand, can
be used as a benchmark to compare the results from the
MAFF model based on the SWOPSIM framework with the
results from the larger models of the OECD (1988), USDA
(Roningen et ali Webb et aI, 1987) and ABARE (1988) with
wider country and commodity coverage.
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Grains policies and Assistance Levels in EC/Japan/USA
The level of assistance to grain producers in the
European Community, Japan and the US is moderate to
high. Percentage PSEs in 1985 ranged from 23 for coarse
grains in the EEC and the US to 95 for both wheat and
coarse grains in Japan (table 1; part I). The values
for wheat in the EC and the US were about 38 percent.
The US is a large producer and net exporter of both
wheat and coarse grains, Japan is an important net
importer of both commodities, and EC is a net exporter
of wheat and a net importer of coarse grains (table 1;
part I).
In the EC and Japan, assistance to grain producers is
mainly in the form of market price support, which
accounted for over 75 percent of the total PSE. Direct
paYments accounted for about 50 percent or more of the
assistance provided to the US wheat and coarse grains
producers (table 1; part II). Measures reducing input
cost accounted for at least 20 percent of the PSE in the
US for both wheat and coarse grains and is the second
largest component. General services assistance
represented over 15 percent of the PSE and is the second
largest in the EC, while no assistance was provided in
the form of direct paYments to the EC wheat or coarse
grains producers. Direct paYments, measures to reduce
input costs, and general services are all used to some
extent to assist Japanese wheat and coarse grains
producers, but individually account for less than 10
percent of the total PSE. Sub national and other forms
of assistance are found in the US only, and represented
less than 5 percent of the wheat and coarse grains PSEs
in 1985 (table 1; part II).
Tri-Iateral Grains Liberalisation Scenario and the
Results
This scenario represents a partial liberalisation of
assistance provided for wheat and coarse grains
producers in the EC, Japan and the US. It is viewed by
some as a likely second best position in the GATT trade
negotiations, if the overall liberalisation scenario to
be considered later in this paper does not generate
adequate effective support for reasons discussed in the
first part of this paper. If agriculture is again
treated as a special case in the Uruguay round, a
USjECjJapan trade-off involving grains could be
contemplated. The consequences of this potential
development for these three countries, New Zealand and
for other trading partners are studied.
For the purpose of modelling this within the SWOPSIM
framework using MAFF, a 10 percent reduction in PSEs for
wheat and coarse grains in the three countries was
considered. In addition, for EC and Japan where most
assistance (over 75 percent) is provided by means of
market price support (table 1; part II), a corresponding
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Table 1: 1985 Level and Composition of Assistance to Grains Producers in the EEC, Japan, and the US
WHEAT1 COARSE GRAINS2
I Level of Assistance EEC JAPAN USA EEC JAPAN USA
a Producer Prices3 178 203 149 180 192 98
b Level of Production4 71,166 874 65,992 70,424 406 274,724
c Net Trade4 13,634 -5,238 25,868 -2,485 -21,182 51,500
d Percentage PSE 37.2 95.2 39.4 23.0 95.4 23.8
e Unit PSE3 48.0 99.0 42.0 34.0 94.0 19 . .Q
II Composition of Assistance (Percentages)
a Market Price Support 81 77 11 79 78 8
b Direct Payments - 9 61 - 9 49
c Reduction of Input Cost 4 6 19 1 4 25
d General Services 15 8 4 20 9 9
e Sub National - - 3 - - 5
f Other - - 2 - - 4
Sources: OECD (1987), "Updating of PSE/CSE Analysis", Country Notes on EEC, Japan and USA.
USDA (1988), "Situation and Outlook for Wheat and Coarse grains", ERS.
1 Represents wheat for human as well as feed use; for EEC the 'Common Wheat' is included.
2 Coarse grains represent barley, Maize; sorghum, Millets etc.
3 Producer Prices and Unit PSEs per tonne are in the currency of respective Countries:EEC (ECU),
Japan ('000' yen), and US ($).
4 Level of Production and Net trade are in '000' tonnes; a negative sign represents net imports.
increase of CSEs by the same proportion was necessary.
This was modelled to reflect the change in market price
for consumers due to the reduction in price support to
the producers in EC and Japan. But in the US where
market price support represented only about 10 percent
or less of the PSEs for wheat and coarse grains, CSEs
were left unchanged. Results can be summarised in terms
of the effects on changes in trade flows, world
reference as well as producer and consumer price changes
in individual countries/region, and changes in total
welfare levels by commodity and region. The output of
this simulation are medium term results of the effects
of liberalisation.
The impact on world reference prices are discussed
first. Wheat and coarse grain prices per tonne rose by
US$ 1-2, the meat product prices fell by US$ 2-4, wool
prices rose by about US$ 3 and the dairy products prices
were almost unchanged. The changes in world reference
prices were not anticipated to be much higher given the
small degree of this partial liberalisation scenario
(ie, 10 percent reduction).
The effects of liberalisation on the trade flow of
commodities are reported next. Trade in beef and
sheepmeat from New Zealand is higher, but the trade flow
changes following liberalisation were less than 1
percent. Estimates of New Zealand's pork imports
increased by over 20 percent, coarse grains exports
increased by about 10 percent, and wheat imports
decreased by about 15 percent (figure 1). But with
initial quantities of trade in these commodities being
relatively small, actual changes were not quite as
significant.
Among the other countries in the MAFF model, EC trade in
wheat exports declined somewhat, but imports of coarse
grains increased by almost 10 percent from a modest
base. Changes in EC trade flow of other commodities
(beef, poultry and sheepmeats) were very negligible.
The Japanese trade in all the meat products (imports)
decreased. The decrease was about 5 percent for pork,
10 percent for beef and almost 40 percent in the case of
poultry meat. But both wheat and coarse grains trade
(imports) in Japan increased by about 5 percent.
Australian trade in pork and poultry (exports) was found
to decline by over 40 percent, from initial levels which
were quite small, and the EC trade in pork (exports)
also reduced by over 20 percent starting from a
relatively larger base.
For the US, the percentage changes in trade flow
following this low level partial grains liberalisation
was quite small. There was a 2-3 percent decline in
pork and sheepmeats imports as well as poultry and wheat
exports. Beef and coarse grains trade was almost
unchanged. The effects on the Canadian trade were also
quite small, where beef and pork exports were reduced,
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while poultry and sheepmeat imports were increased
somewhat. Canadian and Australian wheat and coarse
grains exports also increased by about 2-3 percent.
There were hardly any changes noticeable in the rest of
the world trade, except for some decline in the pork,
poultry and wheat trade. These results are consistent
with a-priori expectations of lower production levels
and an increase in net imports or a decrease in net
exports of coarse grains and wheat in EC, Japan and the
US, following assistance reduction.
The effects of grains liberalisation on changes in
producer prices were quite significant for the EC, Japan
and the US wheat and coarse grains producers (figure 2).
This was anticipated, owing to the tri-Iateral nature of
this liberalisation scenario. But the actual price
decline in the EEC and the US was only about 2-3 percent
and in Japan about 8-9 percent, even though the PSEs
were reduced by 10 percent. This was partly due to the
increase in world reference prices for both wheat and
coarse grains by about US$ 1-2 following liberalisation,
which compensated somewhat the reductions in assistance
levels. Prices for New Zealand wheat and coarse grains
producers also rose by about 2-3 percent, similar to the
rise for the Australian and the rest of the world
counterparts. The increases in Canadian wheat and
coarse grains prices for domestic producers were
somewhat smaller in percentage terms. The effects of
this 10 percenttri-Iateral grains liberalisation on
prices for producers of meat products was quite
negligible (under 1/2 percent) in all the countries
modelled, even though the world reference prices for
these products fell by SUS 2-4 per tonne in absolute
terms. For all the meat products included in the model,
the greatest decline (still under 1/2 percent) of
producer prices in relative terms was experienced by the
New Zealand producers.
The final results of the effects of trilateral grains
liberalisation are related to changes in total welfare
levels by commodities in the different countries and
region modelled (figure 3). This represents the sum
changes in producer and consumer welfare for each
commodity, and the tax payer savings in those countries
undertaking liberalisation. The country to benefit the
most as a result of this liberalisation scenario is
Japan, with benefits of about SUS 200 million in poultry
and over SUS 600 million in the case of coarse grains
(figure 3). The US producers, consumers and tax payers,
on the other hand, will lose between about SUS 25
million in beef and pork activity and around SUS 300
million in wheat and coarse grain activity. EC gains
between SUS 10 and 50 million in the beef, poultry and
pork activity and loses about SUS 40 million in the
wheat and coarse grains activities separately. The
welfare gains and/or losses in each of the different
activities were quite negligible in all the other
countries, including New Zealand.
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Results of the Overall Liberalisation Scenario
This is the most preferred scenario of New Zealand and
MAFF was used to verify the results in relation to
overseas work which has studied the effects of overall
(ie, MUlti-Country/Multi-Commodity) liberalisation.
These models (OECD/MTM, 1985; USDA/TLIB, 1987; ABARE,
1988) have similar economic structure, but differ in the
country/commodity coverage, due to their particular
focus of analysis, and the data and parameter values
used. They have also studied wide variations of the
overall liberalisation scenario and have used somewhat
different time periods to represent the level of
assistance (PSEs/CSEs) to agricultural producers. The
diversity of these models in relation to their specific
model structure as well as the data and parameter use is
summarised in table 2.
Table 2 Coverage and Data Comparisons of some Trade Models
Model 1
Coverage Prodn.
Country Commodity Parameters Disposn. Prices Policies Scenarios
1 OECD/MTM 11 (NZl) 14 Original 1979-81 1985 1979-81 5
1982-85
2 USDA-TUB 36 22 Revised 1984 1984/85 1984/85 several
- STUB 8 (AU/NZ) 13 1986
3 ABARE 12 (OX) 22 Revised 1986/87 1986 1984 10
4 MAFF 7 (NZ) 15 Original 1979-81 1985 1985 2
/upc!ates
Among these four models, the latter three are SWOPSIM generated models with differing
country/commodity coverage operating on micro computers, but are based on the economic
structure of the OECD/MTM model.
In each of these models, country coverage implies New
Zealand being represented separately (eg, OECD/MTM (NZL) i
MAFF (NZ», modelled together with Australia (USDA -
STLIBi AU/NZ) or represented as developed country
exporters (DX) among the Cairns group of countries
(ABARE). The extent of country coverage also indicate
the nature of the rest of the world (ROW) grouping. When
several countries/regions are modelled explicitly (eg
USDA - TLIB), the ROW will comprise of fewer countries;
but in the case of MAFF, the ROW represents all countries
besides the 6 modelled separately. The commodity
coverage also varies considerably across models, with the
USDA and ABARE versions representing a wider coverage in
comparison to the OECD/MTM and MAFF models (table 2).
The data used in these models also differ in relation to
the period of coverage of the production disposition (ie,
quantity data), the prices and the policies. While the
MAFF model is based on 1985 prices and policies (1986 for
New Zealand) and original 1979-81 quantity data from OECD
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sources, the OECD/MTM model uses sets of policies (ie,
averages) for two three year periods (ie, 1979-81 and
1982-85). The USDA models are based on 1984 quantity
data recently updated to 1986 and prices and pOlicies
prevailing during the 1984/85 season. The ABARE version
is also based on 1986 quantity and price data but uses
the 1984 policies for assistance levels (ie PSEs/CSEs) •
The OECD/MTM results are provided for five scenarios, of
which the ad valorem option results are used here for
comparison. The USDA-TLIB and STLIB models have been
used for the evaluation of several scenarios of which,
the developed country liberalisation results are
considered. The ABARE model results cover 3 levels of
partial liberalisation (ie, 10, 20 and 30 percent)
originating from 3 different sources (ie, all countries,
US/EC/Japan and Rest of the world), as well as a total
liberalisation (100 percent) scenario. For purposes of
comparison, the 10 percent level of liberalisation of all
countries is considered here. The results of two
liberalisation scenarios studied in a multi-lateral
framework using the MAFF model are reported here. In
modelling the liberalisation scenarios, the level of
assistance in the ROW group remains unchanged in all the
models.
Effects on World Reference Prices
Due to the need to validate the overall results across
models, percentage changes in world reference prices for
major -traded commodities following a partial (ie, 10
percent) overall (or developed country) liberalisation
are compared in table 3. These results relate to
specific scenarios identified in the previous section for
comparison and have to be viewed in relation to the
differences in model structure provided in table 2.
Table 3 Effects of Partial Overall Liberalisation on World Reference Prices of Major
Traded Commodities
Dairy1 Poul Sheep ~ ~
Models Milk Prod. Beef Pork -try Meats Wool Wheat Grains Beans
1 OECD/MTM2
(Percentage Changes)
2.7 1.5 -0.2 0.6 2.0 0.7 -0.3 -0.9 -1.5
2 USDA/STUB 3.3 1.9 6 7 3
3 ABARE 6.0 2-3 0.7 0.4 0.3 1.1 -3.5
4 MAFF 1.0 2-6 2.8 0.2 0.7 1.4 0.6 1.8 0.9 -0.1
Dairy products in the MAFF model comprise of Butter (4.1%), cheese (4.2%), whole milk
powder (1.5%), condensed milk (4.1%) and skim milk powder (6.4%) and the resulting
increases in world reference prices are reported within parentheses.
2 The OECD/MTM results are based on the Ad valorem scenario reducing assistance from the
1982-85 levels.
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As with other models, the greatest increase in world
reference prices were found for the dairy products and
the ruminant meat (ie, beef). Sheepmeat prices rose by
about 1-2 percent, while wool prices increased very
little. The changes in poultry and pork prices were very
minimal (less than 1%). The results from the MAFF model
suggest an increase in wheat (1.8 percent) and coarse
grains (0.9 percent) prices, but by a smaller magnitude
than the USDA model. Milk prices also rise in all the
models; but are the highest for the ABARE model (6
percent), the lowest for the MAFF model (1 percent) and
in between these two values for the OECD/MTM model at
about 3 percent. Dairy products are not treated
explicitly in the OECD/MTM model, while the USDA-STLIB
model results reported (Webb et aI, 1987) did not cover
the price changes for pork, poultry, sheepmeats, wool and
milk. The ABARE model did not include wool and price
changes for coarse grains and soybeans were reported to
be negligible. The effects on wheat and coarse grains
prices was small and negative in the OECD/MTM model,
while it was relatively larger and positive in the
USDA-STLIB model.
Summary and Implications
This paper identified some of the important issues in the
current agricultural trade negotiations and demonstrated
the use of a trade modelling framework to study the
effects of assistance based liberalisation to New Zealand
and its major trading partners. New Zealand requires the
capability to evaluate the different proposals and
scenarios in a proactive as well as reactive framework,
with emphasis on studying the effects of these measures
on trade, prices and welfare of commodities of
importance. The results of an overall (partial)
liberalisation scenario studied using the Policy Services
version of the trade model MAFF compared well with
findings of similar models.
The results of a tri-Iateral grain liberalisation
scenario studied suggest no appreciable trade or welfare
gains to New Zealand's major trading interests (ie, dairy
products, sheepmeats and beef) even though the trade was
not adversely affected. Welfare gains for Japan and
losses for the US were also observed, while in the EC
there were small gains in the meat activity at the
expense of minor losses in the wheat and coarse grains
activities. This information is very useful and is of
interest for trade negotiators from New Zealand as well
as other Countries. They also suggest the need to
maintain the momentum generated in the Uruguay round of
GATT negotiations for a multi-lateral liberalisation of
trade in all agricultural products. A PSE or some form of
aggregate measure based multi-lateral liberalisation
scenario can be viewed as feasible in this context.
Several issues of concern however, need to be addressed
to satisfy different countries that the effects of
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liberalisation will be beneficial and spread evenly
across all trading nations.
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Annex 1: Classification of Aggregate Measures Assistance
by policy Change
policy Measure
Assistance to output
NPR PAG ERP PSE ERA
via market prices
- tariffs, import quotas
- import quotas
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
via other means
- export incentives, inspection
- stabilisation activity and funds
- production bounties
- set aside payments
- subsidised marketing costs
Assistance to inputs
- fertiliser subsidies
- fuel tax exemptions
Assistance to value adding factors
- concessional credit
income tax concessions
research and extension
disaster relief
farm adjustment
conservation programmes
assistance to other activities
- protection of inputs
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Key: NPR = nominal rate of protection; PAG = price
adjustment gap; ERP = effective rate of protection;
PSE = producer subsidy equivalent; ERA = effective
rate of assistance
Sources: Adapted from USDA (1987a), BAE (1987)
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ANNEX 2: supply control and Direct Income Payments
Under the assistance reduction disciplines proposed by
the US and Cairns Group worthwhile reform of the major
producing countries' agricultural policies will, in the
current jargon, 'decouple' farm product prices from
producer incomes. Almost inevitably real product prices
will be cut, or will be allowed to fall. It is unlikely
that existing farmers will remain uncompensated for such
reductions. The strength of their lobby, and the social
pressures in favour of their remaining on the land will
ensure that those currently farming do not experience a
drastic reduction in government support. Rather a larger
proportion of assistance will be delivered in forms
which do not stimulate supply.
Domestic production quotas and direct income supports
are such methods, and this annex discusses the political
feasibility of these forms of assistance.
Domestic production quotas
Production quotas have certain advantages over open-
ended price supports:
1 Surplus output is curbed
2 Government expenditure is reduced
3 High cost production is cut, leading to a gain in
economic welfare.
However:
1 Consumer prices are raised: some of the budgetary
burden is shifted from taxpayers to consumers where
it is less visible and more difficult to restrain.
Welfare losses arise as consumption patterns are
distorted.
2 Quotas impede structural change in agriculture.
Quota rights could be made transferable mitigating
this disadvantage to the degree that farmers are
unconstrained by liquidity limits or uncertainties
about future policy.
3 Quotas are difficult to remove. If the quota
effectively reduces production (as it should)
withdrawal of the quota would lead to an increase
in production, or would require a significant price
cut - both politically awkward decisions.
4 Quotas for one product can raise the output of
other products. Under a milk quota regime, for
instance, beef production could expand.
5 Quotas are expensive to administer.
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Of alternatives to open-ended price supports, quotas
would be most likely to please farmers. But New
Zealand's goal of restoring international comparative
advantage to the operation of agricultural markets would
not be reached if domestic production quotas were
imposed on the farm sectors of developed countries.
Direct income support
There are, however, even greater difficulties associated
with the use of direct income supports:
1 Would the income support be offered as compensation
for reduced prices? The Cairns Group proposal
excepts "direct income support which is decoupled
from production and marketing" from the disciplines
applying to other forms of assistance to
producersS • It is left open whether direct paYments
would be correlated, to any degree, with income
levels applying before the disciplines were
imposed. For domestic political reasons it is
difficult to imagine acceptance of direct income
aids which did not restore at least some of the
income lost from price reductions. Such support,
proportional to past income - and therefore
production - levels, would not breach the Cairns
Group disciplines. There would be a practical
problem though, of determining by how much to
compensate farmers. This problem is more
complicated than determining the revenue lost from
price cuts. It requires assessment of the
alternative uses of farm resources~ Some, mostly
the bigger farms, will have more opportunities for
diversification than others. [Given the commodity
coverage specified in the US and Cairns Group
proposals diversification within agriculture may
not cause a problem here, but some farmers will be
more able to diversify out of agriculture.] So
replacement of price support by income aids of this
kind will require some jUdgement about the extent
of the alternative income sources enjoyed by, or
open to, the farm household.
If the new forms of income support were not
intended to be compensation for price cuts [and
were therefore flat-rate levels of income support]
then those farmers currently producing large
volumes, and so benefiting most from price
supports, would be big losers under Cairns Group
5 The US proposal exempts "direct income or other
paYments decoupled form production and marketing".
6 US: " .. all agricultural commodities, food, beverages,
forest products and fish and fish products". Cairns
Group: " ..widest possible range of agricultural
products".
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disciplines. Since these farmers are the most
powerful, politically, it is difficult to envisage
the proposals being implemented in this form.
The EC Commission in a special report7 identifies
the principal problem with its own modest income
aid scheme as being to define clearly the
beneficiaries of income aids. It is important, says
the Commission, that direct paYments be reserved
for farmers in real need. However the perception of
such a criterion varies greatly from one region of
the Community to another, with average agricultural
incomes in very productive areas as much as 17
times higher than in the least prosperous regions.
2 Direct income aids shift the basis of support from
commodities to people. One reason why farmers can
expect to resist this change is that it makes
comparisons with non-farmers, many of whom have
also suffered from structural change, inevitable.
Any compensatory scheme would almost certainly
treat farmers more generously than non-farmers, and
would be difficult to implement for this reason.
3 There is another practical problem in that the
expected budgetary gains from structural adjustment
in agriculture take a long time to realize fully,
while the peak demands for income support would
occur from the outset.
Discussion
If targeting of PSEs or similar aggregate measures of
support is not achieved in the MTN the negotiations
would probably have failed from New Zealand's point of
view. If it is achieved it is likely that the US, EC and
Japanese governments will consider production quotas or
direct income aids as important farm policy instruments.
The key questions following from the above discussion
are:
1 Whether direct income aids are going to be seen as
feasible alternatives to existing pOlicies by
sUbsidising governments, and
2 If not, how to formulate supply control disciplines
in such a way as to achieve New Zealand's
objectives most fully.
Of the difficulties associated with domestic production
quotas which are outlined above only number 5 (their
administrative cost) is a problem in so far as
sUbsidising governments are concerned. But
administrative costs have not previously deterred these
7 in "Agricultural Situation in the Community" for
1987.
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countries from similarly cumbersome agricultural support
arrangements. The other difficulties are either too long
term in nature or are otherwise irrelevant from the
viewpoint of current policy-makers in these countries.
This is not the case with the problems arising from
direct income support, as outlined above. with this form
of support budgetary and political difficulties arise
immediately. It therefore seems more likely that if the
US, EC and Japan significantly change their farm
policies they will move down the supply control route.
The implication of the above reasoning for New Zealand's
position on PSEs is that credit should be given for
supply control policies. Ways of doing this are
discussed in the main paper.
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THE INCIDENCE OF TRADE POLICIES ON AGRICULTURE:
THE CASE OF ECUADOR
Veronica Jardine, Grant M. Scobie and Gary R. Baker
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SUMMARY
Trade policies designed to protect or assist one sector of the economy have been shown to have
unintended disprotective effects on the other sectors of the economy. Trade policies designed to as-
sist the industrial (import-competing) sector by imposing tariffs on imports affect relative domestic
prices and distort incentives, with the result that the agricultural sector bears part of the costs of in-
dustrial protection as a tax.
This paper measures the effects of trade policy on relative prices, estimating the adjustments in
domestic markets for non-tradable goods in response to distortions in the markets for traded goods
induced by commercial policies in Ecuador from 1960 to 1986. Estimates of the incidence of protec-
tion on agriculture are made at various levels of aggregation.
Key Words: Protection, Incidence, Ecuador, Agriculture.
1. THE INTERSECTORAL EFFECTS OF TRADE POLICIES
Domestic trade policies designed to protect the import-competing sector of an economy have addi-
tional unintended effects on the exportable sector (see for example Sjaastad (1980c); Garcia (1981);
Clements and Sjaastad (1984); Tshibaka (1986); Oyejide (1986) and Bautista (1987a)). The export-
able and importable sectors together comprise the tradable portion of the economy, where goods
are traded internationally. The prices of tradable goods are set in world markets, while their domes-
tic prices reflect prevailing trade policies such as import tariffs, export taxes, export subsidies or im-
port licensing, and exchange rate policies. Home goods are thosewhich are not internationally traded.
Their prices are endogenously determined by supply and demand in domestic markets. Trade and
exchange rate policies affect the relative domestic prices of importables and exportables. In addition
to the direct effect captured by the traditional partial trade analysis, there is a "general equilibrium ef-
fect" through the price of home goods. This latter component is central to the approach adopted in
this paper. The effect of a tariff designed to protect the import-competing sector is transmitted to the
markets for home and exportable goods through factor markets and the demand structure of the
economy.
A tariff on imports will raise the domestic price of importable goods, causing resources to flow into
the importables sector, as rational domestic producers respond to the price incentives created by the
tariff and attempt to capture the rents it engenders. Users will adjust their consumption patterns to
use less of the higher priced goods. Since the price of home goods is determined by domestic supp-
ly and demand, an increase in the price of importables which alters domestic supply and demand will
be reflected in the relative price of home goods. The response of the relative price of home goods to
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the trade intervention in the importables sector determines the extent to which the home goods or
the exportables sector bear the costs of the protection afforded the importables sector.
The effect of trade policy on relative prices can be measured by estimating the adjustments in domes-
tic markets for non-tradable goods in response to distortions in the markets for traded goods induced
by trade policies. The incidence parameter ,w measures the change in the price of home goods rela-
tive to the price of exportables as result of the change in the price of importable goods relative to the
price of exportable goods, brought about by commercial policy. The substitutability in consumption
and production of goods in the three sectors determines which sector will bear the costs of commer-
cial policy.
If importable goods and home goods are close substitutes, then the price of home goods will also
rise in response to the increase in the price of importables, so that there will be little change in the
price of home goods relative to importables. Since home goods are mainly services, the price of
home goods can be thought of as nominal wages which form an input into the exportable sector. The
exportable sector is less able than the other sectors to absorb increased costs, since its prices are
determined on world market. With increased domestic costs and given world prices, the real price
facing exporters is likely to fall. The direct and intended effect of an import tariff is thus a reduction in
imports and the growth of the import-competing sector. The indirect and unintended consequence
of an import tariff is the imposition of higher costs on the exportable sector and a fall in the level of
both exports and imports. In this case the value of the incidence parameter will be high. If w = 1,
then the burden of protection of the importables sector is borne wholly by the exportables sector.
On the other hand, if exportable goods and home goods are close substitutes in production and con-
sumption, an increase in the price of importables brought about by an import tariff will draw resour-
ces from both the home goods and exportables sectors as the prices of home goods and export-
abies will rise by approximately the same amount. The protection of the importables sector will occur
at the expense of both the home goods and exportables sectors. In this case the incidence parameter
will be low. If w= 0, then the burden of protection is borne equally by the consumers of home goods
and producers of exportables.
The incidence parameter thus reveals the incidence of the burden of commercial policy between sec-
tors, which in turn depends on their consumption and production substitution relationships.
2. THE INCIDENCE PARAMETER IN A THREE SECTOR ECONOMY
The effect of trade policy can be estimated at various levels of aggregation. At its most aggregated,
an economy consists of three sectors, importable goods (m), exportable goods (x) and home goods
(h). The allocation of goods into each sector of the Ecuadorean economy, and the determination of
price indices for those sectors is described in Scobie, Jardine and Greene (1988).
Following Garcia (1981), we define the following notation:
Pm = domestic price of importables,
Px = domestic price of exportables,
P = domestic relative price between importables and exportables,
Ph = price of home goods,
Pm* = international price of importables,
Px* = international price of exportables,
p* = international relative price between importables and exportables,
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En = nominal exchange rate,
E = logarithmic differential operator (eg. EX = dlnX),
e = real exchange rate,
tm = import tariff,
tx = export tax,
T = a measure of relative trade polices,
Dh = demand for home goods,
Sh = supply of home goods,
Y = real income, and
Z = vector of supply shifters.
The domestic price of importables (Pm) is a function of the nominal exchange rate (En), the interna-
tional price (Pm*) and trade policy, represented here by an equivalent tariff on imports (tm).
Pm = En.Pm*(1 +tm)
The domestic price of exportables (Px) is a function of the nominal exchange rate, the international
price of exportables (Px*) and trade policy (tx), generally an export tax or import subsidy.
Px = En.Px*(1 +tx)
With only three sectors, there are two relative prices, so that
Pm/Ph = [En.Pm*(1 +tm)]/Ph
= (En/Ph)[Pm*(1 +tm)]
= ePm*(1 +tm), and
Px/Ph = [En.Px*(1 +tx)]lPh
= (En/Ph)[Px*(1 +tx)]
= ePx*(1 +tx),
where e is the real exchange rate (E/Ph). P is the domestic relative price between importables and
exportables, so that
P = Pm/Px,
= [ePm*(1 +tm]/[ePx*(1 +tx)],
= [Pm*(1 +tm]/[Px*(1 +tx)],
= [P*(1 +tm)]/(1 +tx), and
= P*T,
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where p* is the relative international price of importables and exportables p* =Pm*/Px*, and T is the
ratio of (1 +tm) to (1 +tx) so that T = (1 +tm)/(1 +tx).
The domestic relative prices of importables to exportables is thus a function of their international rela-
tive prices and trade policy. Where tariffs equal subsidies, so that T =1, the relative domestic price
equals the relative international price. When the international price of exportables equals the interna-
tional price of importables, then the domestic relative prices of importables and exportables are deter-
mined by trade policies.
Pm/Px = P*T
(Pm/Ph)/(Px/Ph) = P*T
Pm/Px = (Px/Ph)(P*T)
Now, assuming without loss of generality that Pm* = Px* = 1,
E(Pm/Ph) = E(Px/Ph) + ET,and
(EPm-EPh) = (EPx-EPh) + ET. (1 )
The market for home goods must clear domestically, with demand equalling supply in equilibrium.
The demand for home goods is a function of the relative prices of importables and exportables and
real income (y), while the supply of home goods is a function of the relative prices of importables and
exportables and a vector of supply shifters (Z).
Dh = Dh(Pm/Ph, Px/Ph, Y), and
Sh = Sh(Pm/Ph, Px/Ph, Z).
For the derivation of the incidence parameter (w) Y and Z are held constant, since the primary con-
cern is the effect of trade policy on relative prices.
Taking the log differentials.
EDh =" h.m(EPm-EPh) + " h.x(EPx-EPh), and
ESh =10 h.m(EPm-EPh) +Eh.x(EPx-EPh),
where" h.m and "h.x are the elasticities of demand for home goods with respect to the relative prices
of importables and exportables, and the corresponding supply elasticities are En.m and En.X. Equi-
librium in the home goods market requires that the excess demand be eliminated or
EDh-ESh = 0,
or ("h.m-Eh.m)(EPm-EPh) + ("h.x-Eh.x)(EPx-EPh) = 0,
-ym(EPm-EPh) +-yx(EPx-EPh) = 0,
Replacing (EPm-EPh) in (2) with (1),
-ym [(EPx-EPh) + ET] + -yx(EPx-EPh) =0,
(-ym +-yx)(EPx-EPh) + -ymET = 0,
EPx-EPh = -hml(-ym +-yx)]ET, or
EPx-EPh = -wET,
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(2)
(3)
where
w= 'Ym/{-ym +'Yx).
The incidence of trade policy on the tradable sectors depends on the relative size of the demand and
supply elasticities for importables and exportables. The incidence parameter (w) determines how the
price of home goods relative to export goods changes in response to commercial policy (T) through
its effects on the relative prices of exportables and importables.
Recall that
P = (Pm/Px) = (Pm/Ph)/(PxlPh) = P*T,
so that
EP = E(Pm/Ph)-E(PxlPh) = EP* +ET.
Now, assuming that the relative international price of importables to exportables (p* =Pm*/Px*) is
constant, so that EP* =0 and domestic relative prices reflect trade policies,
E(Pm/Ph)-E(PxlPh) = ET,
E(Pm-Ph)-E(Px-Ph) = ET,
EPm-EPx = ET.
From (3),
EPx-EPh = - wET,
and replacing ET with (4) and mUltiplying by -1,
EPh-EPx =w (EPm-EPx),
E(Ph/Px) = wE(Pm/Px).
Assuming that w is constant, after integration,
In(Ph/Px) = c + wln(Pm/Px)
(4)
which is the equation for measuring the value of the incidence parameter (w) in a three sector model
of the economy. The incidence or 'shift' parameter describes the relationship between the price of
home goods (Ph) and the price of tradable goods (Pm and Px). It can be viewed as the elasticity of
Ph/Pxwith respect to Pm/Px. It shows how much the price of home goods relative to exportables chan-
ges as a result of trade intervention in the importables sector which alters the price of importables
relative to exportables.
If w = 0, then the price of home goods increases in the same proportion as the price of exportables.
The burden of protection of the importables sector is then borne by both the home goods sector (who
are largely domestic consumers) and the exportables sector (who are largely producers of exports).
If w = 1, then the prices of home goods and importables rise in the same proportions as a result of
commercial policy. The burden of protection of the importables sector is therefore borne wholly by
the exportables sector, as resources flow from the exportables sector into the other sectors.
The incidence equation may also be specified when more than three sectors of an economy are iden-
tified.
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3. THE INCIDENCE PARAMETER IN A MULTI-SECTOR ECONOMY
In order to isolate the effects of trade policy on specific subsectors of the economy the three prin-
cipal sectors of the Ecuadorean economy were disaggregated into five sectors, and further disag-
gregated into seven sectors. The principles underlying the determination of the incidence equations
are the same for both levels of disaggregation. At the five sector level, importables and exportables
are separated into agricultural (a) and non-agricultural goods (n). Since agriculture in Ecuador is a
highly tradable activity, all home goods (h) are non-agricultural. The five sector breakdown comprises
Pam = domestic price of agricultural importables,
Pax = domestic price of agricultural exportables,
Pnm = domestic price of non-agricultural importables,
Pnx = domestic price of non-agricultural exportables, and
Ph = price of home goods.
The demand for home goods is a function of the relative prices of goods in all the other sectors and
real income (y), which is assumed to be constant. The supply of home goods is also a function of the
relative prices of goods in all the other sectors and a constant vector of supply shifters (Z).
Dh = Dh(Pax/Ph, Pam/Ph, Pnm/Ph, PnxlPh, V), and
Sh = Sh(Pax/Ph, Pam/Ph, Pnm/Ph, PnxlPh, Z).
Taking the log differentials and setting EDh - ESh = 0,
where 'Y ax = (1lh.ax-ch.ax), and so on for the other sectors.
Solving for EPh and letting 'Y = l.k'yk
so that
where wk = 'Ykh and l.kwk =1.
Now, select any of the RHS variables (sectors) as the numeraire (eg, agricultural exportables, ax) so
that
E(Ph/Pax) =wam(EPam/EPax) + wnx(EPnxlEPax)-+ wnm(EPnmlEPax),
which after integration yields an estimating equation of the form
In(Ph/Pax) = c + l.kwkln(Pk/Pax) (5)
In a like manner, am, nx and nm can be used as the numeraire to obtain four equations for the five
sector model.
Six equations for the seven sector model can be obtained in the same way. The five sector model of
the Ecuadorean economy was disaggregated into a seven sector model by separating agricultural
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exportables (ax) into basic (axb) and processed exports (axp); and agricultural importables (am) into
coastal (amc) and sierra (ams). This breakdown reflects the principal characteristics of the agricul-
tural sector where some commodities such as coffee and cocoa are processed before export; and
the geographical differences between coastal and upland agriculture. The notation for the seven sec-
tor model is as follows:
Paxb = domestic price of agricultural exportables (basic commodities),
Paxp = domestic price of agricultural exportables (processed commodities),
Pamc = domestic price of agricultural importables (coastal),
Pams = domestic price of agricultural importables (sierra),
Pnm = domestic price of non-agricultural importables,
Pnx = domestic price of non-agricultural exportables, and
Ph = price of home goods.
Equation (5) for the seven sector model with basic food agricultural exportables (axb) as the
denominator can be formulated as:
In(Ph/Paxb) = c + 2.kWkln(Pk/Paxb)
with corresponding equations for the other sectors.
4. THE RESULTS
The long run incidence parameter for Ecuador for the period 1965 to 1986 was estimated for the three,
five and seven sector levels of aggregation. The Cochrane-Orcutt method was used to correct for first
order autocorrelation in all the regression equations.
The statistical results of the regression used for the three sector model are good. Ninety four percent
of the variation in the relative price of home goods is explained by changes in the relative price of im-
portable goods. The results for the equation described by the three sector model are shown in Table
1.
Table 1: Ecuador: Estimates of the Incidence of Protection in a Three-Sector Model
(1965-1986)
Independent
Variable
Constant
In(Pm/Px)
Figures in brackets are t-values.
Dependent Variable
In(Ph/Px)
0.6839
(0.5500)
0.9730
(22.2839)
.94
0.0436
1.66
The high incidence parameter value of .973 indicates that the burden of protection is borne by the ex-
portables sector. A value close to 1 suggests that home goods and importables are close substitutes
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in Ecuador. A tariff on imports or a tax on exports falls almost wholly on exportable goods. A rise in
the price of importables is reflected in a rise in the price of home goods by almost an equivalent
amount, causing resources to flow from the export sector into the home goods and importables sec-
tors. Since home goods (services) are an input into the production of exportable goods, the rise in
their prices increases the costs of production of exportables, while the price of exportable goods are
set in world markets. Trade policies designed to protect domestic industry and reduce imports also
reduce the incentive to produce exportable goods and hence exports.
The model assumes, for analytical convenience, that real income and international prices are con-
stant, and that trade is balanced. Since these assumptions are not true over time, real income M
measured by Gross Domestic Product, the balance of trade (BT) and the terms of trade (TOT =
Pm*/Px*) were included as explanatory variables. The results of the equation including the addition-
al variables are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Ecuador: Estimates of the Incidence of Protection in a Three-Sector Model
(1965-1986)
Independent
Variables
Constant
In(Pm/Px)
TOT
InY
BT
Figures in brackets are t-values.
Dependent Variable
In(Ph/Px)
1.3695
(0.4345)
0.9936
(19.4750)
0.0477
(0.6629)
-0.0495
(-0.2260)
-0.0007
(1.2203)
.94
0.0451
1.68
The inclusion of the additional independent variables increases the value of the incidence parameter
to .9936.
Table 3: Ecuador: Estimates of the Incidence of Protection in a Three-Sector Model
(1976-1986)
Independent
Variables
Constant
In(Pm/Px)
R2adj
SER
D.W.
Figures in brackets are t-values.
Dependent Variable
In(Ph/Px)
0.5858
(0.5665)
0.9090
(10.6960)
.89
0.0475
1.98
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The estimation of the parameter is sensitive to the period of the estimation, indicating that omega
is, contrary to the assumptions, not constant. For the estimation of the absolute size of the trans-
fers of income between sectors for 1986, the incidence parameter for the period of 1976-1986 was
estimated.
Table 4: Ecuador: Estimates of the Incidence of Protection in a Five-Sector Model
(1965-1986
Independent Dependent Variable (Ph/Pj)
Variables
(Pi/Pj) Impact in Sector j
Intervention
in Sector i In(Ph/Pax) In(Ph/Pam) In(Ph/Pnx) In(Ph/Pnm)
Constant 0.8324 0.8324 0.8324 0.8324
(0.5364) (0.5364) (0.5364) (0.5364)
Pax 0.0661 0.0661 0.0661
(1.1422) (1.1422) (1.1422)
Pam 0.1025 0.1025 0.1025
(1.4201 ) (1.4201 ) (1.4201)
Pnx 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0213) (0.0212) (0.0214)
Pnm 0.8306 0.8306 0.8306
(10.7013) (10.7013) (10.7013)
R2adj .96 .95 .995 .95
SER 0.0473 0.0473 0.0473 0.0473
OW 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.67
Figures in brackets are t-values.
The disaggregation of the economy into five sectors results in a series of equations, forming the matrix
of results shown in Table 4. The equations for the disaggregated models take the form
In(Ph/Pj) = c +Ii wij.ln(Pi/Pj),
measuring the impact of an intervention in sector i on the relative price in sector j. Table 5 shows
the matrix of results for the seven-sector disaggregation.
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Table 5: Ecuador: Estimates of the Incidence of Protection in a Seven-Sector Model
(1965-1986)
Independent Dependent Variable (Ph/Pj)
Variables
(Pi/Pj) Impact in Sector j
Intervention
in Sector i In(Ph/Paxb) In(Ph/Paxp) In(Ph/Pamc) In(Ph/Pams) In(Ph/Pnx) In(Ph/Pnm)
Constant 0.9527 0.9527 0.9527 0.9527 0.9527 0.9527
(0.4754) (0.4754) (0.4754) (0.4754) (0.4754) (0.4754)
Paxb 0.1236 0.1236 0.1236 0.1236 0.1236
(1.9281) (1.9283) (1.9281) (1.9280) (1.9281)
Paxp -0.0694 -0.0694 -0.0694 -0.0694 -0.0694
(-1.2216) (-1.2216) (-1.2215) (-1.2216) (-1.2217)
Pamc 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065
(0.119) (0.1149) (0.1149) (0.1149) (0.1149)
Pams 0.1742 0.1742 0.1742 0.1742 0.1742
(1.3209) (1.3208) (1.3208) (1.3208) (1.3209)
Pax 0.0096 0.0096 0.0096 0.0096 0.0096
(0.2701 ) (0.2701) (0.2701) (0.2701) (0.2701)
Pnm 0.7555 0.7555 0.7555 0.7555 0.7555
(6.9253) (6.9253) (6.9253) (6.9253) (6.9253)
R2adj .99 .99 .98 .96 97 .96
SER 0.0463 0.0463 0.0463 0.0463 0.0463 0.0463
DW. 1.86 1.86 1.86 1.86 1.86 1.86
Figures in brackets are t-values.
The effect of true protection afforded anyone subsector on any other can be estimated using the dis-
aggregated "omega" parameters. True protection in sector (i) is measured by its price relative to other
goods, so that
In general it can be shown that
(7)
where OJ = 1 - IiWij (i ;c j)
Equation (7) describes the relation between a change in the true protection to sector i on the real
price of sector j. For example, in order to examine the effect of an increase in the true protection to
manufacturing (i = nm) on basic agricultural exportables Q= axb) , while holding constant the real
prices in all the other sectors,
E(Paxb/Ph) = -(1/Oaxb)·wnm.axbE(Pnm/Ph).
72
(8)
From the results in Table 5, it can be shown that this implies that a 1% increase in the true protection
to manufacturing would result in a true tax on basic agricultural exportables of 6.11 percent. This high-
lights the sensitivity of the agricultural sector to protection of the manufacturing sector in Ecuador.
While the impact true protection afforded each of the sectors can conceptually be estimated on any
other sector, the task has proved empirically difficult. The negative value for omega for the processed
agricultural exportables sector (axp) suggests that processed agricultural exportables are comple-
ments and not substitutes for protected goods from the manufacturing sector, clearly a less than in-
tuitive result!
These results constitute preliminary estimation of the disaggregated intersectoral impact of protec-
tion. The aggregate transfers arising from trade policy in Ecuador for the period 1965 to 1986 are
quantified in the next section.
5. GAINS AND LOSSES FROM PROTECTION
The aggregated model makes it possible to measure the absolute size of the transfers arising form
commercial policy between sectors in a three sector economy. Clements and Sjaastad (1984) develop
a matrix which can be used to estimate the size of the burden of protection to each of five groups in
the economy: producers of exportable goods; producers of importable goods; consumers; taxpayers
and the government. The analysis concerns only the magnitude of the transfers between groups and
not the costs of making the transfers.
Clements and Sjaastad (1984) hypothesize that
d = tx + w[tm-tx)
where
d = the increase in the price of home goods
tm = the average import tariff
tx = the average export tax
(9)
The nominal distortion, or net protection introduced by trade policy is the difference between export
taxes (or subsidies) and tariffs (tm-tx). If these two policies offset each other, so that with zero net
protection tm = tx, there would be no real effects on the price of home goods, implying that d = tm
= tx. With positive net protection, prices of home goods will therefore rise by the amount of the ex-
port tax plus some proportion, determined by the incidence parameter, of the net protection (tm-tx).
The incidence parameter therefore indicates how the burden of net protection is distributed between
sectors, since it is that fraction of the net protection of importables translated into an implicit tax on
exportables through the increase in the price of home goods (nominal wages).
If w is zero, then from (9) d = tx• so that the prices of home goods and exportables have risen by
equal proportions. If w = 1, then d = tm, which indicates that the burden of protection is borne whol-
ly by the exportables sector, since the price of importables and home goods will rise by the same
amounts.
The true tariffs and taxes are defined as the changes in the domestic prices of importables and ex-
portables relative to home goods brought about by commercial policy interventions, so that
tm* =8 Pm/8 Ph,
= (tm-d)/(1 +d), and
tx* = 8 Pxl8 Ph,
= (tx-d)/(1 +d).
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The matrix of transfers is shown in Table 6, as a fraction of GOP.
Table 6: Transfers arising from Protection (fractions of GOP)
From
Import
Competing
Firms
Consumers
To
Taxpayers Government Total
Exporters o wtm*cxl(1-w) o wtm*X/(1-w) wtm*qxl(1-w)
Consumers tm*qm o tm*M tm *Cm
Government o o tm*(M + (wX/(1-w))) tm*(M + (wX/(1-w)))
TOTAL
where
tm*qm wtm*cxl(1-w) tm*(M + (wX/(1-w))) tm*(M + (wX/(1-w)))
Source: Clements and Sjaastad (1984, p.60)
qx = value of production of exportables,
qm = value of production of importables,
x = value of exports,
M = value on imports,
Cx = (qx - X) = value of consumption of exportables, and
Cm = (qm + M) = value of consumption of importables.
The elements of the matrix are expressed in terms of the true tariff, tm*, since a weighted average of
the true tariff and tax is zero,
wtm* + (1-w)tx* = 0,
so that the true tax can be expressed as
tx* = -tm*w/(1-w),
which is exactly analogous to equation (8).
Exporters experience a loss on the full amount of the value of exportables, qx, at the rate of the ex-
port tax (tx*) so that the total transfer from exporters is
Te = -tx*qx
= wtm*qxl(1-w).
Exporters will therefore lose whenever an import tariff is imposed (tm* > 0). The implicit tax on ex-
porters is transferred to the government. The lower domestic prices of exportable goods represent a
transfer to consumers, so that
wtm*qxl(1-w) = tx*(cx + X),
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-tx*X = wtm*X/(1-w),
-tx*Cx = wtm*cxi(1-w).
Although consumers gain from the lower prices paid for the domestic consumption of exportable
goods, they lose due to the higher prices they pay for importable goods as the result of a tariff. The
loss from consumers is transferred to import-competing firms, and to the government through import
tariffs, so that
tm*Cm = tm*qm + tm*M.
The net position of consumers is determined by their gains and losses, so that
To = wtm*cxi(1-w) -tm*Cm.
Consumers will experience a net gain when the incidence parameter exceeds the share of import-
abies as a proportion of the total consumption of tradable goods.
Producers of import-competing goods will experience a gain whenever an import tariff is imposed
(tm* >0). Importing competing firms gain from the increased production of importable goods as a
result of the higher prices brought about by a tariff, so that the total transfer to producers in the im-
portables sector is
The government gains revenue from tariffs on imports and taxes on exports, which is assumed to be
transferred to taxpayers through an equivalent reduction in other taxes, so that the net transfer to tax-
payers is
Tt = tm*M- tx*X
= tm*[M+ {wX/(1-w)}].
Since taxpayers are also likely to be consumers (although producers are also taxpayers) the net trans-
fer to this group is
To + Tt = [wtm*Cm/(1-w) - tm*Cm] + tm*[M + {wX/(1-w)}),
which will be positive if
That is, they will benefit from protection as long as the incidence parameter exceeds the share of im-
portables in total production of tradables.
Following Choi and Cumming (1986), production and trade data for Ecuador for the latest available
year, 1986, was used to calculate domestic consumption (Greene, Scobie and Ortiz, 1988; and
Scobie and Jardine, 1988). The production, trade and consumption figures are expressed in terms
of GOP in Table 7.
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Table 7: Ecuador: Production, Trade and Consumption (1986)
Sucres GOP
(millions) %
Production of exportables (qx)
Production of importables (qm)
Exports (X)
Imports (M)
Consumption of exportables (cx)
Consumption of importables (cm)
GOP
531,454
732,578
321,500
317,300
209,954
657,741
1,366,304
39
54
24
23
15
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For Ecuador, the 3 sector incidence parameter for the period 1976 to 1986 and the average import
tariff and the average export tax for Ecuador estimated in Keeler, Scobie and Greene (1987) were ap-
plied to the GOP percentages according to the matrix formulae, where
tm = average import tariff = 0.4
tx = average export tax = -0.1
w = incidence parameter = 0.9090
so that
d = tx + w(tm-tx)
tm* = tm-d/(1 +d)
tx* = tx-d/(1 +d)
= 0.3865,
= 0.0097, and
= 0.3509.
Table 8 shows the transfers of income arising from protection as a fraction of GOP. In Table 9 the
transfers are expressed in millions of sucres.
Table 8: Ecuador: Transfers arising from Protection (1986)
(% of Gross Domestic Product)
To
From Import-
competing Consumers Taxpayers Government Total
Firms
Exporters 0 1.5 0 2.3 3.8
Consumers 0.5 0 0.2 0.7
Government 0 0 2.5 2.5
Total 0.5 1.5 2.5 2.5
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Table 9: Ecuador: Transfers arising from Protection (1986)
(Millions of Sucres)
To
From Import-
competing Consumers Taxpayers Government Total
Firms
Exporters 0 20,495 0 31,425 51,920
Consumers 6,831 0 2,733 9,564
Government 0 0 34,158 34,158
Total 6,831 20,495 34,158 34,158
Table 10: Ecuador: Net Gains and Losses from Protection (1986)
Exporters
Import-Competing
Firms
Consumers/
Taxpayers
%GDP
-3.8
+0.5
+3.3
Millions of Sucres
- 51,920
+ 6,831
+ 45,089
Table 10 shows the net gains and losses to exporters, producers of importable goods, and consumers
cum taxpayers. The benefits of protection for the importable sector and consumers/taxpayers are en-
tirely at the expense of the exportable sector, which experiences a substantial net loss amounting to
16 percent of the revenue from exports in 1986.
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The evidence for Ecuador from a three sector model is clear. The protection of the importables sec-
tor has occurred at the cost of disprotection of the exportables sector. The costs of trade policies are
borne overwhelmingly by the export sector, and outweigh the benefits of protection to the import-
competing sector.
Ecuador's trade policies have had a pervasive effect on agriculture. The tradability of the agricul-
tural sector has meant that agricultural production has been sensitive to policies designed to
protect the import-competing sector. The extent to which trade policies have affected the incen-
tives to agriculture can be established by measuring the partial on disaggregated incidence
parameters. This paper has endeavoured to establish a consistent theoretical framework for es-
timating these partial incidence parameters. While the preliminary results are encouraging, empiri-
cal challenges remain.
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OPERATING A R&D ORGANISATION IN THE USER-PAY ENVIRONMENT
T.D. Heiler
New Zealand Agricultural Engineering Institute
Lincoln College, Canterbury, New Zealand
SUMMARY
The reasons for confusion in the user-pay R&D funding environment in
New Zealand are explored and the recent experiences of the New Zealand
Agricultural Engineering Institute (NZAEI) in adjusting to real funding reductions
of 30 per cent are explained. Important issues of transactional cost, competition,
public accountability and organisational structure are identified. Suggestions are
made about the way in which the present situation can be improved in the
interests of excellence, efficiency and accountability in R&D.
Key words: R&D, User-Pay, NZAEI
FUNDING ENVIRONMENT FOR R&D IN NEW ZEALAND
The outstanding characteristics of the current environment for Government
support ofR & D in New Zealand are confusion and uncertainty, which has meant
that the &UPport mechanisms for R&D in the non-government sector are equally
uncertain of what their objectives should be, let alone what mechanisms are
necessary to achieve them.
The main reason for this situation is the absence of a clear Government-policy on
its own role, despite a good deal of (conflicting) advice from the Beattie Report that
it commissioned itself; suggestions from the Science and Technology Advisory
Committee (STAC), set up by Government to take the work of the Beattie
Committee further; and advice given in a number of review papers written by
Treasury about how it sees the role of Government in the R&D area.
Despite the lack of a clear policy, there have been, however, definite Government
actions in respect of funding for R&D in the agricultural area. These actions
have taken the form offunding reductions to the budgets oforganisations receiving
Government support. By and large, the reductions have been inconsistent, as
evidenced by the way in which they have been applied to different categories of
R&D organisations, such as the research associations, universities, research
institutes, and to the two large governmental R&D agencies -- DSIR and
MAFTech. To illustrate this point, Figure 1 shows the reductions made in the
government funding to the total DSIR vote, MAFTech (which includes the
combined operations of the earlier Advisory Services and Agricultural Research
Divisions) and the New Zealand Agricultural Engineering Institute (NZAEI), over
the period of the fiscal years1983/84 to 1987/88, expressed in real terms as a
percentage of 1983/84 dollars.
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Figure 1: Reductions in Government Funding to Several R&D Organisations in
New Zealand.
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The inconsistencies evident in Figure 1, and which are typical insofar as actions
affecting other R&D organisations are concerned, are disturbing for two reasons:
(a) they ignore the relative payments to alternative public investments; and (b)
they alter the relative abilities of different agencies to win private contracts for
their services. In the absence of clear policies and implementation procedures on
the part of Government, it would seem that the absolute support given to a
particular agency is largely determined by its ability to influence decision-making
on grounds not necessarily related to objective measures of relative performance.
The response to this situation in the nonagovernment sectors of the economy who
have traditionally been the beneficiaries of government-sponsored R&D, has been
to recognise a responsibility for additional levels of industry funding support.
Each industry sector has responded in a different way because of its structure and
ability to generate support monies from its members. As a consequence,
government R&D agencies have shown interest in cultivating industry sectors
where, for whatever reason, support monies are accessible, resulting in resource
allocations that do not necessarilyreflect the in-house R&D priorities of the
organisations themselves. As a final point it should be noted that the current level
of R&D support on offer through the existing industry groups is very much less
than the budget shortfalls resulting from Government funding reductions, and is
likely to remain so in the immediate future. This has created a real problem of
excessive transactional costs, as discussed later.
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Given this general overview of the funding environment for agricultural R&D in
New Zealand, it is clear why confusion and uncertainty exist within the R&D
organisations affected. Each organisation has responded to this environment in its
own way. The remainder of this paper describes how the NZAEI has and is
operating in this situation.
NZAEI - A PROFILE
In order to relate the operational experiences of NZAEI in the user-pay R&D
environment, it is useful to briefly review its institutional situation and resources.
NZAEI is an institute of Lincoln College, set up under a contract between the
College and the Crown in 1963. It is located in facilities on the Lincoln College
campus with a North Island station at Hamilton. The establishment contract
provides for the Institute to be controlled by a Management Committee, whose
representation is prescribed under its Constitution, and which is a committee of
Lincoln College Council. The Institute has no separate legal identity and its staff
are legally staffofLincoln College, with currently about 50% engaged and paid on
a version of the academic tenure system, and 50% on short and medium term
contract.
The Institute is N.Z.'s major centre of excellence in agricultural engineering. In
accordance with the terms ofits Constitution and 25 years experience in providing
engineering expertise to solve problems in N.Z.'s agricultural and horticultural
industries, the Institute provides a range of technical services associated with
three interrelated activities: (a) Research and Development; (b) Specialised
Consulting and Testing; and (c) Commercial Ventures. Its major client for
providing approved R&D services and conducting projects is the Government,
paid for by annual grant via Vote Agriculture to Lincoln College, based on a
submitted annual work programme. Products of the R&D activity enhance the
ability of the Institute to conduct specialised consultancy assignments on behalf of
government and non-government clients. Increasingly in recent times, R&D
products also form the basis of commercial ventures with a variety ofjoint-venture
partners. It must be emphasised that NZAEI is not a "research" organisation in
the accepted classical sense -- it does not allocate resources to activities where the
principal outcome is "knowledge". Institute resources devoted to long-term
strategic projects have as their desired outcome an acceptable return on
investment, whosoever captures these returns (the public, diverse beneficiaries in
an industry sector, or some as-yet-to-be identified commercial entity).
Institute staff numbers of 40 include 20 professionals (mostly engineers of all
disciplines), 15 expert sub-professionals and 5 support staff. All but 5
professionals are located on the Lincoln College campus. The Institute controls
specialised laboratory, workshop and computing facilities.
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Unlike many product-orientated research groupings which have been developed
alongside a particular industry sector, the Institute's work cover all sectors of
N.Z.'s agricultural and horticultural industries. The percentage of total resources
allocated to work in various activity areas is shown in Table 1 for the period
1984/85 - 1987/88, which illustrates changes in resource allocation driven by
market contact and changing circumstances. By way of comparison, the
percentages of resources devoted to outside earnings in the same activity areas are
shown in Table 2.
Table 1: Total Resource Allocation by NZAEI in Various Activity Areas
84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88
-----------------9b-----------------
Water Resources 4 3 6 7
Water Application 7 10 5 12
Frost Protection 13 12 10 3
Waste Management 2 1 1 1
Structures 10 8 9 16
Horticultural Mechanisation 14 21 12 4
Agricultural Mechanisation 27 18 13 19
Tractors 8 5 5 1
Tractor Safety Frames 2 3 1 3
Post Harvest Handling, Processing 11 14 29 29
General 2 5 9 5
1009b 1009b 1009b 1009b
Table 2: Sources of Outside Earning by NZAEI in Various Activity Areas
84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88
-----------------9b-----------------
Water Resources 7 7 8 13
Water Application 4 4 4 7
Frost Protection 29 11 11 4
Waste Management 4 3 1 3
Structures 3 4 8 21
Horticultural Mechanisation 10 23 7 5
Agricultural Mechanisation 19 10 12 4
Tractors 14 10 5 4
Tractor Safety Frames 8 17 10 9
Post Harvest Handling, Processing 7 24 24
General 2 4 10 6
1009b 1009b 1009b 1009b
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SOURCES OF INCOME FOR NZAEI
The details of government grant allocated and outside earnings achieved over the
period 1984/85 to 1987/88 are given in dollar terms in Table 3.
Table 3: Funding Source for NZAEI
Government Outside Total
Grant Earnings Earnings
--------------------$--------------------
(Outside Earnings)
Total
%
84/85
85/86
86/87
87/88
1,189,000
1,443,213
1,558,000
1,558,000
359,391
380,668
387,774
474,835
1,548,391
1,823,881
1,945,774
2,032,835
23.2
20.9
19.9
23.4
There are several points worth making here. The government grant for 1984/85
and 1985/86 reflects the first funding cuts imposed on the Institute -- basically 90%
of the 1982/83 grant held for 2 years, but partly adjusted for inflation and an
unexpected HSC increase in 1985/86. From 1986/87 the second set of funding
reductions was put in place for a period of 3 years (up to and including 1988/89),
setting the government grant in fixed dollars. The overall effect of these two-stage
reductions has been to see a funding reduction in real terms of 30 per cent from the
1983/84 base (see Figure 1).
The outside earnings have increased steadily over the period (Table 3) in dollar
terms, but not as dramatically as a percentage of total budget. The activity areas
that have generated the outside earnings are shown previously in Table 2. There
has been a dramatic shift in the client source for outside earnings, as shown in
Table 4, with decreasing reliance on government and quasi-government sources
and increased activity with private sector clients and with overseas project work.
The implications of this are discussed later.
Table 4: Analysis ofNZAEI Outside Earnings by Client Source
Outside Government Quasi-
Earnings Departments Government Private Overseas
$ (%) (%) (%) (%)
84/85 359,391 39.7 28.3 29.1 2.9
85/86 380,668 37.6 5.9 52.3 4.2
86/87 387,774 21.2 9.2 60.4 9.2
87/88 474,835 21.3 6.2 59.1 13.4
As a matter of record, the unpreparedness ofNZAEI to meet the funding shortfalls
from 1984/85 onwards is illustrated by the fact that annual outside earnings over
the two years previous to 1984/85 (excluding a one-off LFTB contract) averaged
about $70,000, as illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2:' Growth in Outside Earnings
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OPERATIONAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGED FUNDING
CIRCUMSTANCES
The material presented up to this point has been included so as to provide a
background to the experiences ofNZAEI during the period of funding cut~backs.
For the purpose of focussing discussion on what have been found to be important
issues to be confronted by the Institute, the operational and policy implications of
the funding cut-backs will be discussed under the following headings:
• Research and Development Work Programme
• Client Portfolio and Transactional Costs
• Competition and Joint Venturing for Contracts
• Public Accountability Issues and Confidentiality
• Internal Organisational Changes
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Research and Development Work Program
In the period prior to the funding cuts (pre 1984/85) the research and development
programme of the Institute was generated within internal sectional groupings
organised as working teams on the basis of the traditional activity areas of
agricultural engineering.
In 1983/84 these categories consisted of: soil and water engineering, machinery
and mechanisation, environmental engineering and structures/services. Each of
the 4 major sections generated project proposals within discipline areas, budgetted
and justified work on the basis of importance to the problem addressed, perceived
benefits without regard to beneficiaries, relationship to current knowledge in the
area, and use of total resources. This programme was subsequently ratified by the
Management Committee. During this period there was little real attention given
to attracting outside funding, although in 1978/79 this approach still realised
about $50,000 in bits and pieces of outside support.
It is clear in hindsight that the R&D projects conducted in this period were
already reasonably well-targetted to "future" industry needs, despite their
sub-discipline orientation, and the advances made provided the platform of
knowledge and technology for a more vigorous exploitation of commercial
advantage from 1984/85 onwards.
The experiences since 1984/85 have seen a marked shift of emphasis in the R&D
programme. To a large extent, the problems of meeting funding shortfalls
re-directed interest away from activities where the short-term prospects ofincome
generation were not promising. During this period, a large number of NZAEI
contract staff were subjected to the uncertainty of contract renewal periods of 1
(one) month in 1984/85(!) and were extended through 3, 6, 9 and finally 12 month
periods from 1986/87 onward. Without significant financial reserves, longer
contract period committments could not be made, and the Institute as a whole saw
itself literally fighting for its survival as an organisation.
The perspective in mid-1988 is somewhat brighter. The vigorous pursuit ofoutside
earnings have given more scope for devoting resources to R&D activity that is
more speculative and is designed to rebuild the intellectual capital of the
organisation so as to enhance future activities.
The R&D projects that are now being actioned are also identified and developed
in a completely different way to the discipline-driven projects of earlier times. As
will be described later, internal management changes have resulted in a
dismantling of line-control based on discipline areas, and this has given the
Institute the ability to have a multi-disciplinary approach to problems and
opportunities identified by the market. A system has also been developed whereby
responsibilities for knowledge of and contact with the market is given to key
individuals. This system now provides a good deal of the ideas that are taken to
project proposal status in the R&D area.
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Client Portfolio and Transactional Costs
The clients for the Institute's services where outside funding is involved consist of
government and quasi-government agencies, producer boards, service industries,
private sector companies, and a small number of corporate farmer clients (see
Table 4). The Institute does not usually deal directly with farmers and growers
because ofits geographical limitations and its relationship with MAFTech.
The size of the Institute contract is on average small. Table 5 shows the number of
contracts and average size of contract for each year of the period 1984/85 to
1986/87. The average figure is distorted to some extent because of the provision of
a large number of cost-effective computer-based services in testing and analysis.
Nonetheless, the market segment that the Institute serves is such as to involve
numbers of contracts to be negotiated and services offered disproportionately large
for the size of the organisation and the amounts ofmoney involved.
Table 5: Analysis of Numbers and Average Value of Contracts
Number of Contracts
Average Value ($)
84/85
135
2,662
85/86
131
2,906
86/87
166
2,231
87/88
137
3,465
Table 5 shows this situation to be improving, in that average earnings per contract
are higher. With more experience there is better performance also in screening
project opportunities that are unlikely to result in contract earnings.
The problem of transactional costs with such a large number of contracts is a
reality, and is especially difficult where there is more than one beneficiary group
being approached for contributions. The nature of the Institute's work is such that
this situation is quite common. By way of example, a recent project aimed at
improving the economics of spreading reactive phosphate rock (RPR), involved two
importers, two machinery manufacturers, the Groundspread Association, and
though they could not be identified, present and future pastoral farmers who will
benefit from cheaper spreading costs for RPR. Even given a clear appreciation by
the Institute at the time of project formulation of the potential difficulties in
getting a consensus from these sources of potential funding, it must be said that
such situations invite the risk of excessive transactional costs. It is obvious from
our experience that the transactional cost problem will not be reduced until there
are clearer policies and procedures for funding projects of interest and benefit to
the market players.
The most common denominator in multi-beneficiary funding contracts, apart from
the transactional cost issue, is that of the "free rider" problem, where the
beneficiaries involved have difficulties in apportioning benefits in relation to costs
and use this as a basis for extended negotiations. This has a lot to do with the
present number and structure of producer boards and industry associations.
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The current way in which the non-government support system for R&D has
responded to the user-pay policy has inefficient features for all players. Until it is
changed though, the same players will attempt to adjust to their respective needs,
and the danger may be that very valuable resources ofR & D capability may be
lost in the process.
Competition and Joint Venturing for Projects
Many groups within the R&D community have still yet to be seriously affected by
the user-pay environment. This has happened because the inherent inertia in
many large agencies have buffered them from the realities facing their colleagues
in more exposed situations. However, "the word is out", and such groups have the
perception of threat to their status quo, and compete for contracts with little or no
experience of the real costs in undertaking R&D on a commercial basis. The nett
result of this is seen when the R&D community puts forward proposals to
producer board research committees. It is the experience of the Institute that
when marginally-costed (i.e. subsidised) proposals are considered alongside fully-
costed proposals, the research committees are inclined to favour those that promise
more than the support requested justifies. This is an inevitable consequence of the
lack of a coherent and consistent policy for arranging government and non-
government support for R&D activities, and runs the danger of the more exposed,
but not necessarily the least worthy, organisations being unsuccessful. Another
feature of this situation is that it can be difficult to arrange a joint venture with
consistent charging between partners that are exposed differently to the user-pay
environment, and this creates obvious problems with the prospective client.
Public Accountability Issues and Confidentiality
Noone who has operated in the real market place for R&D services believes in
the simplistic and Treasury-promulgated view that there are only two recognisable
extremes of a continuium between "non-appropriable" and "appropriable" R&D
activities. The difficulty is that refutals are hard to find, at least in print. One
wonders why -- perhaps it is because the jargon of the dogma has not got a word
for that in-between activity where a beneficiary captures and pays for some of the
benefits of contract R&D, but where the substantial benefits accrue in a longer
time-frame to such a diverse set of beneficiaries that their input cannot be
captured. Or is it that the simplistic logic involved has some appeal to the
scientific mind?
This is a key dilemma of R&D groups in the current environment. On the one
hand, projects can be "dressed up in dinner suits" and put into the long-term, basic
or whatever category that justifies support under the current policy approaches
suggested by Treasury -- this automatically means that vigorous efforts may not be
made to attract part-funding from identifiable beneficiaries, in that the
"non-appropriable" status of the project might be jeopardised. The nett result is
that the desired "market-led" philosophical shift in R&D resource allocation may
not be achieved because of a simplistic and unrealistic policy perspective of the
real world. There is no doubt that government-funded research organisations are
aware of and are prepared to exploit this dichotomy between philosophical
direction ·and naive interpretations as to how it may be achieved.
88
Most R&D organisations, in response to the dichotomy referred to above, are in
the process ofre-stating their research activities, programmes and projects in such
a way that they are well-positioned to secure their share of the government
funding that will continue to be allocated for R&D activity in New Zealand, on
the basis of being in the non-appropriable category, and it must be questioned
whether this will achieve the obviously desirable objective of making public
investment in R&D more market-led, transparent, accountable and efficient.
How we do this with the systems we finally adopt will be of crucial importance to
our ultimate place in the international community.
As R&D programmes become more dependent upon private sector funding, it is
the experience ofNZAEI that confidentiality issues become more important. This
conflicts with the accepted international policy of free exchange of scientific
informat!on between R&D organisations via the scientific literature. Whether
the public exposure ofR & D activity is restricted because it is restricted by client
confidentiality requirements, or simply because the time for the preparation of
scientific papers cannot be supported for financial reasons, the result is the same --
potentially very dangerous because the basic test of the value of R&D is peer
review. This issue is not one for conjecture insofar as NZAEI is concerned. We are
very conscious of the reduction in the number of our published papers in recent
years and the associated increase in Confidential Reports.
Internal Organisational Changes
Reference has been made previously to the dismantling of discipline-orientated
work groupings with NZAEI in favour of multi-disciplinary work groupings. The
benefits that have flowed from these changes have been that team projects are
able to be organised efficiently and that rigid "demarcation" issues are avoided.
The danger is that excellence is lost in the conduct of the disciplines. It is our
experience that this can be maintained by informal technical linkages within the
discipline groups, although it must be questioned if this is sustainable in the
long-term in the absence of an adequate number of published papers and
associated peer-group reviews. .
The relative success of NZAEI in sustaining viability in recent years in the face of
an apparently difficult situation in terms of an agricultural recession, small
organisational size, limited reserves ofcash or capital, and specialised skills, is due
largely to organisational unity. All of the aforementioned disadvantages can be
turned into opportunities if the approach and committment of staff can be
achieved. This is obviously an easier task with a staffof 40 rather than 400 and it
is more achievable with flexible staff employment arrangements and the absence
of an excessively bureaucratic structure. Nonetheless, it can be argued that there
can be distinct relative advantages in R&D groupings ofmodest size that may not
be achievable in large science bureaucracies linked directly to the political and
departmental system.
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IDEAS FOR THE FUTURE
Government Support Mechanisms for Basic and Strategic Research
(a) From the NZAEI perspective, there is much to commend the general ideas
promulgated by STAC to establish three funding Foundations -- Medical,
Social Services and Science and Engineering -- that each control a significant
proportion of research funding provided by Government; reflect Government
priorities as to the support to be given to each activity area; and determine on
the basis of agreed criteria the allocation of support monies to successful
project proposals. Such a system must be capable of encouraging the most
excellent and efficient grouping of science resources on offer, regardless of the
institutional persuasion of those making up the staff resources in the
proposal.
(b) Support through this mechanism should be for basic and strategic research
projects only, but a realistic view must be taken about assessing the projects
that do not fall neatly into the strategic research category because of their
apparent interest to the market. Some commercial support for a project
should not preclude make-up support from Government so long as the
arrangements are satisfactory.
(c) The mechanisms must avoid, at all costs, the intervention of "croneyism",
which bedevilled some previous attempts at prioritising government support
research.
(d) In order to perturb the status quo, the monies administered through this
system should be not less than about 20 percent of the total government
support for R&D.
IndustrY/Government Support for Applied Research
(a) Satisfactory corporate structures should be set up to represent industry
groupings for the purpose of allocating industry and government funds for
R&D projects.
(b) These organisations should be responsible for setting and collecting levies
from members for the purposes of supporting R&D and monies collected
should be matched by additional Government funds on some basis that
reflects Government priorities.
(c) A review process would be required that was able to judge both the quality
and market-acceptance of particular proposals made to each industry
corporate.
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R&D Organisational Structures
(a) An independent study should be undertaken to determine if the current
institutional structures for organising the R&D resources are adequate and
to suggest change if appropriate.
(b) Consideration should be given as to whether science and R&D should be
departmental affairs at all, and whether some other (perhaps geographical)
organisations based on centres of excellence should not be given corporate
identities for the purpose of participating in such a system.
(c) An essential feature of science organisations of whatever institutional
arrangement should be the ability to capture a commercial return from its
own products, operating with the necessary flexibility to compete with the
private sector.
(d) There would need to be a transitional period during which Government
support was continued as a base load to ensure continuity of operations, but
the ultimate objective would be to link this support to success in attracting
funding through the STAC arrangements and via the industry corporates.
Only the best and the most efficient groups would ultimately survive under
this arrangement
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FUNDING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN RURAL AND WOOL RESEARCH
- AN AUSTRALIAN VIEWPOINT
R. A. Richardson
Group Manager - Economics, Research and Promotion
Australian Wool Corporation
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Victoria, Australia
SUMMARY
Recent public debate on the role of government funding of R&D in
Australia is discussed. This debate seems to have centred primarily
on the use of R&D to achieve economic growth, increased
productivity and structural adjustment in the economy, rather than on
whether public or private funds should be used to finance certain
types of research. Restructuring of the Australian CSIRO, procedures
for allocating wool research funds in Australia and efforts to
improve the objectivity and efficiency of setting R&D priorities
are briefly reviewed. Some future issues in the ranking of wool
textile and production research are also discussed .
.
Key Words: research priorities, productivity, funding
(Views expressed are those of the author and do not
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1. INTRODUCTION
The issue of government versus private or industry funding of
research and development is presently being widely debated in New
Zealand. Similar developments have occurred in Australia and an
Australian perspective on the issue and discussion of. the Australian
experience may be useful. The purpose of this paper is to outline a
view of that debate using rural research and wool R&D in Australia
as examples.
The transfer of political power in Australia to the Labour Party in
1983 seems in retrospect to have been something of a watershed in
government attitudes to R&D. From the outset the approach
developed was one of integrating R&D more in to economic
development strategies. At the same time there was a general shift
to seeking greater industry commitment to R&D. These developments
as they relate to the Australian CSIRO, the rural sector and wool
R&D are briefly reviewed in the following section of the paper.
In the wool industry about A$41 million is presently being spent on
commodity specific R&D. This is supported by the government
matching expenditure of grower funds and by direct government funding
of some research. These arrangements for funding and the basis for
the allocation of wool R&D funds are outlined in Section 3. This
is followed in Section 4 with a brief overview of attempts which have
been made to develop and implement quantitative procedures for
setting R&D priorities. Taken together, these arrangements are one
way of implementing an industry based R&D program. Some
conclusions are drawn about the implications of the current
arrangements in wool R&D in Australia.
2. GOVERNMENT ROLE IN R&D
Numerous reviews and reports have indicated that Australia has a
relatively low level of R&D spending. Total R&D expenditure as a
percentage of GDP generally falls in the bottom quartile of OECD
countries. In a recent study the CSIRO (1987) indicates that
Australian R&D expenditure is generally around 1.0 to 1.2 percent
of GDP. For the USA and Japan the equivalent figure is around
2.8 percent.
Recent estimates by the CSIRO (1987) are that less than one-third of
total R&D expenditure in Australia is by the business sector and
over two-thirds is funded by government. Despite this, general
government financing of R&D through appropriation funds has
contracted as a share of total spending, altering the mix towards
more industry funding.
Rural research in Australia has traditionally been primarily funded
along commodity lineso For each individual commodity the government
established research trust funds. Over the years compulsory research
levies on primary producers were put in these Funds and expenditure
from them was generally matched by government contributions. In the
various individual commodity industries, advisory committees on how
to best spend the money developed. The whole system was administered
by the Commonwealth Department of Primary Industries and the Minister
in that portfolio formally approved the allocation of these industry
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funds. These arrangements were consolidated following the lAC (1976)
review of rural research funding which concluded that there was a
substantial case for continued public sector funding of rural R&D.
In addition to direct funding of rural research through mechanisms
noted above, substantial further government funding of rural research
has traditionally occurred. This has been through the Commonwealth
Department of Science and Technology funding the CSIRO (known as
appropriation funds), through government funding of universities and
through research conducted by state government departments of
agriculture. More recently there have been substantial changes to
these funding arrangements which are described below.
In 1985 the Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC)
reported to the Prime Minister on future directions for the CSIRO.
ASTEC (1985) expressed the view that the CSIRO should change from
"(being) largely science oriented to •... largely applications
oriented", (p.2) and should .... "concentrate primarily on research
in support of existing and emerging industry sectors and measures to
facilitate the adoption of the practical results of its research",
(p.3). The priority ASTEC saw for basic research at the CSIRO was
lower, arguing that it should "give consideration to transferring
elsewhere research groups conducting pure basic research which is not
linked to major objectives of CSIRO". At the same time it was
recommended that the level of appropriation (ie. government) funding
for CSIRO be maintained, although efforts should be made to increase
outside commercial funding (ie. industry funds).
Following from the above the CSIRO has since been restructured. This
restructure involved aligning the senior management and divisional
structure to conform to business systems to which R&D results and
external funding related. In the case of wool this meant that a new
Institute of Animal Production and Processing was established.
Within this Institute the three main divisions engaged in wool
related research are:
The Division of Wool Technology covering wool textile research,
wool measurement and fibre chemistry.
The Division of Animal Production and the Division of Animal
Health covering wool production and related research.
A significant feature of these developments is that the issue of
public versus industry-specific benefits, and therefor.e who should
pay for the R&D, seem not to have loomed large as considerations in
the debate. This seems to stand in contrast to the present situation
in New Zealand.
Since 1983 the present government has been attempting to alter the
relatively low level of expenditure on R&D in Australia. Perhaps
partly as a consequence of the ASTEC Report, attempts have been made
to shift R&D expenditure more toward the "applied" end of the
spectrum. This is seen as an aid to improving national productivity,
export income etc. As a consequence R&D, like the Australian film
industry, has received subsidies through the tax system. At present
150 percent of the investment in R&D is deductible in the year of
expenditure, although this will fall to 100 percent under tax
revisions recently announced. This runs the risk of being the same
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public sector "kiss of death" which some people in Australia see as a
problem with similar measures in the film industry. In the R&D
case, the temptation is to invest in short-term and "safer" research,
the scientific equivalent of Mad Max V or Crocodile Dundee III.
It is also frequently argued that altered R&D priorities can
facilitate structural adjustment in the economy and prompt the growth
of whole new industries. In this argument there seem to be very real
dangers that it may lead to declining net future payoffs from R&D.
The proposition has been advanced by politicians that scarce R&D
resources should be diverted to "high-technology" and "sunrise"
industries. Such suggestions seem to ignore the fundamental
principles of comparative advantage in our economy. As a consequence
there is a risk that resources will be diverted from R&D in
agriculture, mining and perhaps some value adding activities
associated with them, in which Australia is likely to have a
comparative advantage, into the things that are best done in Tokyo,
Osaka or perhaps Silicon Valley.
This is indeed what appears to have been happening in Australia.
Within the CSIRO, senior management had, in response to the political
appeals, implemented a system of "protected" versus "non-protected"
categories for resource allocation. The high-technology and sunrise
industries were classified as protected and much of the rural
research as non-protected. When resources became available in a non-
protected area (eg. establishment vacancies, buildings and physical
equipment) they were diverted to protected areas. So far as I can
ascertain, there appears to have been no consideration by the R&D
administrators and managers of a criterion of whether Australia has,
or could develop, an international comparative advantage in the
industry in question.
Apparently reflecting the policy described above, the share of CSIRO
expenditure devoted to rural industries has declined over the last
eight years from about 41 percent in 1979/80 to 37.4 percent in
1986/87. The share of rural industries funding coming from the trust
fund accounts has generally risen and direct appropriation funding
has declined. Over the period 1983/84 to 1986/87, while the total
number of professional staff engaged in rural production and
processing research has changed very little (a 0.7 percent drop), the
number funded from appropriation sources has declined by 6.3 percent.
Industry funds have been called upon to make up the difference.
In the rural sector the government has moved. over the last two years
to alter the administrative and accountability arrangements for
commodity-specific R&D. This is a form of "democratisation" of the
management and detailed decision making process, while overall
accountability to government is maintained and accountability to the
industry group funding the research with government is strengthened.
Features of the approach are as follows:
separate research councils or corporations have been
established for each commodity;
these organisations, such as the Wool Research and Development
Council (WRDC) and Australian Meat and Livestock Research and
Development Corporation (AMLRDC) are responsible for developing
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strategic plans, recommending operating plans and budgets and
reporting back to government and relevant producer
organisations on performance of the R&D function; and
the trust funds previously held by government have been handed
over to the relevant organisation for administration and
allocation.
The objective is to remove government from overview of the detail and
shift the balance of detailed accountability to the representatives
of the industry in question.
As a consequence of these arrangements the Wool Corporation now has
more direct control of the funding of wool related research. The
wool R&D fund has a balance of about $64 million and expenditure in
1988/89 will be about $41 million. This will be financed
approximately equally by compulsory taxes on woolgrowers and a
government subsidy. These funding arrangements are accepted without
any significant debate with government about whether the results of
R&D accrue substantially to woolgrowers or to the general public.
It is in the area of direct expenditure by the CSIRO of appropriation
funds on wool R&D where the government is reducing the real level
of spending on R&D.
3. THE ALLOCATION OF WOOL R&D FUNDS
The Wool Corporation has the responsibility for administration and
allocation of R&D funds for wool, taking advice from the WRDC under
arrangements noted above. In this section the working of these
arrangements and methods of allocating funds are briefly reviewed.
Membership and functioning of the WRDC was developed in 1986. The
Council comprises four AWC Board Members, four independent members
(chosen by a "Selection Authority" which is appointed by the Minister
for Primary Industries and Energy, but includes some wool grower
representatives) and a Chairman appointed by the Minister on the
recommendation of the Chairman of the AWC. The Council has been in
operation for two years and has yet to become a major force in the
allocation of R&D funds. So far it has largely continued the
practices of its predecessor organisation within the AWC.
At the broadest level the Council must address the issue of setting
priorities between broad areas of research. It is necessary to use a
consistent framework so that major streams of production, textile and
other research are viewed within a common overall context. R&D
funds are presently allocated by a two-stage procedure:
Budget levels are set for each of five defined major areas of
research. These include production, textiles, raw wool
marketing, wool harvesting and economics, in descending order
of annual expenditure. These research area budgets are largely
set by historical patterns with production research being about
50 percent of the budget.
Allocation of expenditure between specific research programs
and projects is done by the WRDC on the advice of five advisory
committees, one for each research area.
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It is the latter of these two stages where much of the detailed
decision making on allocating R&D funds occurs. The research
advisory committees (RAC's) enable the WRDC and the AWC to get the
best possible advice as they comprise a mixture of experienced
researchers and commercial/marketing members with competence in
research ;n the area in question, along with wool grower and AWC Board
Members.
The RAC's generally meet twice annually, once to review progress in
major research areas and the other an annual budget meeting. The
review meetings include visits to major research sites and detailed
presentations by research staff involved. In the major area of
production research, all the principal sites are visited about once
every three years. Budget meetings revolve around submissions by
researchers and these sUbmissions, rather than the direct contracting
of research by the AWC, form the main basis for direct resource
allocation. The effect of all of this is that researchers and
research agencies see their strongest accountability for performance
being to the RAC's.
In each of the five research areas the AWC employs professional staff
with research backgrounds to support the WRDC and RAC's. In addition
there are several relevant administrative staff and some staff
devoted primarily to evaluating research priorities. The AWC's R&D
group comprises eighteen staff of which thirteen are "professional"
staff. Over the years R&D priorities and strategies have been
developed in the various areas by these staff. These are now
collected together in the WRDC Strategic Plan; in the production
areas, for example, there are twelve sub-strategies with relative
priority weightings. The staff are responsible for monitoring the
performance and progress of the main areas of research and provide an
executive officer role in relation to the various committees. In the
future they will become more involved in evaluating priorities and
reviews of the results of R&D.
The R&D function also draws heavily on advice, at a staff level,
from other parts of the Corporation and the IWS; this is particularly
so in marketing and textiles areas and includes technical input on
textile technology, raw wool measurement, transport and distribution
and economics. The IWS has developed a global research plan for wool
textile R&D and provides significant inputs to textile research
priority setting. In addition it serves as a mechanism for
international communication and co-ordination of research in this
area; in New Zealand, Wool Research Organisation of New Zealand
(WRONZ) staff are involved in such co-ordination along with the
Division of Wool Technology in the CSIRO in Australia. Recent higher
priorities for research on mothproofing of wool, in the context of
environmental concerns arising from existing mothproofing technology
are a case in point. Both Australia and New Zealand are now
accelerating research in this area which has its most direct effects
on carpet wool which is principally produced in New Zealand.
97
4. SETTING RESEARCH PRIORITIES
There has been a long-standing debate in Australia about the setting
of R&D priorities and the ex paste evaluation of research payoffs.
This has gathered new impetus with the formation of the WRDC and
projects have recently been funded to further review methods of R&D
priority setting. In a recent unpublished report, Scobie and Jardine
(1988) summarised and assessed techniques in the field while Mullen
~ (1988) developed a model for assessing the relative merit of
textile versus production research. This interest is by no means
new; in the early 1980's a similar burst of enthusiasm led to reports
by Brindle (1981) and Greig (1982) along with" substantial amounts of
internal work of a benefit/cost analysis type on wool harvesting
research.
A broad conclusion derived from all of this work is that detailed
ex-ante analysis can only be justified in terms of cost for very
large individual projects or for groups of projects (a "program" of
research) in which there is a single common goal. Less costly
techniques such as ranking or scoring systems do seem to have
practical appeal for ex ante project evaluation and Scobie (1988)
suggests that they can produce essentially similar results (in terms
of funding decisions) to more costly benefit/cost analyses. Further,
simple and practical procedures fit in quite readily with reasonably
disciplined application of sUbjective judgement by panels of experts
such as our RAC's, which feel less threatened than they would by a
more sophisticated economic analysis.
Scoring systems do, however, have some weaknesses in a practical
sense. They have been used only in some areas and inconsistencies in
allocations can arise if ranking systems are not applied throughout
the R&D program. Periodically there has not been a binding
economic constraint in the sense of project applications totalling
more than the indicative budget in given research areas. In this
situation ranking, or any other systems, are of little relevance.
Further, there is potential for inconsistencies in scoring to develop
over time and possibly far too informal a set of criteria for scoring
may be used leading to inconsistency between projects. Despite these
problems, the resultant tightening up of criteria for jUdging
projects is a major benefit of scoring systems.
In Australia the wool production research committee (PRAC) uses a
formalised point scoring system and has done so for many years. This
was probably borne of necessity to enable committee members to digest
the great volume of research proposals and because they have
consistently had a rationing problem (in 1988 PRAC considered 210 new
projects and funded 69 of them).
One significant development in recent years has been the holding of
conferences to review major areas of research. These began with a
review of sheep reproduction research leading to a review report by
Lindsay and Pearce (1984) replete with recommendations.
Subsequently, similar conferences occurred on pasture utilisation and
sheep genetics research, (the latter with involvement of stud sheep
breeders) with the use of delphi study techniques to elicit views of
research priorities amongst participants. More general reviews of
research in various areas have also been periodically completed.
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Examples include a survey of economic research priorities by Walker
and Ki1minster (1978), a review of economic and modelling issues in
setting production research priorities by Parton (1986) and a review
of wool handling and distribution research by McLennan and Magasanik
(1984). These studies have all contributed greatly to altering R&D
priorities and the criteria by which individual project decisions are
made.
Recent work by Mullen~ (1988) involves an econometric approach
to the allocation of effort between production and textile research.
The informational requirements of such an approach are substantial;
it relies heavily on the reliability of estimates of the elasticities
of supply and demand at various stages of the wool production and
processing industry. A further complication is that it is totally
reliant on externally generated estimates of the probability of
achieving a given (eg. 1 percent) change in productivity in various
areas of research. Those probabilities are basically unknown, but
are likely to vary greatly between areas of research, over time and
between levels of research in any given program area.
As Mullen et a1 point out, the extent of input substitution is likely
to be crucial to returns to R&D. Given that such substitution
parameters are likely to be higher in "off-farm" research, returns to
textile research have to be substantially higher than for production
research for Australian wool growers to get similar benefits. This is
another way of saying that international "leakages" of benefits are
potentially substantially higher for textile than production
research. Perhaps explicit consideration of such leakages could be a
basis for closer co-ordination of R&D effort between Australia and
New Zealand in some areas of rural research.
My own view is that our type of system for setting R&D priorities
can lead to "over-investment" in production R&D because the system
is oriented toward producers. In Australia the training of people to
be career researchers in agricultural science with emphasis on soils,
agronomy, sheep nutrition and reproduction etc is a substantial
industry in its own right. There are eight universities involved in
this production research training industry compared with only one in
the area of fibre and textile science (University of NSW). In these
circumstances there seems to be a shortage of career scientists in
textiles and a surplus in production. There is also a risk that the
allocation of funds is driven more by what the scientists think will
lead to successful refereed publications than by what generates net
benefits to wool growers.
Allocation between research programs is the area in which there seems
to be the greatest potential to augment existing research priority
setting procedures by more analytical and objective approaches. Ways
of doing this include studies to estimate potential technical
productivity gains, benefit cost analyses and peer reviews and
conferences on major programs of research with explicit goals of
priority ranking, perhaps using delphi or other similar techniques.
These are the main ways in which technical and economic analyses are
utilised in wool R&D programs in Australia.
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5. SOME FUTURE ISSUES
In Australia there have been significant changes in the roles of
government and industry in the funding of R&D. The CSIRO is the
largest single research agency and also the major rural research
body. While there continues to be a large government commitment to
direct appropriation funding of the CSIRO, there are increasing
pressures on the organisation to be more commercially oriented, to
attract industry based funding and to earn revenue from commercial
patenting and licensing arrangements. To this end the CSIRO and most
universities now have their own technology adoption subsidiaries.
An issue which appears to have been largely lost in the recent debate
in Australia is that of private versus public funding of basic or
pure research. The general thrust of debate has been about expanding
applied research and diverting CSIRO resources in to applied
research. In contrast to this it would seem that a stronger case can
generally be made on public interest grounds for public sector
funding of basic research where chance discoveries may have widely
dispersed benefits. Industry-specific research which is "successful"
seems likely to have industry-specific benefits. This public
interest aspect of the types of research which are publicly funded is
central to the present debate on the funding of R&D in New Zealand.
In that sense, and for reasons enunciated in Section 2 of this paper,
the quality of debate which appears to be occurring in New Zealand
has a good deal more to recommend it than is the case in Australia.
A major concern for the Australian rural sector and, more
specifically, the wool industry is the progressive erosion of
appropriation funding in rural research. At the same time, real
levels of CSIRO appropriation funding in manufacturing and other
areas has expanded. This may potentially run counter to the
comparative advantage of agriculture leading to lower returns to
Australia on investment of appropriation funds in R&D. Perhaps
government funding of R&D should be viewed more in the context of
effective rates of assistance to various sectors; in this respect the
distorting effects of input subsidies familiar to economists are
likely to occur.
Given the size of the Australian wool industry in world terms, the
small country argument generally does not hold. This means there are
likely to be revenue effects from technically successful wool
production R&D which has significant adoption rates. While it is
necessary to continue major production research programs that enhance
the competitiveness of Australia as a world wool and fibre supplier,
successful research in this field may significantly raise Australian
and thus world wool production with consequent reductions in prices.
It is necessary to take long-term industry revenue effects resulting
from reduced prices into account in assessing returns to and
priorities for production increasing R&D. Failure to do so is
likely to lead to over-estimation of the potential returns to some
production R&D. This means that priority in the area must be given
to research, the results of which are specifically beneficial in
maintaining our international competitiveness in wool production,
taking into account long-term revenue effects.
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In areas of textile R&D, and perhaps to a lesser extent in some
production research, an important strategic issue is the leakage of
benefits from R&D. Priorities for textile R&D must take into
account the extent to which benefits are shared with wool producers
from other countries, with other fibres and with machinery
manufacturers and other input suppliers to the wool textile industry.
Regarding other wool producers, it should be recognised that
Australia does confine textile R&D largely to apparel wool.
However, in both that and other areas of textile research, the IWS
provides a convenient vehicle for jointly sharing the cost of
specific textile research projects where the benefits are likely to
be shared. It also provides a framework for IWS partner countries to
co-ordinate their separate research work in the textiles area, and to
ensure that technical marketing priorities are developed and provide
a common base of knowledge in setting textile research priorities.
Textile research funded by the wool industry is concentrated most on
the earlier stages of the textile processing and manufacturing
pipeline. These are the areas where wool-specific activities are
involved (eg. scouring, carbonising, carding and combing) or where
wool-oriented machinery or other inputs occur (long staple spinning,
chemical treatments such as shrinkproofing and dyeing). In these
areas R&D investment is partly funded by machinery manufacturers to
improve the speed and efficiency of machinery. However, they seem
likely to give a lower priority to R&D in wool specific machinery,
relative to the benefits to the wool industry. This occurs because
the size of general non-fibre specific machinery markets is much
larger and generates larger overall returns from new machinery
developments than wool specific machinery.
The wool growing industry in Australia has a prominent role in the
allocation of R&D funds through the AWC and the WRDC. A positive
aspect of this is that R&D can be more closely integrated with
marketing strategies implemented by the AWC and the IWS; for example,
textile research in Australia is closely integrated with
international promotion strategies of the IWS. In this respect there
is something of a distinction between Australia and New Zealand.
WRONZ seems over the years to have worked very closely with the early
stage wool processing industry (particularly scouring) in New
Zealand, even though a minority of its funds come directly from the
local industry. In Australia textile research of the CSIRO is
primarily geared to worldwide users of apparel wool and there is no
funding from the Australian wool textile industry.
Wool R&D may sometimes be consistent with national economic goals
only in an indirect sense. For example, we do not see any argument
for confining the transfer of new technology to the Australian
textiles and clothing industries in preference to overseas users.
Given the high levels of assistance received by the local textiles
and clothing manufacturers, it is often the case that the best
interests of wool growers and the Australian economy may be best
served by concentrating our efforts on efficient international users
of Australian wool. The purpose of textile R&D is thus to develop
beneficial technologies for adoption by efficient processors of
Australian wool wherever they are in the world.
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ADJUSTMENT IN AGRICULTURE: AGRIBUSINESS
R.W.M. Johnson
Centre for Agricultural Policy Studies
Massey University
SUMMARY
This paper reviews changes in the agribusiness sector since
1984. Evidence is based on available statistics and some
anecdotal information. Considerable changes are identified in
factor markets, input markets and service markets. Main features
include rapid increases in factor productivity, stabilization of
service prices (except interest), a decline in investment and a
decline in balance sheet assets. Amalgamation and restructuring
has occurred in the input and service industries and surplus
capacity still exists at several points. Outputs can only be
maintained at current high levels by disinvestment in the capital
base. The agribusiness sector is likely to settle down at some
new lower level of output and investment with increased levels of
productivity in the medium term.
Key Words: Adjustment, Markets, Competition, Survival, Exit,
Entry.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the adjustment in New Zealand
agribusiness. This is interpreted to mean economic changes in
the micro-economy of agriculture as opposed to the more macro
matters considered in the previous paper. By agribusiness we
mean all those industries concerned with agricultural products
from farm to final consumer although data and length
considerations restrict the coverage mainly to the production,
input and service industries of agriculture in New Zealand. The
approach taken is to review changes in the factor, input and
service markets to ascertain where changes in economic direction
have occurred or where prices of resources or services have
undertaken adjustment in response to recent policy and market
environment changes. Unless otherwise indicated, statistical
materials are drawn from "Situation and Outlook for New Zealand
Agriculture, 1988" (MAF, 1988).
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FACTOR MARKETS
The area farmed in New Zealand has not shown much change in
recent years. There is a major adjustment, however in the total
area farmed as land has been transferred from the Department of
Lands and Survey to the Department of Conservation. The number
of holdings continues to rise. This appears to be more to do
with the coverage of the Statistics Department's questionnaire
than changes in the number of full-time farms. Some authors have
noted the emergence of a bimodal distribution of part-time small-
holdings and full-time farms (Fairweather, 1986; Schroder, 1987).
There are questions about the level of the real productive
capacity of the land resource, which is largely unmeasurable,
concerned as it is with fertilizer maintenance, weed control and
other capital asset maintenance procedures.
There is little evidence of a major shift of labour from the
farm sector. The number of working owners, full-time, part-time
and casual employees recorded at June 30 have not changed
perceptibily. There is, however, plenty of anecdotal evidence of
off-farm part-time working arrangements and an increase in the
number of working wives. Rewards for self-employed labour have
declined markedly.
There has been a massive change in the level of farm
investment (50% decline in nominal terms from 1985 to 1987). The
fall in land development investment is greater than in other
categories. This data therefore suggests that the capital base
of farming is not even being maintained, and must be in fact
declining at some as yet unmeasured rate. In the plant and
vehicle area, normal replacement is being delayed, the age of the
stock must be increasing, and greater maintenance costs are
likely to be required.
Since 1982 there has been a large decrease in land sales
values. As is well known, the large increase in land values in
the period 1977-82 was not markedly associated with any changes
in income earning capacity, but appears to be related to the then
current tax provisions, the availability of development funds at
concessional interest rates, and the floor price system then in
place. Movements in aggregate sales values since 1982 appear to
bear little relation to operating surplus, nominal GDP, real GDP,
or net farm incomes, except that money incomes have also declined
markedly since 1984-85.
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In 1987 the all farm sale price index appears to have
stabilized after falling successively each year from 1982. Only
grazing farms were selling at less than their 1986 values. In
terms of butterfat and/or stock units 1987 land sale prices were
generally lower in 1987 than in calendar 1986.
These changes in land prices are reflected in the changing
capital structure of pastoral farms. On average the value of
land bUildings on sheep farms declined by 35% between 1984 and
1986 and on dairy farms by 19%. Market values of livestock have
also declined while the average level of liabilities has remained
constant on dairy farms but risen slightly on sheepfarms (to
1986). The cost of debt servicing has risen sharply under the
new regime and these major changes in farm balance sheets are
reflected in the following MAF data:
Year
Sheep/Beef Farms
Debt/Equity Debt
Ratio Service %
Dairy Farms
Debt/Equity Debt
Ratio Service %
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
0.19
0.21
0.26
0.27
0.32
0.53
10.8
12.7
14.0
15.6
13 .4
20.2
Source
0.34
0.24
0.24
0.27
0.36
0.43
MAF, 1988
12.3
12.2
13 .1
14.4
13 .5
16.0
In 1987 the cost of debt servicing has risen further
(sheep/beef farms 26%) and presumably debt/equity ratios have
crept up a little further. The onslaught of deregulation was
felt sooner on sheep farms and the overall decline in incomes has
been greater. Presumably re-structuring of liabilities has not
yet been reflected in the above data.
As MAF points out, average debt/equity ratios do not reflect
what is happening at the margin. They state that in 1985-86, 24%
of sheep farms had less than 50% equity (ratio of one) and that
5% of all farms had zero or negative equity. These farms have
correspondingly higher levels of debt servicing - 24% of farms
had debt servicing levels of 41% in 1986. A level of 25% of
equity in total assets (equivalent to a debt equity ratio of
2.33) is considered to be the maximum position of exposure to be
aimed at. The adjustment of existing farmers to revised asset
valuations is a continuing process (well described by MAF) where
considerable sacrif ice, off-f arm working, and rest ructuring of
debt may all playa part.
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Finally in the factor market sector, the above changes have
brought about a rapid increase in factor productivity since 1980.
In terms of real GDP per labour unit, there has been a 5.3% per
annum increase in factor productivity in total agriculture.
Since the land input ("capital") has possibly declined in the
last two years, total factor productivity has likely increased
faster than 5.3% in this period. In terms of physical output per
unit of physical current inputs, the Economic Service sheep farm
sector has increased productivity by 4.7% per year in the period
1980-1988, and by 9.3% per year since 1984.
In both measures quoted the rate of increase has risen still
higher in the period 1985-1988. This appears to be the normal
response of productivity ratios when the sector is contracting
and has been observed before by Philpott, Ross and Scobie. When
investment and current inputs surge upwards the productivity
ratios tend to fall.
INPUT MARKETS
Fertilizer manufacture reached 2.5m tonnes in 1973 and 1974
and, after a cyclical decline in demand in the late 1970' s,
reached 2. 3m tonnes in 1980. There has been a steady decline
since 1980 in fertilizer output except in 1984-85. In the two
years following 1985, fertilizer manufacture has halved. It is
said the industry was operating at 50% of capacity in 1986 and
possibly down to 30% in 1987 (Hoggard, 1987). Recovery to an
output of 1.6 m tonnes was then thought possible i.e. around 58%
of installed capacity.
In 1970 there were 13 manuf ac turing plants owned by 5
companies of which 10 had survived in 1986. The above authority
believes 6 plants could now service the demand. Competition from
imports has been opened up and a nitrogen plant installed at the
gas field in New Plymouth.
This change in demand has had massive effects on
distributors, both on the ground and in the air. Latest figures
on the aerial spreading industry show a halving of flights and
hours flown between calendar 1985 and 1987. The number of
companies now involved has only declined marginally, though staff
numbers are much reduced.
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1985 1987
Flights (000) 1074 559
Hours Flown (000) 104 58
Fertiliser (t) (000) 633 350
Lime (t) (000) 121 51
Liquids (ha) (000) 768 559
Fencing (t) (000) 2.3 0.9
Operators (Aerial) 108 110
Source Ministry of Transport
Changes in other input markets can be examined indirectly by
breakdown of the intermediate inputs matrix of the national
income accounts. Between 1985 and 1988, nominal expenditure
increased by 3.8% with an actual decline in 1986 and 1987. In
real terms the value of inputs has fallen by 8% between 1984-85
and 1986-87. Changes in individual items in the input matrix from
1985 to 1987 in real terms are as follows:
Category 1984-85 1986-87 Percent change
at 1984-85
prices
Purchases of
Livestock $876m $806m - 8.0
Feed & Grazing 254 236 - 7.1
Animal Health 187 175 - 6.4
Weed & Pest Control 130 137 + 5.4
Fertilizer,Lime,Seeds 620 434 -30.0
Fuel & Power 379 427 +12.6
Repairs & Maintenance 669 535 -20.0
Freight 177 172 - 7.8
Other (Admin) 1066 905 -15.1
Sub-Total 4358 3824 -12.2
Capitalised
Development 89
Total Int.
Consumption 4269 3931 - 7.9
(1986-87 inputs deflated by all farming inputs price indices)
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Traditionally, the downturn in receipts has always been
reflected in the fertilizer and repairs and maintenance
industries, but the demand for inputs has also significantly
fallen in livestock purchases, feed and grazing, animal health,
freight, and overheads. Weed and pest control and fuel and power
demand have both risen in real terms. Thi~ lower level of inputs
also shows up as a lower level of demand for seasonal credit.
SERVICE MARKETS
Processing
For the last eight years the cost of processing/handling
meat, wool and dairy products has been under considerable market
and political pressure. In general, increases in these charges
have been well below the general rate of inflation.
Item
Meat Slaughter* (S/head)
NI Lamb
NI Ewe
NI Cow
SI Lamb
SI Ewe
SI Cow
Index Numbers Per Cent
1980 1988 Change
6.35 10005 58.2
8.82 12.88 46.0
92.10 130000 41.0
6.12 10.29 68.1
7.95 12.60 58.5
87.40 129.60 ( '87) 48.2
7.58 14.16 86.8
83.60 118.36 41.5
175.7 480.2 173.3
94.0 180.0 91.5
1750 2804 60.2
1650 3438 108.3
1550 3187 105.6
1664 1539 -7.5
686 1584 ( '87) 130.9
Wool Handling* (S/bale)
Total**
Net
Meat Handling (S/head)
Works-f.o.b.
Lamb
Beef
CPI
Dairy Handling
Tankers
Freight
Dairy Processing
Cheese
Butter
* From 1985 storage allowance excluded
** Includes change in Wool Board levy
Source: MAF, 1988
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In the period since 1984, there have been sharp increases in
slaughter charges for NI cow and in meat handling charges for
beef. Some of this charge may reflect the companies quoted by
the Meat Board and not reflect the general trend. The remainder
of meat processing charges have continued to be contained.
Processing costs in the dairy sector, have also risen steadily
since 1984, and tanker charges also nearly reach the general rate
of inflation. Freight costs on butter have been contained more
than adequately.
This containment of costs in the marketing channel is
clearly of considerable political and economic interest. Such
improvements would suggest major restructuring and productivity
changes in the processing sector, and this has been put forward
by a recent commentator (Rufus Dawe, Straight Furrow, 18 May).
Attempts to locate the real data have not been successful to
date.
In the meat industry there has been a major restructuring of
ownership and plant closures. Three large North Island plants
have been permanently or temporarily closed in the last three
years. On the other hand, the removal of licensing in the meat
industry has enabled 18 new processing plants to be opened or
started construction (Dominion, April 8). These changes must
bring about further rationalisation in due course, especially as
regards by-product and skin processing and disposal.
Considerable excess capacity currently exists and is being added
to.
Profitability in the meat industry is also down going by the
Waitaki International results. I understand farmers in the South
Island benefited from the high schedules offered there last
season, if not in the current season.
The exit of companies from the dairy processing sector has
been taking place over a long period, and there appears to have
been no recent acceleration in this trend. It is understood that
the rate of investment in dairy product processing continues at a
high level and this must auger well for the future.
Stock Firms
According to MAF statistics, trading bank advances to stock
firms have declined in the last 3 years. On the other hand,
stock and station advances to customers have risen steadily.
Customers credit balances with stock agents declined but deposits
for various terms have risen. This reflects a movement towards
interest earning opportuni ties encouraged by the stock firms.
Net debits of farmers with stock firms appear to have risen
appreciably in 1986, but fallen in 1987. These statistics
reflect very conservative management of funds and a lack of
expansion of credit in the industry as a whole due to lack of
demand. They also appear to conceal the bad debt situation and
the possible wide differences that exist between viable and
unviable accounts. Stock firms are required to participate in
re-structuring proposals.
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There has, of course, been a major restructuring of the
number of agencies in recent years with the demise of one of the
traditional companies, but also with the entrance of a new
company from Australia. Recently, this company has announced
staff cuts of 150 in a total complement of 750 (Evening Post,
June 14). Considerable internal rationalisation is evident among
the existing companies, Knott, (1987) citing a reduction in staff
from 460 to 285 in his company (Williams and Kettle). It is
reported that more than 100 dealers in a farm equipment
distribution network (Tulloch's) have gone out of business in the
last two years (Dominion, June 9).
Finance
As with stock firms, statistics of trading bank advances to
farmers do not reflect the wide disparity in individual farm debt
situations. On average advances to the different types of
farmers (sheep, dairy, other and services) have not increased in
money terms since 1984 (MAF, Table 12). The trading banks have
been the conduit whereby major cost increases have been imposed
on farmers through interest rate policy.
There appears to have been a massive change in RBFC loan
authorisations (MAF, Table II). Total concessional loans have
dropped by two thirds from 1985 to 1987 with a major fall in
loans for land development followe<;l by land purchase. In some
compensation, commercial lending by the RBFC doubled between
1985/86 and 1986/87, though total lending has sharply dropped.
Accounts in arrears increased from 5 percent in 1982/83 to 11.5
percent in 1986/87, while the provision for doubtful debts
increased from zero to $3.2 million. Interest rates to clients
have only been slowly increased towards market rates.
Since July 1986 there has been considerable restructuring of
loans by the RBFC. Some of this restructuring has involved
adjustment by other lenders as well. Applicants for
restructuring totalled 8099 and 4706 have been approved for
discounting, 699 restructured by other means and 2724 declined.
Of the 8099, 4798 were sheep farms, 2571 dairy farms and 730
other farms. Most importantly, the farmers discounted owed the
bank $696m prior to discounting of which $228m (33 per cent) or
$50,000 per farm was written off.
As at 31.3.87, the RBFC had not restructured its own balance
sheet although the Minister of State Enterprises has stated
publicly that the Bank was in no state to be privatized. More
interesting perhaps, from the adjustment point of view, will be
the extent of the write-down of the bank's assets when the
accounts for the most recent financial year are finalized, and
the consequent adjustment of liabilities.
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Landcorp has also introduced a restructuring programme for
its farmer mortgagees. Discounting is used to establish new debt
levels at around 70% of existing levels with an interest rate of
13%. Provision is made to "park" some of the debt interest-free
until July 1989. A cash settlement offer is also available (NZ
Farmer, April 27).
In the financial sector the question of entry and exit does
not appear to affect the competitive position of the existing
firms. The Reserve Bank (1986) argues that, apart from the RBFC,
financial institutions are not seriously threatened by the farm
debt problem, as rural lending represents a small proportion of
their total debt portfolio. This observation appears to overlook
the amalgamation and re-structuring of the major stock agency
firms in New Zealand.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper was commissioned to review and analyse adjustment
in New Zealand agribusiness. The review has concentrated on
identifiable economic responses to recent policy and market
changes. Such a review does not reflect the degree of hardship
and stress that such changes involve. The OECD talks of
"positive adjustment" to identify appropriate policies to manage
change. New Zealand does have its share of positive adjustment
policies (discounting the prime example) but one is left with the
feeling that more should have been done to facilitate the change
from protectionism to full market exposure of the New Zealand
agricultural sector since 1984.
Without doubt the major cost of adjustment has been borne by
the farmers themselves both in income and in equity terms. Some
sharing of the burden of adjustment is evidenced by the financial
sector arrangements and government backing for the Rural Bank.
There is evidence that pressure has been brought to bear on
some of the cost excesses in the marketing channel. This has
probably been achieved by increased productivity, restructuring
and reduction of profits. In current circumstances, these
pressures are likely to continue, with further rationalisations
and exits likely.
Output of the whole agricultural industry has largely been
maintained to date, but at the expense of capital stocks and
maintenance expenditures. This process must come to an end soon.
In the medium to longer term, the capital stock will fall, a new
lower level of outputs will be established, at lower expenditure
and maintenance levels, but at higher productivity levels. The
search for the right balance of market returns, exchange rates
and internal cost pressures will need to continue until the
appropriate position of the New Zealand tradeables sector is once
again clearly delineated and established.
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ADJUSTMENT IN THE WHEAT AND FLOUR INDUSTRy1
o K Crump, Senior Agricultural Economist,
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries,
Wellington
SUMMARY
The regulated system which operated in the Wheat and Flour industry did not
provide participants with market signals to efficiently allocate resources
and failed to adequately distinguish between differences in the quality of
products. Since deregulation the market signals are causing production
and processing to be conducted in locations which have comparative
advantage. The conduct of milling is shifting from the South Island to the
North Island so that producers and processors in the South Island are
confronted with difficult adjustment decisions. Consumer preference and
market demand are now driving forces in all sectors and are causing
industry participants to be more customer oriented.
INTRODUCTION
The wheat and flour industry has been a heavily regulated industry that has
recently been deregulated. There has been considerable media comment about
the plight of the arable farmer and many consider deregulation to be a
major cause of the farmers' problems. Different points of view are
expressed by millers, bakers and farmers about what should or should not
happen in the industry. The increased wheat imports are seen by some to be
a failure of the deregulation policy. The purpose of this study is to
examine these issues, document the changes, the reasons for the changes and
their impact on farmers, millers, bakers and consumers. Consideration of
the historical basis for the changes adds to our understanding of the
present industry as the future and the factors that impact on its viability
continue to be debated.
POLICY ISSUES
Historical 1914-1988
During the first world war the Government controlled the prices of wheat
and flour to encourage wheat growing in New Zealand. The controlled
situation continued after the war during the commodity price boom.
In 1923 the controlled prices were abandoned because farmers believed that
they would receive a better return from the free market.
1 The author would like to acknowledge the constructive advice and
comments from his colleagues, especially Or R A Sandrey, in preparation
of this paper. However the final responsibility for the contents of
the paper and views expressed are his alone.
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In 1928 wheat and flour duty was introduced to encourage increased
plantings. The Government at that time believed that there was inherent
merit in self sufficiency of the wheat industry. In 1929 wheatgrowers
volunteered to pool their wheat in an attempt to influence the price of
wheat. They had little success in controlling the market and growers
outside the pool system received better prices. The farmers attempt
to increase their market power failed.
Farmers requested statutory powers in 1932 and these powers were granted by
Government in 1933 in the form of the Wheat Purchase Board operated under
the Board of Trade Act. The Board had power to purchase all wheat and fix
prices to the grower and the miller. The Board could not control imports
which formed the basis of New Zealand pricing. In 1936 the Board became
the sale importer of wheat on behalf of the Government. In 1939 price
control was introduced generally and was extended to wheat, flour and
bread.
The industry functioned in a totally regulated state for 40 years. The
regulated condition was not harmonious and there were constant rows
between interested parties about the price set for wheat, bread, and flour
the level of flour quotas, the quality of product etc. These issues were
decided by committees who were persuaded by the argument of one of the
truculent parties.
In 1980 bread was removed from price control as part of Governments move
towards de regulation of the economy. The baking industry immediately
became more competitive and innovative. Different types of bread were
produced and marketed, and bakers sought higher quality flour in reponse to
consumer demand for quality.
In 1981 in response to pressures from growers to increase prices, the Wheat
Board moved to basing the New Zealand price on a 3 year rolling average of
quoted Australian Standard White Free on Board prices East Australian
Ports. In any season the fall in price was limited to 90% of the previous
season. After the 1983 CER agreement Cabinet decided to review the wheat
and flour industry to consider what structural changes would be needed to
adapt the industry for CER.
In 1984 the Board decided to purchase milling wheat on the basis of quality
and defined the grades A-B. Contracting for special purpose wheats and
feed wheats was introduced to allow more market freedom in the stock feed
sector. A premium was paid for North Island wheat to reflect the
greater value of wheat in the North Island. In 1985 following an officials
report on the wheat industry the basis for pricing was shifted to weekly
average pricing of wheat delivered to mills based on world market price for
Australian wheat.
To protect farmers from the fall in world prices the Board in 1986
abandoned weekly average pricing and provided a floor price for wheat.
At the same time an Index system was introduced to further reflect
differences in quality. Wheat Board control ended from 1 February 1987
when regulatory controls were removed and the Wheat Board was dissolved on
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30 April 1987. In August 1987 the Government announced a compensation
grant payment of $27.50 per tonne for wheat harvested in 1987 to compensate
farmers for low prices and to compensate United Wheatgrowers for
withdrawing their dumping and counterveiling duty claim against imports of
Australian Wheat.
Self Sufficiency
The original reason for regulation was to increase prices to growers
to stimulate production and increase the level of New Zealand self
sufficiency in wheat. Government at that time apparently believed that
self sufficiency was more important then efficient resource use and that
farmers should be protected from the competition of imports. These same
arguements have been made by various farmer groups since the recent de
regulation.
Problems with the Regulated Industry
The basic problem with regulations was that controls obscured price signals
which needed to be observed to direct resources to maximise returns to the
nation. Controls were a barrier to innovation in both the wheat growing
and flour milling industry. In the flour milling industry competition was
eliminated by the flour quota system.
The 1983 review of the industry identified the following specific problems
in the wheat industry:
(1) Because transport costs were eliminated from market signals farmers in
high freight cost areas were subsidised by farmers in low freight cost
areas.
(2) The rolling average price formula and the floor price for wheat were
not workable under CER where free market conditions were needed.
(3) As Quality standards were set by the Wheat Board the consumer led
demand preference chain was not allowed to operate.
(4) A system of premia and discounts was needed to reward producers who
responded to market signals.
In the flour milling industry the following problems were detected:
(1) A national flour pricing policy led to location of production and
quality specification distortions.
(2) Flour quota allocations were based on historical output. Cost of
production was ignored as was the market requirement in the location
that mills were operating.
(3) Excess mill capacity and the inefficiency of some mills led to
additional costs to the consumer.
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(4) New milling companies could not enter the industry.
(5) Because flour prices were on a cost plus basis and quota sales were
assured there was no incentive to minimize costs.
Stimulas for Deregulation
The removal of price control from bread in 1980 unleashed some market
forces in what was a totally regulated industry. Bakers began demanding
higher quality flour from the Board so that they could better compete for
market share. The forces for change increased over the years and the move
to market pricing of wheat in 1981 was an acknowledgement that the old self
sufficiency arguments were not as relevant as in the past.
The 1983 review of the industry was motivated by Governments policy of
changing to a more deregulated economy and by the ANCERTA agreement which
now provides for limited flour imports up to 1990 and unlimited quantities
after 1990. Deregulation was considered to be essential because
inefficiencie in the regulated system meant that the New Zealand industry
would not be able to compete with imports of flour.
The Timing of Deregulation
In the broad context deregulation commenced in 1980 and is still occuring
as the impact of deregulation in other sectors is beginning to have effect
on the wheat and flour industry. The original timetable for deregulation
was shortened at the request of the industry participants. The phasing in
of deregulation became increasingly difficult to control as successive
parts were deregUlated. This is the sequence versus speed of adjustment
argument.
CHANGES IN THE WHEAT INDUSTRY
Prices for Wheat
The New Zealand wheat growers felt the effect of de regulation when the
price of wheat fell from the floor price provided by the Wheat Board to
world market prices (See table I). The 1987 harvest was large and the
quality was variable. Mills had a preference for Australian wheat which
was generally higher average quality and could now be imported free of
duty. New Zealand wheat consequently sold at a discount.
The prices paid by mills also reflected the location of production as
fanners now had to pay the cost of delivery to store door or a specified
loading point. North Island fanners in 1988 received $260.00/tonne
compared with $200.00/tonne received by South Island farmers for the same
quality of wheat.
Table I and figure I illustrate the price received by growers, the total
yield of wheat in New Zealand and the quantity of imports. With the fall
in price since 1986 the quantity of wheat produced has fallen and is
forecast to fall further. The fall in yield is matched by an increase in
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imports of wheat. The driving force determining prices of wheat in New
Zealand is the cost of importing alternative sources to New Zealand.
Transport Costs
Transport costs have a major influence on the price of wheat landed in
New Zealand and consequently the prices New Zealand farmers receive for
wheat. In the context of CER both the Australian and New Zealand
Government are committed to the achievement of competitive freight rates
across the Tasman. A reduction in trans Tasman freight rates will reduce
the prices New Zealand farmers receive for their wheat. There has already
been a reduction in freight rates since the private sector commenced
imports of wheat.
Internal transport costs influence the prices farmers can expect to receive
for their ~rop at any location. The most important freight cost is that
between North Island and South Island because a reduction in freight rates
would lift South Island prices for wheat closer to those of the North
Island. In the short term there are unlikely to be substantial changes in
the internal costs of transport. The established trends in shifts of
production are therefore likely to continue because there are real
cost-price incentives for these changes to take place and production in the
North Island will continue to increase.
Location of Production
Over the past decade there have been distinct shifts in wheat production
between regions. The important trends presented in Table II and figure II
are:
(a) reduction in the proportion of South Island production;(b) corresponding increase in North Island production; and(c) a decline in Southland production
Historically most of the wheat produced has been grown in Canterbury.
The advent of modern machinery and crop drying facilities has widened the
geographic spread of wheat production to other areas. Under the Wheat
Board national pricing system the costs of producing in areas distant from
the market were not reflected in the returns farmers received and this led
to further regional distortions. Since deregulation transport costs have
been fully reflected in the prices farmers received for their wheat at farm
gate and consequently further change can be expected.
In Table III and figure III the consumption, production and milling of
wheat are presented for the South Island and the North Island. While the
South Island produced 81% of the wheat, it consumed only 23% and
conversely, while the North Island consumed 77% of the wheat it produced
only 19%. The imbalance in the areas of production and the areas of
consumption is one of the major problems facing the New Zealand Wheat
Industry.
117
Selling Options
Under the regulated environment producers had to sell milling wheat to the
Board. With deregulation farmers can sell to any buyer including an export
buyer. Common systems of selling are fixed price contracts, floating price
contract, grower pools operated by merchants or pools through the farmers
co-operative. Some farmers prefer to grow wheat free of any contact in the
expectation that selling options will improve in the future. The choices
now open to farmers require considerable analysis and evaluation of future
market returns and the risk involved in the different alternatives. This
involves an extra dimension to the farm management decision making process.
In all the selling options the price is based on the cost of importing
wheat to the Auckland market. Prices offered for wheat in any New Zealand
location are equal to the Auckland imported price less the cost of wheat
transport to Auckland. The rationale for pricing has not been understood
by farmers or their adivsers who after 40 years of national pricing were
not prepared for the large regional differences in price. The Flour
Millers have been irrationally blamed for causing monopolistic or
oligopolistic bargaining strength to force down wheat prices. In reality
the millers faced with competition from imported flour had to operate a
competitive purchase policy for wheat.
The Quality of Wheat
In the 1987 harvest the average quality of wheat was 21.6 mechanical
dough development (MOD) with much of the crop below 20 MOO. The 1988
harvest had an average quality of 25.2 MOO a 20% increase on the previous
year. The change in quality was achieved by a change in variety of wheat
grown and a reduction in total wheat produced. Many farmers who believed
they were unlikely to produce milling quality decided not to produce wheat.
These changes demonstrate the ability of farmers to respond rapidly to
price related signals.
The introduction of the variety Otane has been a major contributor to
increased wheat quality which was accelerated from 6% of the crop in 1987
to 60% in 1988. The rapid increase in quality of the New Zealand crop
could not have occurred under the old system because the Wheat Board was
not able to impose the hard discipline of the market. In common with most
group decisions the Board decisions were a compromise which reflected the
opposing interests of the industry participants. The resulting decisions
were ones which tended to reinforce the status quo rather than make
changes.
CHANGES IN THE MILLING INDUSTRY
Consumer Preference
Si-nce deregulation changes in the industry have been driven by consumer
preference. In competing for customers the baking industry experimented
with differences in quality type and presentation of bread. Bakers found
that consumers were identifying differences in MOO, colour water absorption
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etc. These different qualities were given different brand names and prices
and consumers consistently demanded and were prepared to pay for higher
quality. Consequently the quality specifications set for 1989 will be
higher then those for 1988.
Quality of Flour
The deregulation in 1987 saw intense competition among flour mills. Mills
which were previously restricted by quota now competed to increase mark~t
share. Flour millers also faced competition from imports because the large
increase in the global import quota in May 1987 gave bakers the choice of
local or imported flour. Competition was based on both price and quality
and Millers consequently demanded wheat which would produce higher quality
flour.
Prior to de regulation the Wheat Board had accepted wheat as low as
14 MOD for milling. After deregulation the Millers raised the standard
to 20 MOD and wheat below this was unacceptable as milling wheat and
had to be sold as feed wheat with a 50% price discount. Consequently the
average quality of flour produced since deregulation has increased by
3-4 MOD. Other qualities to improve are colour and water absorption
(increases the length of time bread can be kept fresh.)
The Price of Flour
Table IV and figure IV show that the lowest price of flour was reached in
August 1987 6 months after deregulation, and indicate competition in that
industry. The Wheat Board attempted to leave the industry with a low flour
price and to that end deliberately made a loss of $18.8 million is the last
year of operation by maintaining a low flour price. It is significant that
the industry in competition lowered the price below that of the Board.
Competitive pricing has also resulted in prices of flour and bread being
lower in the South Island than the North Island. These price differences
reflect the different costs experienced by flour mills in obtaining wheat.
Prior to de regulation South Island consumers were subsidising North Island
consumers.
Rationalisation of Mills
The process of rationalisation is likely to take some time to work through.
Efficiencies will derive from:
(a) better use of capital by increasing mill output;
(b) economies of scale as small inefficient mills are closed; and
(c) modernisation of plant and equipment.
The long term result will be fewer mills working at a higher capacity and
producing at a price competitive with the alternative source of flour.
The imbalance of flour production and demand in the North and South Island
has been described. Present mills in the North Island have the capacity to
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produce all the flour requirement for the North Island. Prior to
deregulation the Wheat Board annually shipped 40,000 tonnes of flour to the
North Island and by 1987 the quantity was reduced to approximately 12,000
tonnes. Many South Island mills are consequently working at 10-20% of
capacity because the market in the South Island is already saturated and
the mills can not compete with North Island mills. The result is that some
of the South Island mills will go out of business. Already one mill has
closed and we are told that another 2 mills are on the point of closing.
The Ireland group of mills has been sold to Defiance Mills of Australia.
There have been other sales of mills within New Zealand in response to the
decision of the commerce commission following the Wattie Goodman Merger.
THE FUTURE OF THE INDUSTRIES
Government Support for Wheatgrowers
In the first year of deregulation the Government made a compensation grant
to wheatgrowers of $27.50 per tonne for all wheat produced. This grant was
to compensate wheatgrowers for loss of income and assist farmers adjust to
deregulation, and compensate farmers for ceasing their counterveiling and
dumping duty action against Australian wheat. Grant payments are unlikely
to be paid in the future because Government policy is to provide a neutral
environment for industries to operate. Future planned deregulation of
other sectors will result in lower costs for the wheat industry for
example, lower costs of fuel, machinery and transportation.
Profitability of Arable Farming
Arable farming has been the least profitable form of farming over the past
three years. Figures V and VI are derrived from New Zealand Meat and Wool
Boards Economic Service Sheep and Beef farm survey of income and production
estimates. A comparison between South Island mixed finishing farms (arable
farms) and the all classes average highlights the problems in the arable
sector.
(a) Interest payments are higher on arable farms in all years indicating
a higher level of indebtedness on arable farms.
(b) Over the years 1981-88 interest charges have doubled on the all class
average and trebled on the mixed cropping farm. This is because of
both a higher rate of interest and a higher rate of debt increase on
the arable farms.
(c) Total expenditure has increased by a factor of 2.0 on the arable farm
and a factor of 1.4 on the all class average between 1981 and 1988.
These differences reflects the difficulty that arable farmers have had
in cutting costs and the less flexible nature of arable farm costs.
(d) The all class average had a positive net income in all years under
study, while the arable farm has had negative net incomes in 3 of the
7 years.
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(e) The year with the lowest ,net income for both classes of farm was in
1985-86. This was the year before the wheat board was disbanded,
suggesting that factors other then deregulation resulted in the
financial difficulty that faces arable farmers.
The present problem on arable farms is a function of the low product prices
reflecting depressed international markets and the high level of debt on
farms. Much of the debt on farms was accummulated during the early 80s
when many farms changed hands and when there was a high level of investment
in machinery and irrigation development. Arable land prices were caught up
in the general land price euphoria of 1981-82. The prevailing expectation
among arable farmers and many of their adivsers during the early 80s was
that product prices and land prices would both continue to increase. These
expectations no longer hold and many farmers are now facing the after
affects of that era.
Since 1984 product prices and land values have declined while interest
rates have increased. Many farms now have a high debt to equity ratio.
Some farmers have no equity. On average, arable farms are forecast to make
a loss in 1988-89. Most farmers are clinging tenaciously to their farms
and are reluctant to sell their farms on the depressed land market. They
are hoping that product prices will improve sufficiently in the future for
their farm to become viable.
Those farms that are being sold are purchased by farmers with much less
debt, although few farms have been sold at the time of writing and the
arable crisis situation seems to be worsening. Prospects of a better
harvest and higher prices in the wake of the North American drought
offer arable farmers their best hope to alleviate their problems.
Much of the financial difficulty on arable farms would have been
experienced with or without deregulation. Had the Wheat Board continued in
existence it would probably have maintained higher prices in the short term
and passed these on to the consumer in the form of higher flour prices.
The result would have been surplus stocks of wheat because the wheat price
would have been out of line with the price of other enterprises such as
barley. There would also have been problems in defining boundaries between
feed wheat and milling wheat. Eventually the Board would have been forced
to lower prices.
The Board if it existed today would have accepted lower quality New Zealand
wheat than the mills are currently accepting. This action would have
assisted arable farmers, but The consumer would have suffered in terms of
both price and quality of bread and flour.
The Profitability of Wheat Growing
The Gross Margin for selected crop and livestock activities for the year
1987/88 are compared in Table V and figure VII. These gross margins were
prepared by farm advisers in late 87 early 88. Wheat is shown to be the
most profitable enterprise on the farm, and recent price expectations since
the gross margins were calculated would further increase wheat
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profitability. These gross 'margins indicate that many fanners will
continue to grow wheat.
Fanners who no longer grow wheat were those who are located in marginal
areas because of location from market, soils or climatic factors. Fanners
who because of one of these or other factors were not able to produce
quality milling wheat generally ceased production and produced another
product which was more profitable to them. In making these decisions
farmers are maximising both their own net income and at the same time
maximising national benefit from the use of national resources.
The future level of wheat production in New Zealand depends on many
interrelated factors. The effect of transport costs (trans Tasman and Cook
Straight) has been noted. The profitability of alternative enterprises has
a strong influence on the decision to grow wheat. Technology can improve
the quality and yield of the crop. The deregulation of other sectors can
reduce costs to the arable sector and increase profitability. Interest
rates and exchange rates are part of the complex of issues which will
influence the size of the industry. Exchange rates are especially
important as Australian wheat is immediately responsive to price changes
resulting from currency fluctuations.
The Adjustment Process
The return to the free market system after 40 years of regulation has
adversely effected many peoples incomes because market disciplines required
changes in resource use. The Board attempted to phase in some of the
changes prior to deregulation but met with limited success because
effective transitional adjustment implied pain for industry participants.
For wheat growers the adjustment has been made more difficult by the market
downturn in all arable products. However, even if prices for arable
products had been higher there would have been a similar decline in the
area of wheat. Mill closures in the South Island are now beginning to
impact on wheat growers because they are faced with large transport costs
to get their wheat to the nearest mill. Some fanners faced with these
costs will decide not to grow wheat, and it is likely that in the event of
a general market upturn in arable products farmers would grow increased
quantities of barley for export.
With the present costs for transport there will be little transport of
wheat, flour, bran or polland from the South to the North Island. The
South Island wheat industry will be reduced to around 60,000 tonnes from
the 273,000 tonnes produced in 1987. The extent of future wheat growing in
the North Island is unknown. It is physically possible for the North
Island to grow wheat and become self SUfficient, and the extent of actual
North island wheat production depends on comparative profitability at
the fann level.
Deregulation of the wheat industry will be effecting other sectors. For
example the Wheat Board annually paid around $17.0 mi11io~ on freight
largely between North Island and South Island. The loss of the Wheat
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Board business will increase 'restructuring of transport systems which
will in turn have some impact on the wheat industry.
The future size and health of the New Zealand wheat and flour industry is
in part dependent on further deregulation of other sectors to reduce costs.
Particular examples for cost reduction are fuel, transport and fann
machinery, and the general reduction in cost excess caused by protection of
other sectors will increase the profitablity of arable fanning.
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Table I
Prices received by growers total yield of wheat in New Zealand and quantity
of imports.
Harvest
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987E
1988F
1989F
E = estimate
F = forecast
Growers New Zealand Imports
Price Yield
($/tonne) ( I 000 tonnes) (1000 tonnes)
140.00 305.8 53.3
183.00 325.7 43.4
203.00 292.1 70.3
204.00 300.8 110.2
227.00 314.6 96.5
274.00 309.6 71.4
240.00 379.7 11.9
200.00 338.0 23.7
220.00 228.0 123.2
240.00 210.0 130.0
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Table II
Trends in location of wheat production (Yield thousand tonnes and % of
New Zealand total)
North Island % South Island % Southland ~
1979-1980 25.3 (8) 280.5 (92) 92.1 (30)
1980-1981 26.3 (8) 299.4 (92) 82.7 (25)
1981-1982 26.6 (9) 265.4 (91) 80.7 (2l)
1982-1983 31.6 (lO) 26902 (90) 72.7 (24)
1983-1984 38.7 (l2) 27508 (88) 39.8 (13)
1984-1985 48.7 (16) 26008 (84) 2903 ( 9)
1985-1986 48.4 (l3) 331.3 (87) 37.5 (10)
1986-1987 (E) 67.0 (l9) 273.0 (81) 32.0 ( 9)
1987-1988 (F) 51.0 (22) 173.0 (78) 2500 (ll)
1988-1989 (F) 59.0 (28) 151.2 (72) 20.0 ( 9)
E = Estimate
F = Forecast
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Table III
Production Consumption and milling of wheat
1987
North Island % South Island ~
'000 tonnes '000 tonnes
Wheat
Consumption
(Flour) 162.7 77 50.5 23
Wheat
Production 67.0 19 273.0 81
Wheat Mill ed 137.0 63 80.0 37
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Table IV
Prices of Bread, Flour. All Food CPI and All Groups CPI
Quarter (a) (b) All Food All Groups
of Year Bread (I) Flour (I) CPI (I) CPI (I)
December 86 1.22 (1.0) 1.52 (1.0) 1.46 (1.0) 1.49 (1.0)
March 87 1.22 (1.0) 1.48 (0.97) 1.47(1.01) 1.52(1.02)
June 87 1.22 (1.0) 1.44 (0.94) 1. 50 (1.02) 1.57(1.05)
September 87 1.27 (1.04) 1.47 (0.96) 1.51 (1003) 1.60(1.07)
December 87 1.29 (1.05) 1.47 (0.96) 1.52( 1.04) 1.63(1. 09)
March 88 1.31 (1.07) 1.49 (0.98) 1.56(1.06) l.66( 1.11)
I = Index
(a) = retail price $ of 750 kg bread sliced wrapped.
(b) = retail price of a 1.5 kg packet of white flour.
Source: Department of Statistics
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Table V
Profitability of farm enterprises (Gross Margin)
$/ha
North Island South Island
Breedi ng ewes
Wheat (Mill i ng)
Wheat (Feed)
Barley (Malting)
Barley (Feed)
Peas (Feed)
Ryegrass
Source: MAFTech
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Rygrass
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN EGG PRICE DETERMINATION
John Gibson, Bert Ward & Ralph Lattimore
Lincoln Coilege, Canterbury, New Zealand
SUMMARY
This paper reports on an investigation into the processes
determining egg prices over the period 1982:4 to 1987:4. A
model relating egg prices to lagged producer input prices
was discovered using the econometric modelling methodology
discussed by Gilbert (1986) and Hendry (1987). This model
was used to test the hypothesis that the removal of price
control on April 1, 1986 led to the breakdown of markup
pricing, with it's replacement being a return to price taker
status for producers. The empirical results confirmed this
hypothesis of a change in the price determination process.
Strategies by which producers attempted to maintain their
favourable position of price makers are reported and the
paper concludes with a discussion of the necessary and
sufficient conditions for farmers to pass on costs.
Key Words: Egg industry;
methodology
Price determination;
INTRODUCTION
Econometric
The hypothesis that prices are determined by a markup on
average costs is normally not applicable in the agricultural
sector. Models of agricultural product price behaviour tend
to assume perfectly competitive market structures (Tomek and
Robinson, 1981). In such a competitive setting atomistic
farmers are presumed to be price takers with respect to
input costs and marketing and distribution services.
This price-taker status of farmers resulted in governments,
particularly in the 1930's, giving legislative blessings to
agricultural marketing institutions which allowed the
'orderly marketing' of commodities to increase the level
of, and reduce the variability in, rural incomes (Zwart and
Martin, 1987). Farmers saw marketing boards as an
institutional mechanism for gaining bargaining power to
enable them to receive a similar rate of return for their
labour and investment as occured in non-agricultural
sectors. By the 1980's government attitudes had changed
such that the redistribution of market power, in favour of
producers, was no longer politically salient as criteria of
efficiency came to dominate those of equity. This view was
most forcefully put forward by Treasury (1984):
"the approach which seeks to ensure 'adequate'
farm incomes is one that has inhibited the
adjustment process by protecting farmers from the
realities of markets"
The result of this change in agricultural policy objectives
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was widespread deregulation. It is hypothesised that
farmers, when legislatively sanctioned, were able to price
in a markup based manner. A deregulation can be expected to
produce a significant shift, i.e. a structural break, in the
underlying process 'which generates prices and it is
predicted that following deregulation, farmers will once
again become price takers. This hypothesis is tested by
constructing a model of price determination in the New
Zealand egg industry.
The econometric modelling methodology used is based upon
that proposed by Hendry (1986) and follows a general-to-
specific model discovery process with data-allowable
restrictions being tested and imposed if accepted. Such a
methodology relies upon an interaction between theory and
data with the aim of producing a model exhibiting the
greatest congruence with the available evidence. The
credibility of our model was evaluated by testing against
evidence which was independent of the discovery mechanism.
Markup Pricing Theory
The hypothesis of markup pricing was first made by Kalecki
(1938) who argued that prices in the manufacturing,
construction and transport sectors were determined largely
by changes in the cost of production. This markup, which
was considered stable in the short run, was due to the
oligopolistic structure of these sectors and the constant
marginal, and therefore average, costs up to the full
capacity point. In Kalecki's model, the products whose
price changes were considered demand-determined consisted
mainly of raw materials and primary foodstuffs. The
Kaleckian distinction between two pricing mechanisms was
similar to that later popularised by Hicks, of fix-price and
flex-price sectors, although Hicks concentrated more on the
speed of adjustment whilst still accepting a competitive
framework (Sawyer, 1985).
The hypothesis of markup pricing was supported by Hall and
Hitch (1939) in a study of 38 oligopolistic firms. They
argued that prices were determined by average total cost,
with an allowance for profit. The theory was refined in the
1950's and several empirical studies of the industrial
sector confirmed the hypothesis. Meanwhile, agricultural
price determination was modelled using inverse demand
curves, with price and quantity simultaneously determined.
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
The Regulated Environment
Eggs first came under price control on September 1, 1939 and
remained so until April 1. 1986. The commissions of both
distributors and retailers were determined by price control
from 1940 onwards when marketing areas (monopoly franchises
for distributors) began to be ~gislatively established.
Farm level prices, which determined maximum retail prices,
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were set on the basis of surveys of egg production costs,
~arried out every four years, beginning in 1946. The
elements of the cost of production were: overhead expenses,
variable costs, family labour and an allowance for a rate of
return on assets (14%' in the 1983 survey). A weighted
average cost of egg production, based on the proportion of
production accounted for by each farm size class, was
derived from the survey. The producer price was generated
by adding this to the cost of 'running the industry' in the
form of Poultry Board levies and surplus disposal costs.
In the period between surveys, the producer payout price was
regularly updated to reflect the effect of input cost
movements. Egg marketing agents and retailers margins were
altered if the Department of Trade and Industry accepted the
submissions from representatives of these institutions. An
example of this price setting is illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1: Components of the Grade 6 Egg Price 1984
Component
Farm Gate Price
Delivery Allowance
Carton Cost
Wholesalers Commission
Maximum Wholesale Price
Retailers Margin
Retail Price
Price
$1.359
0.060
0.090
0.161
$1.670
0.160
$1.830
% of Retail
74
3
5
9
9
Source: Price Order No. 281 March 1984 (quoted in IDC, 1984)
The most noteworthy po~nt from Table 1 is the high ratio of
farm gate to retail prices. Undoubtedly part of this was
due to the nature of the product; there being little
opportunity or need for further processing. However, the
fact that marketing margins were set by regulation at levels
only one· third to one half of that applying on other
perishables (Gibson, 1988) suggests that the high
farm/retail price ratio was due more to intervention than
to product characteristics.
Guaranteed producer returns were supported by supply control
and a prohibition on imports of eggs and egg products. Egg
production was licenced. Quotas were placed on the number of
hens able to be farmed. When this regime was implemented in
1970 hen quotas were transferrable but their movements were
steadily restricted to control the relocation of production,
effectively disguising the true value of quota rent. From
1982 the quota price was regulated to zero and eggs, rather
than hens, were transferred to deficit production areas.
The Deregulated Environment
On April 1 1986 egg pricing, marketing and grading controls
were lifted. Production control remained but restrictions
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on hen quota values and movements were removed. The
government was motivated by a desire to introduce more
competition into the economy and achieve lower prices
(Caygill, 1985). The removal of price control and monopoly
marketing areas resulted in an immediate decline in retail
prices due almost entirely to a battle for market share in
the lower North Island and upper South Island. Six market
centres had price declines of 10% or more: Nelson (-27%);
Wanganui (-17%); Christchurch (-17%); Palmers ton North
(-16%); Wellington (-15%) and Timaru (-10%). In all of
these areas, plus Gisborne and Hastings, producer prices
were cut at the time of deregulation. This occured during a
time of rising production costs, as measured by the producer
price index for 'pig poultry and other' farm types.
Figure 1 shows movements in the egg price index 1 , deflated
by the food price index and an egg producer cost index,
deflated by the producer price index for all agriculture.
This provides immmediate graphical support for the
hypothesis that deregulation caused a structural break. The
two series in Figure 1 had tracked each other from 1982:4
(the starting period for the input price index) to 1984:4.
Then the hiatus during the industry review, followed by the
announcement and implementation of deregulation, saw the
series diverge and move in opposite directions.
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Figure 1: Real Retail Egg Prices and Producer Costs
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1 This index causes some measurement error
solely on graded eggs. Mixed grade eggs,
widely available prior to deregulation,
market share after deregulation, notably
and had prices up to 50% lower.
as it is based
which were not
gained a moderate
in Christchurch,
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THE MODEL
Economic time series data are generated by a process of
immense generality and complexity (Hendry, 1986). Economic
theory tends to operate with unrestricted ceteris paribus
conditions, unobse~vable theoretical values, general
functional forms and unspecified adjustment processes
(Pesaran and Smith, 1985). As a result the econometrician
must often augment theory with auxilIary assumptions
relating to functional form, error distribution, proxy
variables, data frequency and the specification of lag
structures. It is our aim in this paper to empirically
test, wherever possible, the assumptions and restrictions
used in deriving the final specification of the price
determination model. .
Model discovery by this process cannot hope to match the
elegance of final specifications reported as if they were
known to be correct a priori .. Our approach is messy, time
consuming and reveals how little we know about the data
generating process. It does however allow readers to judge
the plausibility of the final. specification based on their
own personal selection criteria. It seems safest to begin
with a general specification, simplifying it only if the
data legitimately allow. The reverse approach, of beginning
with a simple model and 'patching it up' as problems arise
has the weakness of not allowing the investigator to know
whether the final specification could be encompassed by a
more general model (Gilbert, 1986).
Model Discovery
We initially specified our general model as an
autoregressive, distributed lag
k k NID(0,~2)Yt = a + r ~'Yt . + r 1,C t . + Vt Vt - (1)J -J J -J
j=l j=O
This was a general form of a specification reported by
Gibson (1988) where Yt was the real price of eggs and Ct wasthe real farm cost of egg production. The included
variables were justified by Gibson on the basis of
production costs being the short run determinant of prices
and lagged egg prices reflecting the fact that prices in any
period were some function of their previous value. The
length of the lag (k) was set to two as we were dealing
with quarterly data and there had been 10 increases in the
maximum retail price over the five years prior to
deregulation. Making allowance for the period of the price
freeze it appeared that producers faced approximately six
months of input price rises, before redress, in the form of
a retail price rise, was granted.
The simplification procedure was based on common factor
(COMFAC) restrictions popularised by Hendry and Mizon
(1978). Rewriting equation (1) in lag operator notation and
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subtracting the lagged endogenous terms from both sides
yields equation (2).
2 2(1-~lt-~2t )Y t = ~ + (~O + lIt + 12L )C t + Vt (2)
If the COMFAC restriction ~2 = -~21l holds then equation (2)
can be more parsmoniously represented as equation (3)
due to the common factor on Yt and Ct (1-~2L). This
restriction was tested with a Wald test, yielding a ~ldf
value of 2.09, which did not exceed the critical level at 5%
significance (3.84) so the restriction was accepted.
However, we also tested for the presence of an AR(l) error
term in equation (3) and found no evidence of serial
correlation. This indicated that our initial lag length was
too long i.e. k ~ 1, leaving us with equation (3) with a
white noise error term, which can be writen in more
conventional notation as equation (4).
y =t ~ + (4)
Imposing restrictions, including those for an additional
common factor, on equation (4) enabled us to define a family
of nestable models, each of which represented a competing
hypothesis. These competing hypotheses were: an
autoregressive model, a distributed lag model (both with
white noise 2isturbances) and a static model with an AR(l)
disturbance. We have already seen from Figure 1 that a
substantial shift appeared to occur in the DGP with the
removal of price control. Testing the rival hypotheses
within this family of models required that account by made
of this shift. If this were not done, the regressor with
the greatest explanatory power would have been the lagged
value of the dependent variable, whereas the hypothesis
under test concerns the exogenous variable Ct' Account of
the deregulation was made bY3 incorporation of interactive
and intercept dummy variables.
One further source of error in the comparison between rival
models was due to multicollinearity amongst the regressors.
The correlations amongst the three explanatory variables in
the unrestricted model (4) were all greater than 0.6. This
problem was mitigated with a transformation suggested by
3 An alternative method would be to test the rival
hypotheses over the period prior to deregulation, whilst
the DGP was stable. Scarcity of observations precluded
this approach.
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Gilbert (1986). Expressing Ct and Ct - l as a level and a
change variable made them almost independent as they were
highly autoregressive (DW = 0.43) in levels.
(5)
Equation (5) is equivalent to (4) where 0 = 1 0 + 1]. Thefamily of nestable models and the values of tfie test
statistics on the necessary restrictions are listed below.
Table 2: Restrictions Used to Nest a Family of Models
Restriction Model
Test
Statistic
Critical
aValue
1 1=-f311 0 Static with AR( 1) error term 0.182
f3 -0 Distributed Lag with Ut ·- 'WN' 0.2041-
1 0 =11=0 Autoregressive with Ut - 'WN' 11. 62
a 5 % significance level
x?' = 3.81
F(1,13)=4.67
F(2,13)=3.80
The necessary restrictions for nesting a distributed lag and
a static model with AR(I) error process were seen to be data
acceptable. Note that the COMFAC restriction could not be
applied to model (5) as it would have been of the form
o=(10 +11 )=-f311 0 , so was instead applied to the equivalent
model (4). Accepting the restrictions suggested that a more
efficient estimation would occur with either of these
models, rather than the unrestricted model. However, the
nesting of the autoregressive model was not data-acceptable
so that specification was disgarded. The Cox-Pesaran N-test
for non-nested models was used to discriminate between our
two remaining competing models (labelled HI and H2 below).
HI: Yt = a + 1 0Ct + lit where lit = pU t - l + Vt
H2: Yt = a + 10~Ct + oC t _ l + Vt
This test is based on comparing the observed difference in
log likelihoods with the estimated expected difference when
HI is true (Pesaran, 1974) i.e. we look at the behaviour of
H2 under a presumed true HI. It can be shown that the test
statistic Nl is a standard normal variable under HI.
NI was computed using
. 4
regresslons.
regression residuals (e.)
J
from four
4 RSS.=residu~1 sum of squares=(e.)2
J J
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A
to obtain YZl ' RSS Zl and e Zl
and
andto obtain
HZ: to obtain
A
Yl on regresso~s of HZ
HI:(1)
(Z)
(3)
(4) e Zl on regressors of HI to obtain RSS Zll
The equation nominated as HI has a privileged position as a
'presumed true' null hypothesis so the test must be reversed
and NZ computed to test HI under a presumed true HZ. Thisgives four possible outcomes.
Outcome N - 01 - N = 0Z Implication
1
Z
3
4
reject
accept
reject
accept
accept
reject
reject
accept
Rejection of HI
Rejection of HZ
Rejection of HI & HZ
Failure to r~ject either
HI was estimated using the maximum likelihood procedure of
Beach and MacKinnon (1979) with the equation being
transformed with the estimated value of the autocorrelation
coefficient, p. The resulting value of N was -Z7.0Z which
exceeded the critical value for a stan!ard normal (at 5%
significance level) of 1.96, indicating that HI should be
rejected in the direction of HZ. The estimation of NZ gave
a value of 0.63 indicating that HZ should not be reJected.
The conclusion was that model HZ could encompass HI so HZ
was selected as our final model.
Estimation and Diagnostic Testing
Our selected specification
(6)
was estimated with maximum likelihood regression over the
full sample period (198Z:4 to 1987:4) with intercept and
interactive dummy variables to account for the removal of
price control. Quarterly dummy variables to account for
seasonality were found to be insignificant. The results,
after re-transforming to levels, were:
Yt =-0.83l + 0.96ZC t + 0.905C t _ l + Z.390D - Z.046D*C t - 0.48lD*C t _ 1(3.286) (3.147) (6.874) (4.581) (1.041)
where: C and Yare defined above and D is a dummy
variable equal to zero for observations prior
to deregulation
() = t-statistics Adjusted H2 = 0.929
F(5,14) = 50.76 Durbin Watson = 2.128
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The estimated model clearly shows the significance of the
structural break in the egg price DGP that occurred with the
removal of price control. The negative signs on the slope
dummy variables indicate that the coefficients on the input
cost terms were lower in the period after the removal of
price control. The results from the estimation of equation
(6) were subjected to a battery of diagnostic tests to check
for mis-specification. This step was an important
precondition to using our estimated statistical model as
incorrect specifications can give misleading policy
inferences (Spanos, 1986).
These quality control tests were as follows:
1) Jarque and Bera (1980) test for normality of
disturbance term. Violation of the assumption
normality can lead to invalid inference testing
disrupts the results of other diagnostic tests.
the
of
and
2) Ramsey's RESET test for general misspecification of the
functional form (which is a special case of excluded
variable bias). The test consists of augmenting the
regression with the predicted values raised to various
powers (normally 2 and 3) and testing the significance
of the coefficients on these augmenting variables.
3) Rao-Miller test for log-linear versus linear functional
form, this being a special case of the general Box-Cox
tests. This test had to be carried out on the model
without dummy variables as the log of zero (for
observations prior to deregulation) is undefined.
4) Breusch Pagan lagrange
heteroscedastic disturbances,
violates the assumptions on
error term.
multiplier test
the presence of
the distribution
for
which
of the
5) Breusch Godfrey lagrange multiplier test for
autocorrelation due to AR(p)/MA(q) processes
(p=q=l, ... ,4). As with test 4) the presence of serial
correlation in the error violates the assumptions under
which the estimator was derived and is often indicative
of mis-specification.
6) Tests for parameter constancy (Chow test #2). This
criteria was particularly important for this model given
that it's function is to test for a structural break. We
did not want a specification that exhibited parameter
instability across periods expected a priori to be
stable. We tested by reserving values for ex post
comparison, 4 quarters prior to deregulation and 4
quarters afterwards.
7) Test for the structural break at deregulation. This
test was to confirm the findings of the dummy variable
analysis. The hypothesis of non-equal parameters across
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the deregulation is
variances, which was
Quandt test.
conditional
tested with
upon equality of
a modified Goldfeld-
Table 3: Results of Diagnostic Testing Procedure
Test Critical Valuea Statistic Value Verdictb
DNR
DNR
DNR
DNR
DNR
DNR
REJECT
DNR
DNR
DNR
DNR
DNR
0.908
0.809
0.137
3.805
3.253
0.662
5.011
8.574
9.476
deregulation
36.885
1.269
3.841
= 3.88
3.841
5.991
F(3,14)= 3.34
F(4,10)= 3.48
2X (1) =
Ff2 ,12)
X (1) =
2X (2) =
2X (1) = 3.841
2X (2) = 5.991
2X (3) = 7.815
2X (4) = 9.488
post forecast periods)
1. 920F(4,6) = 4.53
F(3,11)= 3.59
structural break at
Normality
Ramsey's RESET
Rao-Miller
Breusch Pagan
Breusch Godfrey
AR (1 ) /MA ( 1 )
AR(2)/MA(2)
AR(3)/MA(3)
AR(4)/MA(4)
Chow tests (ex
1985:1-1986:1
1987:2-1987:4
Goldfeld-Quandt
Chow test for
ab 5% significance level
DWR = do not reject the model under test
The results of the diagnostic testing procedure were
generally favourable for the selected specification. There
did appear to be some problem with higher order
autocorrelated residuals although the test statistic
exceeded the critical value by only a small degree. Current
research also suggests that the X2 versions of the lagrange
multiplier tests reject acceptable models far too often
(Kiviet, 1986, quoted in Hendry, 1984). The tests of
parameter constancy showed that the model did not generate
structural breaks for no apparent reason, so it can be
considered a useful . instrument for the economic
interpretation to which we now turn.
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS
The dummy variable analysis indicated that two distinctly
different data generating processes were operating in the
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period prior to and after the removal of price control. The
definitions of, and coefficients on, the dummy variables
allowed us to derive price determination relationships for
the 'deregulation-off' period (1982:4-1986:1) and the
'deregulation-on' period (1986:2-1987:4). These are
reported below. '
'Deregulation-Off'
Yt = -0.831 + 0.962 Ct + 0.905 Ct - l(3.286) (3.147)
'Deregulation-On'
Yt = 1.559 - 1.084 Ct " + 0.424 Ct - l(2.301) (0.841)
These derived equations support our hypothesis that egg
farmers were not able to maintain markup pricing behaviour
when the legislative sanctions allowing this were removed.
The significance of Ct and Ct - l as explanatory variablesfor egg prices were lower, as were the coefficients on these
variables. The continuation of production control prevented
simultaneous determination of price and quantity in the
deregulated environment, so there should be no bias in a
single-equation price determination model. The coefficents
for the 'deregulation-on' period indicated that farmers were
no longer able to pass cost increases on into egg prices.
The removal of price control relegated producers to their
traditional position of being in a cost-price squeeze. This
is shown by the decline in the ratio of producer prices to
retail prices which was 0.74 at the Sime of deregulation but
had fallen to to 0.63 by March 1988. Some of the increased
marketing margin was due to fragmentation costs, notably in
cartoning but most appeared to be due to changed margins by
retailers, 60% of whom reported this behaviour when surveyed
in August 1987 (Gibson, 1988).
The return to price taker status appears to be due to the
inability of producers to maintain a national cartel of
sufficient strength to allow them to pass on cost increases.
In the deregulated environment the responsiblity for surplus
production was borne only by a limited subset of producers,
rather than equalised across all producers by Poultry Board
levies, or passed on to consumers in the disposal costs for
the previously "allowable" surplus of 5 million dozen eggs.
If markets were competitive the end of this cross-
subsidisation would have produced retail price declines
and/or producer cost increases (in the form of levies for
surplus disposal) in surplus production areas. The varying
regional rates of return for egg production would then have
driven production relocation to more profitable (egg
deficit) regions. In fact markets did not appear "to be
behaving competitively.
5 Based on Canterbury figures as national ones were no
longer available.
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Producer Response
The removal of the institutional mechanism which had allowed
price making behaviour led producers to seek other
mechanisms to maintain this favourable position. These
responses were: market sharing agreements; price
discrimination; and increased producer control of egg
distribution.
Market Sharing Agreements
After the inital battle for market share in the lower North
Island and upper South Island a market sharing arrangement
was reached in the Wellington market, which was the largest
single egg-deficit area. The Canterbury egg floor became
horizontally integrated by assuming majority shareholding
in, and management of, the Wellington egg floor. This
enabled Canterbury producers to maintain their 30% market
share and they also reached an agreement with Oamaru
producers for partioning of the Wellington market. In May,
1988 the Wellington egg floor was closed with the market
requirements being met in the export regions of Canterbury,
Palmers ton North and Hastings.
Price Discrimination
It appears that a second type of producer response to the
loss of their favoured position was price discrimination by
producer-controlled egg floors in surplus production areas,
Suggestive evidence of this came from the cummulative
percentage retail price change in the 19 market centres
surveyed by the Department of Statistics. We obtained
values for 6 monthly periods after the April 1, 1986 removal
of price control. Regional prices were largely equal under
price control so percentage changes from that base should
equate closely to price level changes. Market centres
within regions which were surplus production areas are
identified by an *. The measure of overproduction used was
the ratio of. egg recei-pts to' sales by licenced egg floors
for the 33 months prior to deregulation.
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Table 4: Market Centres With Greatest % Increases in Egg
Price Index Since Removal of Price Control
Rank October 1986 April 1987 October 1987 April 1988
1
2
3
4
5
Greymouth
Chch***
Tauranga***
P.N.**
Nelson*
Greymouth
Tauranga***
Chch***
Wanganui**
P.N.**
Greymouth
Tauranga***
P.N.**
Masterton***
Wellington
Greymouth
Gisborne***
Masterton***
Tauranga***
Chch***
P.N. = Palmerston North
Wanganui & Palmerston North~are supplied by same egg floor.
* 0 to 10% overproduction
** 11 to 20% overproduction
*** > 21% overproduction
Source: Department of Statistics, INFOS Series CPIM.SE+23A
It is not surprising that Greymouth was the market centre
with the greatest increase in price; indeed economic theory
would predict this. Greymouth has a large regional deficit
and is some distance from alternative supplies. What 1's
surprising is the presence of significant surplus production
areas amongst those market centres recording the greatest
price increases. For the first year of the policy reform
period, four out of the five markets with the highest egg
price increases were areas of significant surplus
production. For egg producers in these areas to sell eggs
in other cities, where prices were lower, price
discrimination was required. This analysis suggests that
egg producers in surplus areas prefered to use their home
market power to share the costs of surplus production with
captive consumers, rather than go out of business as
production relocated to deficit areas. Canterbury provided
the most graphic example of this with negligible movement of
hen quotas out of the area despite its chronic oversupply
and the high quota prices being paid by producers in egg
deficit areas.
Increased Producer Control
The third form of producer response to the removal of
legislative sanction was an increased control of egg
marketing floors as exploitation of distributor market power
was seen as an attractive alternative to farm-level
adjustment. Many of the egg floors were co-operatively
owned at the time of deregulation, however of these, several
were controlled by dairy farmers. Table 5, which details
owner~hip changes in egg floors shows the two major trends
to be the replacement of private control with co-operative
control and the replacement of dairy producer control with
egg producer control.
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Table 5: Changes in Egg Floor Control Since Deregulation
Egg Floor
Whangarei
Auckland
Hamilton
Tauranga
New Plymouth
Gisborne
Hastings
Palmers ton N
Wanganui
Masterton
Wellington a
Nelson
Canterbury
Dunedin
Invercargill
Control At 1.4.86
Private
Private & Co-op Floor
Private
Private
Egg producer co-op
Dairy co-op
Dairy dominated co-op
Dairy co-op
Dairy co-op
Dairy co-op
Dairy co-op
Dairy co-op
Egg producer co-op
Private
Egg producer co-op
Control At 1.&.88
Producer co-op
Merger, 50:50 control
Private
Private
Egg producer co-op
Egg producer co-op
Dairy dominated co-op
Egg producer co-op
Egg producer co-op
Closed down
Egg producer co-op
Egg producer co-op
Egg producer co-op
Private
Egg producer co-op
a Floor due to close at time of writing
Source: Mitchell (1988)
Implications For Agricultural Incomes
Our analysis of the inability of New Zealand egg producers
to continue markup pricing once legislative sanction was
removed has several implications for the proponents of
schemes to enhance agricultural income. Farmers in many
countries are currently faced with a decline in state-
generated income supports, with the result being
characterised as a 'farm crisis'. Out of this has arisen
many populist schemes for maintaining rural incomes, most of
which have as their rationale, a desire "for farmers returns
on equity and labour to be on par with the rest of the
economy" (Harkin, 1987). Our research has shown that supply
control, producer controlled marketing and exploitation of
market power by producer groups are not sufficient
conditions for farmers to price ~n a manner similar to the
industrial sector of the economy.
It is difficult to control the behaviour of free-riders in
agricultural cartel-forming attempts. Piggot (1981) has
shown that for commodities with low demand elasticities,
where non co-operators are of equal, or larger size, than
co-operators, the greatest gains from voluntary supply
restriction accrued to non co-operators. The egg industry,
post-April 1, 1986 co~ld be considered as a compulsory
cartel with regulatory legitimation of supply restriction.
6 Those conditions are of course necessary to minimise the
fiscal impact of programs that aim to guarantee rural
incomes through setting above-equilibrium prices.
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However, within this overall structure there existed
differential degrees of market power and supply imbalances.
Market share arrangements on a national basis, comparable to
the previously exclusive marketing areas, were not able to
be established due to the magnitude of transaction costs,
and the inability of, some regions, notably Canterbury, to
expel excess producers from the industry and equalise
regional profit opportunities by relocating production. The
result was interpenetration of markets, and a breaking away
of some individuals from co-operatives, all of which acted
to depress producer payouts. Whilst this was occuring
retail institutions were able to exploit distributor
competition and adjust the margin on eggs to a level more
similar to that on other perishables (Gibson, 1988). The
net result was a breakdown in the ability of producers to
act as price makers.
CONCLUSIONS
This study tested the hypothesis that the removal of price
control forced farmers to return to price taker status with
respect to input costs and. m~rketing services. The recent
deregulation of the New Zealand egg industry was used to
test the predictions of the hypothesis. We used an
econometric methodology of explicitly testing implied
theoretical restrictions in our model discovery process. A
distributed lag model was selected as the best approximation
of the data generating process and was evaluated with a
series of diagnostic tests. The selected model and
evaluatory test results provided strong evidence to suggest
that during the period of regulation egg producers followed
a markup pricing strategy.
This price determination mechanism appeared to break down
after the removal of price control with input cost increases
having a negative relationship to egg prices. This return
to price taker status occured despite the continuation of
supply control and the presence of a largely producer
controlled distribution sector. Pro~~cers appeared to react
to the loss of their price maker status by increasing their
control of the distribution sector, discrimination pricing
and market sharing agreements.
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ADJUSTMENTS IN THE KIWIFRUIT INDUSTRY A
MAFCotp Iblicy services
Private Bag
~
Excess demand, government assistance and high retm::ns have encouraged
a large planting and production response of kiwifnrit both in New
Zealand and overseas. With increasing supplies the status of
kiwifnrit is evolving from an exotic to a nonnal good which has made
demand increasingly elastic and lowered market retm::ns.
With economic rents dissipating, the industry is quickly entering a
mature phase with a substantial rationalisation needed to survive in a
competitive market place. In addition to detailing the market
dynamics the paPer discusses possible areas of the industry in which
adjustments may occur.
Keywords: supply and demand, kiwifnrit, horticulture and market~.
Introduction
A key feature of New Zealand's horticultural sector during the 1970's
and early 1980' s has been the rapid development of the kiwifnrit
industry. '!his industry exparx:led in response to economic stllnu1us
from high overseas returns to the fnrit, and it is only very recently
that signs of financial difficulties and an end to the expansion are
appearing.
Most new products are characterised by the classic "product
development" cycle, with its three phases of inception, development
and maturity. Initially, production was limited, and high market
retm::ns stimulated a large acreage response. Increasing overseas
demand kept retm::ns high, accentuating the planting boom and retunring
economic rents to early owners of the factors of production. '!bus,
kiwifnrit showed all the features of the inception and development
stages of a new industry, with rapid growth, outward shifting demand
cw::ves and disequilibrium. product and factor values.
A Contributed paPer to the 13th Annual Conference of the New
Zealand Branch, Australian Agricultural Economics Society,
Blenheim, July 8-9 1988.
B Assistant Analyst and Senior Analyst resPectiVely, MAFCOl:P Iblicy
services, Wellington. '!he views expressed in this paPer
represent these of the authors and not necessarily those of
MAFCorp
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Excess demand l1OW' appears to have been eliminated in overseas markets,
and grower retunls have fallen. '!his has placed many New Zealand
growers under financial pressure. and caused a cessation .of the acreage.
response. Despite this levellinJ of the planted area, domestic output
will continue to rise because of the lags between planting and maximum
production.
Additionally, rapidly expanding overseas production will accentuate
problems of supply and add to New Zealand I s "problem". Market
~tition has hastened the domestic kiwifruit industJ:y into the
maturity phase of the product deVelopment cycle.
'!he objective of this paper is to document and discuss the dynamics
and time path of the industJ:y from the development phase through to
its emerginJ maturity. '!his is achieved by analysinJ the acreage
response and the changing nature of the demand curves in overseas
markets. Responses of growers to these changes are highlighted.
Impacts of current and past government policies on the industJ:y
development are also discussed, with particular reference to the
effects of policy changes upon the industty dynamics.
SUpply
New Zealand
'!he kiwifruit crop takes 5 to 8 years to achieve maturity. '!hus
aggregate supply in time t will depend on the mature and innnature
areas planted in kiwif:ruit (At). It is likely that area planted in
kiwif:ruit will be influenced by expected future prices (Labys, 1973).
since kiwifruit is a capital and labour intensive crop the level of
inputs used (Xt) will influence output. In addition, the prevailinJ
envirornnental corxlitions in the crop year (Wt) will also affect yields
and export percentages. '!his supply relationship takes the form:
(1)
where t is time measure in years and Et is a random error tenn.
Observations of yearly values of wt and xt were not available ani are
thus treated as endogenous variables1. '!he sheer size of the acreage
increase suggests that total acreage has influenced aggregate New
Zealarxi production more than variation in input levels. In addition
producer objectives have been aimed at achievinJ high volumes a.nd
quality of production, so cost constraints have not heretofore been a
serious problem. As a consequence, the initial development of the
kiwifruit industJ:y can be characterised by an acreage response rather
than a supply (variable input) response per see Consequently equation
1 was silnplified to:
(2)
lA biennial pattern in yields has been obsel:ved, which is in part
weather dependent and partly dependent of previous years yield.
'!his study assumes average annual yields and thus does not
account for this biennial phenomenon.
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New Zealand area in kiwifruit has increased substantially since the
early 1970's. '!he annual variation (in proportionate change per annum)
in planted acreage (bt) is assumed to be a function of expected prices
(P*) :
6\ = f(P*, Et) (3)
where t is measured as:
$' t = (At - At-1)/At-1
Total area in kiwifruit in a given year can be estimated as:
At = (1 +St) * At-1
(4)
(5)
'!he relationship between At and Qt, will be detennined by the age
distribution of planted kiwifruit vines, as output per hectare (Y)
increases with vine age. Total export production can be estimated by
multiplying the area of vines in each age group by the average export
yield for the age of vines and sunnned across all age groups
QO
<,
Qt, = ~ (Yi * At-i) (6)
i=k
where t is time measured in years:
i is the age of vines:
Qt, is the average exportable production in a given year:
k is the age in which vines become productive;
Yi is the potential exportable yield of vine at age i;
At is the hectares of vines planted of a given age;
Actual export production rose from 1,600 tonnes in 1975 to 162,000
tonnes in 1987. Mean forecasts of Q from equation 6 for the period
1973-1987 differed from obsel::ved values by an absolute average of 9.5
percent. Some of this error is caused by the biennial nature of vine
production.
As hypothesized in equation 3, the yearly change in hectares planted
in kiwifruit (0') is a function of expected future prices (P*). Price
expectations were found by search technique to be in:licated by a
weighted average of the previous three years crop. prices. '!his
expected price figure is deflated by an input price irrlex to give a
measure of real returns to the crop. Data on P* was available for
1975-1986. In addition to the price expectations variable, a variable
was added to the equation to aa::ount for the sizeable effect of tax
incentives on planting rates. '!he development tax incentives (D) were
specified as a dummy variable with values of 1 for the period
1978-1982 and 0 otherwise. '!his modified version of equation 3 was
formally estimated using ordinary least squares (standard errors of
the regression coefficients are in Parenthesis):
t = -0.481 + 0.633 * p* + 0.180 * D
(0.095) (0.085) (0.038)
Results from this estimation in:licate that:
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(7)
Expected real prices had a strong positive correlation with
changes in production area (the acreage response was very
elastic) ;
Development tax incentives had a statistically significant
influence on planting rates (see figure 1);
Acreage equilibrium would occur at a grower price of
approximately $7.15 per tray (1988 nominal dollars).
Olanges in planted area were forecast using equation 7. Given that
price forecasts are below equalibrium levels, the:mcx:1el predicted that
there would be vine removals over the next 3-4 years. It is beyorrl
the scope of this paper to estimate the age arrl regional distribution
of any removals. Further, the removal of vines is not a costless
excercise, arrl asset regidity is such. that limited actual removal may
take place.
World Situation
Large planting responses have been evidenced in the U.S., France,
Italy, Chile and Japan (see table 1). '!he increase in acreage in
these countries have also been in response to the favorable narket
returns, arrl in the case of EEC countries, development arrl narketing
subsidies. '!he result of planting increases elsewhere is that world
supplies will continue to grow at a fast rate arrl that New Zealarrl' s
share of world production and exports will contract. Increases of
supplies in Northern hemisphere countries will serve to broaden the
seasonal distribution of kiwifruit and provide some direct competition
at the beginning and end of the New Zealarrl marketing season. Other
Southern hemisphere exports will compete directly with New Zealarrl
supplies. In 1987 world production totalled 379,000 tonnes, of which.
New Zealand share was roughly 50%. World production is expected to
increase to 1,200,000 tonnes by 1995, with New Zealarrl share falling
to 25%. While New Zealand production will be nearly maximised by
1991, world production is forecast to expand well beyorrl that given
the recent nature of many overseas plantings (see figure 2) and the
large lag between planting and full production.
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Figure 1: Area Response in NewZealand
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Table 1: Area in Kiwiftuit by camtl:y (hectares)
New Zealand
Italy
France
United states of America
Chile
Australia
Japan
Total for above countries
1980 1985 1990
5,500 16,000 17,000
1,200 6,000 15,000
3,200 6,400
3,000 3,800
2,500 20,000
1,200 2,000
3,300 4,000
35,200 68,200
Source: New Zealand Kiwifruit Authority
Demand
Consumer theory suggests that own price, personal income, price of
substitute goods, and irrlividual tastes and preferences can influence
derrarrl and thus market prices (Koutsoyiarmis, 1983). '!he relative
illlportance of these factors in determining kiwifruit demand is
considered. Given the infancy of kiwifruit markets and the unique
market position of the f:ruit, some of these variables may have more
influence than others. Kiwifruit has been sold as an exotic fruit in
most export markets, with associated high income and lOW' price
elasticities of demand and little substitution effect (uniqueness).
Wider distribution and promotion of the product has increased consumer
awareness, preference and demand for the fruit. Given the large
increases in expected supply, consumption of kiwifruit is being pushed
to greater volumes in order to clear markets from excess supply.
Further, consumption in main markets is nCM occurring on a year round
basis. '!hese may well cause the status of kiwifruit to evolve from an
exotic, occasional purchase to one of a more everyday or nonnal geed
status. '!hese trends would suggest that:
1 Excess demand will be eliminated in foreign markets causing
market prices to decline;
2 Income elasticity of kiwifruit will decrease with time;
3 '!he price of kiwifruit relative to other substitutes will become
more illlportant;
4 With increasing supplies and competition from foreign producers,
export price elasticity will increase.
'!he above hypothesis suggest that the demand curve for New Zealand
kiwifruit is stabilising and also changing slope.
Figure 3 contains schedules of real foreign prices (Per kilogram)
plotted against New Zealand export volumes (tonnes) to Japan, West
Gennany and a residual category (ReM) for the period 1976-1987. Early
in the sample period there was a rather inconsistent relationship
between price and quantity, probably due to market establishment.
159
However, as export volumes increased to over 10,000 tormes in each
market, this relationship does apPear to be taking a more
"conventional" fonn, that of a negative relationship between quantity
and price. The small negative slope of the curves in figure 3 suggest
a rather elastic relationship between price and volume.
It is probable that the plots in figure 3 are not in fact the demarxi
curve for each market but instead a locus of equilibrium points
between successive supply and demarxi curves. It is k:nown that NZ (and
foreign) supply is increasing rapidly, fuelled in Part by Past price
expectations. It is likely that market demarx:l curves are also shifting
outward. This would be caused by increases in consumer preference for
the fruit and increases in disposable i.ncorLe. However as the
consumption of kiwifruit becomes more dispersed (preferences become
established) the demarxi curve may become stabilised or subject to nnlch
smaller shifts. Movements will be more along one demarxi curve rather
than between curves. Figure 4 depicts a hypothetical relationship of
kiwifruit supply and demand over tiIne. Large shifts between supply
curves and decreasing shifts between demand curves could be a possible
explanation of the concave shape of plots shown in figure 3. Growth in
demarxi was enough to increase real prices early in the sample period,
despite increases in supply. But as nnlch larger quantities were sold
on the markets, the trencl in prices is downward. as depicted by the
locus of short :run equilibrium points in figure 4.
Price Equation
Estimation of an equation to explain real foreign export price
movements for New Zealand kiwifruit was constrained by three major
factors. Foremost is the apParent instability of the emerging world
market for kiwifruit with both demand and supply schedules changing
with tiIne, a problem of identification exists. Second, a small number
of annual obseJ:Vations (13) on export prices were available, severely
limiting the number of explanatory variables able to be employed. A
third problem was the appropriate definition of an exchange rate for a
given year. The annual exchange rate, as defined here, is an average
over the statistical year (July through June). However, it is possible
that export sales are converted into NZ currency at only a few periods
thus there is a potential large measurement error in converting New
Zealand price into foreign currency equivalents. With these
difficulties in mind, a model of price determination was formulated.
Export prices (P), are assumed to be a function of quantity exported
(Q) and a trend variable (T) which is intended to capture increases ,in
demarxi as well as income effects ('1'=1 for 1975 and '1'=13 for 1987).
Thus, the model for a given market is expressed as:
(8)
where t is tiIne in years and i is the export market (Japan, Gennany,
and RCM) and e is an random error tenn. It was expected that quantity
will have a negative effect on price and while the trend variable will
have a positive influence on price.
Estimates of equation 8 were obtained for each of the three separate
markets. A log-linear functional fonn provided the satisfactory
regression estimates. Specifically, the equation estimated was:
Pti = bO * ~iAb1 * TtAb2 * ~i (9)
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Figure 3: Price-Volume Schedule for New Zealand Export Markets
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Results from the regression estimates are given in table 3. All the
regression parameters were of expected sign with quantity having a
negative relationship with price and trend a positive relationship.
All parameters were significant from zero at a 95 percent confidence
level. Estimates of price elasticity are taken from the inverse of b1
coefficients and range between -2.0 and -2.5, suggesting an elastic
demand for New Zealand exports.
Table 2: Fu.....::uetric ESt:imates of D:!Dard Par:aDet:e1:s by Mal:ket
(dependant variable = real foreign price)
Constant Quantity Trend R2 OWn-Price
Elasticity
Germany 4.180* -0.488* 0.691* .65 -2.05
Japan 9.170* -0.461* 0.345* .92 -2.17
RCM 3.104* -0.398* 0.331* .96 -2.51
* statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence level
Tests were made to ascertain the changes in demand elasticity and
demand shifts over time. Results indicate that demand is becoming
more elastic with time. 'Ibis suggests that kiwifruit is evolving
towards a canunodity status on world markets, and that New Zealand
exporters are increasingly becoming price takers. Similarly tests on
the trend variable suggest that preference/income induced shifts in
demand are declining, which is consistent with the hypothesis of a
stabilising demand ctn:Ve. Anecdotal evidence of an increasing cross-
price elasticity emerged from 1987 marketing season as the large
Northern hemisphere surmner fruit crop was believed to have a
depressing effect on export prices received for New Zealand kiwifruit.
'Ihese developments indicate that kiwifruit is losing its unique
consumer status and buoyant demand in overseas markets, and as a
consequence, obtaining the salient characteristics of a "nonna!" good.
in accord with microeconomic theoJ:Y.
Grower Retmns
Further evidence of the rapid maturation of the kiwifruit industJ:Y can
be gained from a review of orchard cash bUdgets over time. A
combination of falling returns and rising costs have served to
dissipate rents quickly from the industry. cash margins for a typical
orchard fell from $5.13 per tray prcx:luced in 1982 to $2.45 in 1985 and
$0. 72 in 1987 (table 3). A forecast cash budget for the current 1988
crop are also given (the returns figure may be optimistic). Returns
for the 1987 crop were insufficient to cover total costs for
approximately 90% of the industJ:Y (MAF, 1988). At present, cash
income needs to exceed $7.00 per tray if economic rents are to be
gained from a typical orchard.
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Table 3: Kiwifruit Ordlani BDJets
(values on a per tray basis)
crop year
1982 1985 1987 1988* % change
1982-87
cash Income $9.63 $8.17 $6.76 $8.52 -29.80%
levy 0.30 0.38 0.44 0.40 46.67%
coolstore 0.61 0.70 0.90 0.82 47.54%
Net cash Income 8.72 7.09 5.42 7.30 -37.84%
Wages 0.52 0.95 0.90 0.96
O1emicals 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.23
Fertiliser 0.07 0.13 0.25 0.16
Grading & Packing 2.21 2.37 2.45 2.50
Pollination 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.20
Vehicles 0.16 0.25 0.19 0.25
Repairs 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.19
Administration 0.12 0.25 0.31 0.40
other 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.05
cash cost 3.59 4.64 4.70 4.94 31.01%
Gross Margin 5.13 2.45 0.72 2.36 -85.97%
Source: MAP, Tauranga
* MAFTech estilnates
GrcMer cash retums fell by over 37 percent from 1982 to 1987, mainly
due to the laJ:ge .increase in exports for the same period. cash
expenses have risen by about 30 percent, a rate of increase that is
less than the prevailing cost inflation rate of 44 percent for the
same period. '!his indicates that real production costs have declined,
probably due in part to .increases in orchard productivity over the
sample period. Of the costs listed in table 3, a large proportion
relate to marketing activities, including coolstore, levy ani grading
ani packing costs. Labour represents the other significant cost
factor.
Land Values
Practical measurement of the relationship between income streams ani
asset values are complicated by a number of policy distortions and
measurement difficulties. A study by Seed et al (1986) fourrl that
real New Zealani fann lani prices were positively related to both
expected net income ani expected rates of inflation. It appears that
kiwifruit orchard land values have exhibited some of the same patterns
over time. Valuation Department data from Tauranga COUnty indicate
that real orchard prices, have generally followed the general downward
trend in cash incomes of kiwifruit grcMers (table 4). From 1981 real
orchard values have tracked downwards from $·65,000 to $38,000 per
hectare. Exceptions to this trend were 1983 ani 1987. A plausible
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explanation for these abberations is the lagged response to increases
in kiwifruit retunls in 1982 and 1986.
'!he shal:p decline in orchard returns in 1987 appears to have had a
pronounced effect on land values. Anecdotal evidence for 1988
irrlicates that mature orchards are selling (some are passed on at
auctions) for between $20,000 and $30,000 Per hectare (nominal
dollars), down as much as 50 percent from 1987 values.
Table 4: B:Jrt.i..cultural Ia:nl Prices - TaI.JraDja
Prcx:lucing units
sale
Year Numbers Nominal Valuejha Real Value* Real Gross*
Margin/tray
1980 36 $44,305 $61,620
1981 81 54,848 65,295
1982 39 59,371 62,893 $5.43
1983 36 72,965 74,303 3.15
1984 49 63,881 61,483 3.68
1985 36 49,586 41,599 2.06
1986 42 44,099 33,207 3.57
1987 88 57,382 38,153 0.48
* Deflated by Consumer Price Index (4/83 = 100)
Source: Valuation New Zealand, MAP Tauranga
Price Forecasts
Given current orchard area and productivity levels, New Zealand's
export supply is expected to rise from a current level of 160,000
tonnes to 260,000 tonnes in 1991 and 300,000 by 1995 (NZKA, 1988).
'!hese exports will be competing with 2,500, 28,000 and 215,000 tonnes
from Chile for the same years. With an elastic demand CUIVe this
iIrplies that real returns will continue to fall.
Forecasts of grower returns2 were made using the estimated equations
listed in table 2. Conversion of real foreign FOB values to domestic
nominal equivalents were made using MAP macroeconomic assumptions
(MAFCoJ:P, 1988, smith, 1987). 'Ihese indicate low foreign inflation
rates and a slight weakening of the dollar against foreign currencies.
A market margin of 40% was used to convert FOB values to fanrgate
returns (New Zealand Kiwifruit Report, 15.5.87).
Nominal grower prices for 1988 are forecast at approxiInately
$6. 60/tray, due in part to a small increase in export volume from 1987
(table 5). Increasing export volumes through 1991 are forecast to
depress returns to approxiInately $5.30. Forecasts do not explicitly
include the influence of expected exports from Chile or Northern
hemisphere st.nmner fruits (substitutes) on prices, and thus may be
2Forecast of grower returns are net incomes and should not be
exactly compared with the returns listed in table 4, which are
actual cash incomes.
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optimistic.
Table 5: ~:::cu:m::!LticFm:ecast of Net 0I:dlal:d IncclDe
Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
P = PrelilninaJ:y
f = Forecast
Gove:rnment Policy
Exports
(tonnes)
175,00Op
228,000f
245,000f
263,000f
Retum
(per tray)
$6.59
$5.85
$5.60
$5.27
Previous New Zealand Gove:rnments made a number of development schemes
available which hastened the growth phase of the kiwifruit industry,
particularly during the boom period from 1978-1982 (see Nickel,
1984b). Tax concessions against current incomes encouraged
speculative capital and orchard development expenditures. 'Ihese were
eliminated after 1982. Equation 7 above showed the presence of these
subsidies significantly influenced planting rates during the 1978-1982
period. Interest concessions from the Rural Bank artificially lowered
capital costs, thus raising perceiVed rents available to kiwifruit
invesbnent. Export tax incentives encouraged (currently 7) an
objective of maximising export volumes. Managed exchange rates served.
to reduce exporters I risks 0 'Ihese support mechanisms were Partly
offset on the cost side by the high tariffs/protection rates which
affected iInportant inputs such as packing materials, sprays, and
equipment. Estimates of effective rates of assistance (ERA IS) to
kiwifruit by Nickel (1984a), confinned the presence of large
subsidies. ERA's were ewer 50% from 1978/79-1981/82 and neariy 30%
for 1982/83. The assistance measures were instrumental in fostering
the development boom in kiwifruit during these years.
'!he economic libera.lisation instituted by the present Gove:rnment have
eliminated or reversed many of the prevailing subsidies and/or cost
distortions· fonnally present. Concessional interest rates are being
phased out, and, coupled. with an anti-inflationary monetary policy,
have raised capital costs significantly, contributing to the current
cost-price squeeze. Import duties have been lowered, but with only
marginal effects on the cost side as of yet. 'Ihe devaluation and then
floating of the dollar appears to have been of significant benefit to
the returns of the industry with the kiwi dollar depreciating against
major currencies in which the fruit is traded (Yen, Deutchmarks,
Francs) • A kiwifruit trade weighted exchang'e rate is shown in table
6, along with changes in grower retunls. Currency movements appear to
have helPed earnings in 1984, 1985 and 1986 and have had only a small
negative impact in 1987.
European Cormnunity policies have promoted kiwifruit development,
particularly in France and Italy. Marketing and orc:hal:d development
subsidies and interest rate concessions for kiwifruit are currently
available. One of these subsidies is geared towards replacing surplus
conunodities, such as wine grapes, with higher income crops such as
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kiwifnrlt. European producers also receive assistance in the fonn of
ilnport tariff and non-tariff barriers. A real possibility of a
reference price system exists, particularly when Connmmity production
reaches sizeable volumes.
Table 6: Kiw:i.fi:uit~ Rates am Returns
Year Kiwifnrlt Trade Weighted
exchange rate
Net :Returns to Growers
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
DebtlEquity
(% change from previous year)
-17.89%
-8.52%
-15.69%
2.96%
21.68%
-18.39%
37.89%
-39.63%
Estimates of the debt load and growers' perceptions of their financial
difficulty can be seen from the following table, taken from the
MAFI'ech/NZKA grower sw:vey;
Table 7: Pel:oeptialS of Financial Difficulty (% of Graers)
Equity% Severe Moderate Minor None Total
<0 4.1 2.0 0.3 2.0 8.4
0-25 3.1 2.4 1.0 2.0 8.5
25-50 3.1 8.1 1.7 5.4 18.3
50-75 2.7 9.5 3.4 10.2 25.8
>75 2.4 7.8 9.2 19.7 39.1
Total 15.4 29.8 15.6 39.3
Source: MAFTech/NZKA SUrvey, 1988
Some 35 percent of kiwifnrlt growers have less than 50 percent equity
as of November 1987. Of this total 8.4 percent have negative equity.
Fifteen point four percent of growers consider themselves in "severe"
financial difficulty, while 39.3 percent consider they have no
financial difficulty. We can only salute the 2 percent of growers
with negative equity who consider they have no financial problems, and
wonder about the 2.4 percent with greater than 75 percent equity and
"severe" financial problems! A Chi square test on table 7 irxlicate
that grower perceptions of financial status were not independant of
actual situation, but only at a 90 percent confidence level.
Since this sw:vey was conducted in November 1987, it is probable that
the estimate of current market values of kiwifnrlt units of $30,064jha
used to base the equity levels upon would have, in fact, decreased.
nus is likely to accentuate the degree of financial difficulty from
the above table, and effectively move ma.I).y growers to a lower equity
166
position.
From the same MAFI'ech/NZKA grower survey we are able to obtain an
estimate of some ~732 million as the national debt exposure of
kiwif:ruit growers. Gdve:rrnnent or quasi-government agencies (the
Rural Bank, DFC an:l the mz) hold some $283 million (39%) of that
debt, with much of it in secorxl and subsequent mortgages, tenn loans
and overdraft. Private sources, at $128 million, is the next largest
catego:r:y•
As market prices are forecast to decline, many growers will have
increased difficulty in sel:Vicing debt, swelling the mnnber of growers
in "severe" financial difficulty. Even though market interest rates
are tracking dovmwards, the cumulative debt load of growers continues
to grow. CUrrently leming institutions appear to be taking a ''wait
arxl see" attitude towards orchards and 1988 returns. If debt load
continues to grcM, lenders options will be restricted to such
possibilities as foreclosing, reducing interest, equity sharing arxl
debt write-off (parking). It is not clear at this stage how financial
institutions will resporxl to their exposure in the kiwif:ruit irrlustry.
Changes in Net Returns
Given the current outlook of falling market prices arxl stable/rising
production costs, it is opportune to look at means of improving net
returns to growers. With the irrlustry driven by export eanrings,
production objectives have been to maximise quality of f:ruit, rather
than total output. Previous excess profits from production arxl
marketing have cushioned growers arxl exporters from the need to adopt
a least-cost production strategy, thus it is likely that the irrlustry
is not at the lowest point of its average cost curve (optimtnn
competitive production strategy). Gains in efficiency are .i1nperative
to survival, particularly.when the Chileans are producing f:ruit for
approximately NZ$0.75jkg (NZKA, 1988) whereas a similar figure for New
Zealand would be approximately $2. 30jkg (FOB value less commission) •
A number of options are available for increasing net returns to
growers. 'lhese options include:
Increase Returns
1 the COOpers and Lybrarxl study (NZKA, 1988 section 8.5)
reconrrnend.ed "... substantially increased demand for kiwif:ruit at
prices that will provide economic returns for competitive
growers" • It can be assumed that this statement is calling for a
major promotional exercise to move the "overseas" demand curve
outwards and/or to create a separate demand curve for New Zealan:1
kiwif:ruit by means of a brani promotion (differentiation).
Either option will involve substantial effort ar.rl cost. '!he
differentiation approach would require New Zealand exporters to
maintain a distinct quality and sel:Vice image arxl that the market
be willing to pay for the New Zealarxl "difference". We note from
the irrlustry marketing review (NZKA, 1988) that the J:):)le
Corporation may manage some 30 percent of expected Chilean
production. Given the international marketing expertise of this
3Some of this debt pertains to non-kiwif:ruit operations.
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company, it will be increasi.n;Jly difficult for New Zealam to
create and/or maintain a unique brand image as Orllean supplies
enter the market in large volumes.
While past promotional activities may have helped st:i.mulate
foreign demand and maintain market retums, it behoves operators
to be cognisant of the changi.n;J nature of our competitors supply.
Promotion is not a costless exercise, and has an elasticity
response value am faces diminishing marginal returns. Not only
is the kiwifruit demarrl curve becoming harder to lOOVe outwards,
but the potential to capture the economic benefits solely for New
Zealand producers must be dilninish:in;J as competi.n;J supplies are
placed on the market. '!here is no doubt of the desirability of
establish:in;J and promoti.n;J a New Zealand kiwifruit brani image,
but a clear accounti.n;J of the methods, costs am benefits must be
made;
Reduce Off-Farm Costs
2 reduce domestic marketi.n;J am packagi.n;J related costs. '!his
could be achieved in three areas: gradi.n;J am packagi.n;J,
coolstore and exporter commissions. Gradi.n;J and packing costs
are currently at $2.40-2.80/tray (MAP) and represent at least 50%
of on-orchard costs. Of these costs at least $1.50 is materials
with the remainder for labour. A number of lower cost
alternative are available to the domestically produced wooden
trays, used almost exclusively for exporti.n;J. '!hese include
cartons, polystyrene am inexpensive imported trays. '!he latter
option has been uneconomic due to high tariffs on imported
packi.n;J materials. (Usi.n;J bulk rather than highly packaged
materials may lower returns however and is not necessarily
compatible with the brani differentiation approach discussed.
above.) Ccx:>lstore costs are currently 0.85-0.9OC Per tray and
could be reduced by increasi.n;J efficiency/scope of the storage
operations. Exporter commissions are on a cost-plus (10% of FOB
retums) basis. '!here appears to be room for considerable cost
savi.n;Js if export OPerations are rationalised. '!he wide
differential in 1987 returns from various exporters in:licates the
possibility for increasi.n;J marketi.n;J/cost efficiency;
Reduce On-Farm Costs
3 labour costs are a considerable proportion of kiwifruit
production costs. casual labour involved with gradi.n;J,
packagi.n;J, and harvesti.n;J costs are in excess of $1. 20 Per tray.
Additionally, other production and consulti.n;J services cost
growers up to $1. OO/tray. Obviously, flexibility in adjustments
to both skilled and unskilled labour costs would benefit growers.
However, this raises an equity issue which is beyond the scope of
this paPer;
4 another option to improve retums is for growers to utilise
available contract services. '!hese services can be used for
orchard management and/or harvesti.n;J. '!he size am efficiency of
these services may allow owner-oPerator orchards to reduce costs
while at the same time freei.n;J up labour to gain off-farm or
other income;
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5 the existence of a mnnber of large size syn:licated and co~rate
orchards, suggests that increasin;J the size/scope of orchard
operations may be a plausible strategy to increase returns.
Skilled labour and capital inputs can be utilised more
efficiently over larger orchard areas, reducin;J average costs;
6 potential exists for boostin;J output per hectare, as lIaveragell
orchard yields are currently well below these of the highest
yielding private and research orchards. Research by Doyle et al
(1988) concluded that certain inputs such as artificial
pollination, growth regulators and irrigation can boost yields
significantlYand/or reduce year-to-year yield variation. 'Ihese
inputs, if used in appropriate circlnnstances, also increase net
returns to production.
All the strategic options mentioned above, would to varying degrees
boost annual returns to growers. However none of the changes would be
costless. Large new capital/invesbnent outlays for some of these
strategies would have to be viewed critically given current costs, and
difficulties faced, in obtaining finance.
OWnership/Scale
At present, the majority of kiwifruit orchard blocks in New Zealand
can be characterised as small holdin;Js of less than 5 hectares managed
on an owner-operator basis. Over 80 percent of the 4,300 registered
kiwifruit growers have orchard areas of under 5 hectares, with half of
these bein;J lifestyle or sidelight blocks of 2 hectares or less (table
8) ~ At the other extreme only 4 percent of orchards are estimates to
occupy an area greater than 12 hectares and these blocks are estimated
to produce up to 30 percent of domestic output. On the armershi.p side
there are 10% of orchards as registered companies, 20% in syndicated
partnerships with most of the remainder in individual/family armershi.p
(MAFTech, 1988). '!he industry can therefore be characterised by small
scale family holdings.
Number
Number
Table 8: size Di.st:r:i1:Juti.an of ordlaI:ds
MAFTech/NZKA SUl:veY*
Planted Area (ha)
2-4 4-8 8-12 >12
364 210 60
55 32 9 4
NZKA Registered Growers
Planted Area (ha)
<2 2-5 >5
1,664 Iv 775 831 4,270
39 42 19
Totals
25 659
100
100
* '!his survey did not include growers with less than 2 hectares of
kiwifruit.
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Evidence of developments in fann size and structure from the united
states and New Zealand Wicate a trend towards a bi-modal
distribution of small and larger fann sizes with a decline in the
medium size, single-oNI'ler fanner (Fail:weather, 1985). 'Ibis trend was
in part fostered by declining retunls and the need for fanns to
utilise economies of scale or go part-ti.Ire and utilise both off and
on-fann income. 'nlese patterns may well eventuate with kiwifruit.
Small holdings may be able to survive the era of diminishing retmns
by drawing upon off-orchard income. 'nle orchards portion of these
properties may well be a small part of total property value. large
properties can utilise scale economies to lower costs and maintain
adequate retunls. BJdget evidence suggests that medium sized. orchard
(of 4-8 hectares) are rapidly becoming uneconomic and the inability to
service debt may force these growers either to lease the orchard out
or sell the kiwifruit portion of the property. It is not clear who
will be buying the large number of freehold sales, but if other
sectors are i.rx:li.cative, it could well be existing growers and/or
business operations interested. in expandirq scale or throughput of
their enterprises. Bi-modal distribution of orchard size and
increasing separation of owners and factors of production represent
plausible future scenarios for kiwifruit orchard structures.
Marketing
With large increases in exports and in competing supplies, the
marketing of kiwifruit has become increasingly complex. A major
review of industIy marketing has been recently completed. and we will
eschew this type of effort.
'Ihree areas of in:1ustry concern will be briefly discussed. as they
relate to other content in this paper. 'nlese are: the degree of
competition between exporters, risk management and product
differentiation.
Recently a number of public and private individuals, as well as the
in:1ustry review (NZKA, 1988) have suggested. that a single desk or
monopoly seller be instituted in the interim for the in:1ustry. 'n1is
would be a large departure from the multiple exporter arrangement at
present. Reasons put forth for this change include duplication of
efforts among exporters, and perceived. inability to respond to
changing market conditions.
Economic theo:ry POStulates that a monopolist can best extract rents
from a market when demand is relatively inelastic. 'nle effectiveness
of a monopolist in exploiting the demand cw::ve, ie with control of
supplies, is reduced. when demand is more elastic. OUr analysis
indicates that demand for New Zealand kiwifruit was more inelastic
when the share of world production was larger and total export volmnes
were lower. It is apparent that foreign demand is currently becoming
increasingly elastic. Working from these basic premises we suggest
that a monopolist may not be more effective in extracting rents in the
current marketing envirornnent. We do recognise that a monopolist is
better able to capture the benefits of promotional and re.search
activity than a multiple desk selling arrangement. However,
co-operation between exporters, with a statutory marketing body
providing these activities, may achieve the same objectives.
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Further a rationalisation of exporters (currently going from 7 to 4 or
possibly 2) appears to be already urrler way. '!be transaction costs of
encouraging efficiency along current stru.ctura.l lines may be
substantially less than a major overt1al1 of the marketing operations.
A floating exchange rate and irrlications of protectionism abroad are
two of the factors increasing the risks in marketing kiwifruit. As
mentioned above, exchange rate variation means exports may have to
forward contract anijor cover sales. A risk to exporters is the
possibility of the European Cornmlmity instituting a reference price
system. While initial proposals have been rejected, a real
possibility of reference prices, countervailing duties and possibly
quotas being applied to imports exists in the future. '!be rapid
emergence of EC supplies and competing Southern hemisphere supplies
may instigate this system. since 50 percent of New Zealarxi exports
currently go into Europe, management of this situation will become
increasingly critical.
Kiwifruit has been sold in a very upmarket fashion, catering to higher
income consumers with tidy packaging and near flawless fruit quality.
As fruit is purd1ased increasingly through conventional channels, the
current marketing strategy may have to change to reflect differential
price and income elasticities of demand in various markets. '!he
split-market approach to marketing may be necessary to more properly
align product costs with mcu:ginal returns. An example of this
strategy is the "choice" grade fruit marketed to Australia this year
where semi-perfect fruit are shipped in larger containers in order to
capture middle market returrls.
Given the product volumes and degree of competition, the choices of
marketing strategy will be important to market returns and to minimise
price variation over the coming years.
Policy Implications
What, if any, are the iInplications for public policy from developments
in the kiwifruit i.ndustJ:y? Possible areas of social and economic
concern include debt loads, regional economic issues and marketing
structures.
It is apparent that the kiwifruit i.ndustJ::y is canying a sizeable debt
burden and that many growers are facing increasing difficulties in
servicing this debt. However, there is no clear cut reason why
anything should be done with public monies to save the kiwifruit
fanner from insolveney. Many growers bought properties during a
speculative boom when property values were high. How are these
irrlividuals any different than those who invested in Judge Co:rp
shares? Nor are kiwifruit fanners a cultural institution. '!hey have
assumed the risk of the invesbnent so why should the taxpayer help in
retiring debt or vines because the invesbnent has gone bad?
More ominous is the possible iInpacts of a downtunl in the i.ndustJ::y on
the Bay of Plenty economy where the majority of production occurs.
'!he region has enjoyed a boom period along with the i.ndustJ::y, but
signs of economic strain are already evident in kiwifruit centres such
as Te Puke. As spending by orchardists declines regional income and
employment will fall. '!his may have a circular iInpact on orchards as
off-fann employment becomes harder to obtain, further worsening
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orchardists' cashflCMS. '!he possible use of economic policies to
offset this downturn are subject to the current free market
orientation of the Labour goverrnnent and the fact that there is no
compelling reason vmy tne region should be supported vmile others,
feeling the squeeze of a depressed roral sector, are not.
.Another possible in:lu.sb:y strategy would be to restrict supply either
through market withdrawals or through vine removal schemes. Neither
of these options would be very effective as foreign deman:l is elastic.
Further, any benefits of supply reductions would PartlY accrue to our
competitors•
Conclusions
'!he dynamics of the New Zealand kiwifruit in:lu.sb:y confo:rm closely to
the product development cycle. Prior to 1978 plantings and production
were relatively small in magnitude, with a consequently slow growth in
supply. Foreign demand increased relative to supplies, creating
excess demand. '!his, coupled with high rates of assistance, fuelled a
planting boom vmich drove up factor values and created a general
development euphoria in the in:lu.sb:y.
ruring this expansion phase in the late 1970's and early 1980's, the
demand CUl:Ve for New Zealand kiwifruit shifted outwards. With the
relatively small volume of fruit on the market this outward shift was
sufficient to maintain or increase real returns to growers. However
our analysis indicates these preference/income induced shifts in
demand are stabilising. '!his is consistent with the maturation stage
of the product cycle. Kiwifruit is losing its unique consumer status
and bUOYant demand in overseas markets, and becoming a nonna! good.
As demand matures, income elasticities will decrease with tiIne, and
cross-price elasticities will increase and as a consequence export
prices will become increasingly elastic with respect to volume
changes. '!he result of these changes is that New Zealand is
increasingly becoming a price taker unless it is possible to
differentiate our product from other suppliers.
'!he increase in area of kiwifruit has only just begun to stabilise,
but production lags are such that overall quantity supplied from these
increased plantings will continue to rise until around 1992-1993.
Equally significant is that other countries are rapidly increasing
their plantings of kiwifruit. World forecasts of kiwifruit production
indicate output will increase dramatically over the next 7-8 years,
even if acreage were to level, accentuating New Zealand's grower and
marketing problems. other Southern hemisphere countries will compete
directly with NZ supplies, vmile Northern hemisphere supplies will
mean that kiwifruit is available year round in our major markets, that
is the fruit is becoming "cormnodified". '!his will move NZ further
down the demand CUl:Ve and remove any early season premiums that
exporters have been able to obtain.
'!he maturation of the kiwifruit markets has caught many exporters and
growers by surprise. Economic rents have declined or even dissipated,
exp:>sing many in the in:lu.sb:y to financial difficulties. Growers have
seen gross margins and consequently, land values decline, causing a
severe debt-equity situation.
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Exporters were likewise squeezed by falling returns, forcing an
ongoing rationalisation of operations. 'lhese developments are a
natural (but painful) part of the product development cycle. It
should come as no major surprise that the maturity phase is beginningo
PeJ:haps the only surprise is that the industry reached this stage
earlier than same observers had anticipated.
A number of options do exist by which the industry can maintain or
improve retmns in the face of an increasingly competitive market
place. Many of these options involve improving the efficiency a.rrljor
effectiveness of marketing operations (fann gate through to foreign
markets). Growers are unlikely to be at a minimum average cost
situation as of yet, and. lowering production costs a.rrljor increasing
output could increase net retmns. Furthennore, the average kiwifruit
orchard of 3-5 hectares may prove uneconomic in the lol1CJ tenn. '!his
will force operations to consolidate with a possible dichotomy in the
ownership pattern of orchards.
Given the projections for a large Chilean presence in the market place
by 1991-92, New Zealand has a two to three year window of opportunity
to institute necessary marketing and production changes prior to the
serious competition. Chile has a cost and seasonal advantage in
producing fruit. New Zealand can adjust to make its exports more
competitive or differentiable, but this must be done soon before
incentives are lost. It is not clear from available evidence that a
move to a single desk (monopoly) seller can best achieve a
rationalised system able to adapt and survive in a competitive, risky
market place. A rationalisation of current export operations may be
more ~ent, involve fewer transactions costs and offer more
industry flexibility in the near tenn.
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